JUDGMENT 1. In the suit out of which this appeal arises, the Plaintiffs sued for damages for breach of contract of sale. The Defendant-Appellant contracted to buy the ancestral share of the Plaintiffs in a certain property for Rs. 7,200, to be paid on the 3rd of September 1898 agreeing at the same time that if they failed to perform their part of the contract, it would be competent to the Plaintiffs to re-sell. The Plaintiffs accordingly on such failure on the part of the Defendant re-sold the property in question, together with another share which they had acquired in the same Mouzah. After deducting the value of the acquired share, they sued the Defendant-Appellant for damages calculated on the difference between the price at which he had agreed to purchase and the price at which they ultimately sold. 2. The Plaintiffs obtained a modified decree for something short of the amount claimed by them. 3. The Defendant appealed to the District Judge ; but his appeal was dismissed. 4. In this second appeal it has been urged before us: first, that the Plaintiffs are not entitled to damages at all, without showing that they gave notice to the Defendant-Appellant and called upon him to fulfil his part of the contract, giving him notice that on his failing to do so, they would resell the property; and, secondly, that damages have been calculated on a wrong principle (1) in that the true market-value of the property should have been ascertained, with reference to its profits, for comparison with the price at which it has been sold, and (2) that it should not have been assumed that the ancestral share and the acquired share bore the same relative value. 5. On the first point we have been referred to the provisions of sec. 107 of the Contract Act, as containing the direction of law upon which the Plaintiffs should have acted. It is sufficient to point to the terms of the agreement, whereby it was expressly and unconditionally provided that on his failure to pay the consideration-money and complete the purchase by the date fixed, it should be open to the Plaintiffs to execute a deed of sale in favour of some other person. In the face of the express stipulation the general rule does not apply. 6. In the face of the express stipulation the general rule does not apply. 6. With regard to the other contention we think that the measure of damages was obviously the difference between the price at which the Defendant-Appellant contracted to purchase and the price ultimately obtained by the Plaintiffs-Respondents. It has been suggested that the application of this principle leads to great injustice in a case of the re-sale being for a mere nominal price. No inadequacy of price has been alleged in the present instance. The statement on this subject in the appeal of the Defendant-Appellant was that the Plaintiffs committed fraud by receiving a larger amount than that which was actually entered in the sale-deed evidencing the second transaction; but it does not appear that this allegation was in any way substantiated. Of course, if it be shown that the Plaintiffs had fraudulently sold the property for an inadequate consideration, the Defendant-Appellant could not be held liable to the extent of the difference between the two prices; but that is not the state of things with which we have to deal in this case. 7. With regard to the other point it has not been distinctly stated, up to the present time, that the ancestral share and the acquired share did not bear the same relative value. The details of the transaction were clearly set forth in the plaint. So that the Defendant-Appellant had every opportunity of taking this objection, if there had been any substance in it. Altogether we think that this appeal is groundless and we accordingly dismiss it with costs.