JUDGMENT 1. This case concerns an order passed by a Magistrate under sec. 449 of the Calcutta Municipal Act (III, B. C., of 1899) on a reference from the General Committee. The order of the Magistrate directs the demolition of a certain building which he has found has been made in contravention of the terms of the Act, inasmuch as no special sanction, such as he has held was required by that law, had been obtained. The building was undoubtedly commenced in March 1899 before the Municipal Act of that year came into operation, and, consequently, if any sanction was necessary, it would be a sanction under the former Municipal Act (II of 1888). The Petitioner contends that on previous occasions he applied for sanction to erect this particular building and, inasmuch as no order had been passed by the Municipal Commissioners within the prescribed period, he was entitled to erect it without sanction. The Magistrate has, however, found that on every previous occasion the application made for any sanction in respect of the erection of any buildings connected with these premises had been refused. We have, therefore, to consider how far the acts of the Petitioner in commencing a building in March 1899, before the present Municipal Act came into operation, required a sanction under that Act so as to make him liable to be called upon to remove that building by an order passed by the Magistrate under sec. 449, or whether, on the other hand, he is liable only under the Municipal Act of 1888 and not under the Act of 1899. It seems to us, after hearing the arguments of learned counsel, that this case does not come within the provisions of the Act of 1899. That Act relates only to acts done after the commencement of that Act, that is to say, after the 1st April 1900. That appears clear from the terms of the Act itself, in regard to which we may refer to sec. 363, to the definition of the term "re-erection" contained in sec. 3 (39), as well as to the terms of sec. 369 which have special reference to acts done before and after the commencement of the Act. But in addition to this we find that this is a matter expressly provided for by the Bengal General Clauses Act (I of 1899), sec. 3 (39), as well as to the terms of sec. 369 which have special reference to acts done before and after the commencement of the Act. But in addition to this we find that this is a matter expressly provided for by the Bengal General Clauses Act (I of 1899), sec. 8, which saves the operation of a repealed Act in matters such as now before us. We cannot also agree with the argument addressed to us that the acts of the Petitioner come within Sch. XVII of the Municipal Act of 1899. It seems to us that the terms of the rule to which our attention has been drawn do not in any way vary the general intention of the Act, which is to provide for acts done after the Act came into operation, and we may here say that we include within this intention acts done to complete a building commenced before the Act came into force. In our opinion the terms of sec. 449 (3) do not touch the matter before us, inasmuch as they relate to things done in breach of sec. 391, and sec. 391 does not relate to the alteration of, or addition to a building commenced before the Act of 1899 came into operation. The question then arises whether a sanction under the Act (II, B. C., of 1888) was necessary, that is to say, whether in erecting this particular building a sanction was necessary within the terms of sec. 236 of that Act. It seems that there was a building on these premises and that the building which forms now the subject of objection before us was a detached building, that is to say, it was a building standing on a site altogether unconnected with the previous building belonging to the Petitioner. It is objected on behalf of the Petitioner that such a building is not an alteration of the structure of the house already existing so as to come within the terms of sec. 236, but the erection of a new building. It is objected on behalf of the Petitioner that such a building is not an alteration of the structure of the house already existing so as to come within the terms of sec. 236, but the erection of a new building. It seems to us, however, that the words of that section "material alteration of the structure of any house" contemplate the erection of anything on a site attached to, or detached from, any building standing on it so as to alter the structure of the house, that is to say, of the house with all buildings standing on that site, and they do not necessarily refer only to an alteration in the building used as a house or residence. It is not shown that the Petitioner ever made an application to the Commissioners under sec. 236 for permission to erect this building. Consequently, as no limitation is laid down within which such permission should have been applied for or received, he may be liable to action within the terms of sec. 241, but that section does not authorize any proceedings before a Magistrate such as are before us. The Magistrate can deal only with a case which comes within the Municipal Act of 1899, and in this view we think that the order made must be set aside.