JUDGMENT 1. The two Appellants in these cases have been convicted by the Deputy Commissioner of Sonhati under special powers as a Magistrate conferred by sec. 30, Cr. P. C., and they have been sentenced, Amir Khan to transportation for seven years and Mati Sheik to rigorous imprisonment for five years. In regard to Mati Sheik (Appellant in No. 426), we think that the evidence is clear. He has twice confessed to the Magistrate and some shoes which were identified by his father as belonging to him were found not far from the house which was attacked. In addition to this, we have the evidence of his father that +he was absent on the night on which the dacoity took place and that he returned on the following morning with a considerable sum of money which he made over to his father. 2. Against Amir Khan (Appellant in No. 422) the case, in our opinion, has not been properly established. He is said to have been recognized by two persons at the time of the dacoity. He is also mentioned by an approver witness. There are further statements made by the witnesses Khodabuksh and Jumman to which reference will shortly be made. Now, in regard to the evidence of identification, we think that it cannot be safely relied upon. The old lady, the owner of the house attacked, professes to give a most circumstantial account of the manner in which the dacoity was committed. We find ourselves unable to believe that she could have seen all that she professes to describe so accurately. Amongst other details, she mentions a tall man who, after his arrest, is recognized by her as the man who was the ringleader of the dacoits. Another witness professes to give the same evidence. We think that it would not be safe to convict Amir Khan on such evidence. Then we have the evidence of the approver. We find that this man, together with the two Appellants Amir Khan and Mati Sheik, was arrested by the Police on the 8th March and admittedly they were in police-custody until the 14th by various orders passed by the Magistrate sanctioning their detention in such custody. After Uma Sonari who confessed on the 8th was returned on the 14th to the Magistrate, he was kept up to the time of the trial in the custody of the Court Sub-Inspector. After Uma Sonari who confessed on the 8th was returned on the 14th to the Magistrate, he was kept up to the time of the trial in the custody of the Court Sub-Inspector. Now this custody was, as a matter of fact, a police-custody and as we learn from the evidence of the Court Sub-Inspector himself, it was the custody of a police-officer who had taken part in the investigation. It is impossible to attach any weight to evidence obtained under such circumstances. We further observe that the Magistrate who held the first proceedings from time to time sanctioned the detention under police-custody under sec. 167 (2), Cr. P. C., without recording any reasons such as are required by law. The police-officer in the first instance asked for a remand for two days "as the accused will have to be taken to the place of occurrence for individually pointing out the places of their action and journey and also for their identification in the village." The reasons stated by the police-officer were obviously insufficient. 3. There was no object to be gained by requiring these men to point out the places through which they passed on their way to commit the dacoity and their identification by witnesses could be best obtained before the Magistrate. The next report of the police-officer asking for sanction to further detention in police-custody requests that the time might be extended for three days more to enable him to finish his inquiry. The result was that these persons had been in police-custody for six days without any reasons being given by the Magistrate under whose authority they were so kept and without the existence of any special circumstance requiring this exception to be made. In the order-sheet we find that in granting their detentions in police-custody, the Magistrate merely states that "they were to complete the inquiry as requested by the Sub-Inspector." The Magistrate has laid himself open to censure for thus having violated the law for the reason stated by him for sanctioning detention in police-custody is really no reason inasmuch as it could be given in every case and it allows what the law expressly declares shall not be permitted except for some special cause. 4. 4. In ragard to the detention in police-custody of an accused who had confessed and had been admitted or was likely to be admitted as an approver, it is clear that any evidence that he might afterwards give must be open to the greatest suspicion that the Police have arranged his statements so as to fit in with any evidence that they may have obtained elsewhere. In this particular case, with the exception of the Identification of the two witnesses in the house, there is really no corroboration of the statement of the approver witness in respect to Amir Khan. Khodabuksh who is apparently a police informer states that he was required by the Police to make inquiries into what was termed the North Bank Dacoity. In the course of his inquiries, he asked Amir Khan and was told by him that they were about to commit the dacoity which forms the subject of the trial before us and although this was several days or perhaps weeks before this occurrence, it does not appear that this witness ever gave any information to the Police. We do not believe Khodabuksh in reference to this incident. Jumman, the father of Mati Sheik, states as has been already mentioned, that Mati was absent on the night of the dacoity and he further states that Mati returned on the following morning with Amir Khan who lives next door and lastly that Mati gave him a considerable sum of money. Now, although he states that Amir Khan was with Mati, he was unable to say that Amir Khan spoke to him or Mati in connection with their return together or the payment of the money. This evidence is, we think, too weak to stand alone in convicting Amir Khan. We dismiss the appeal of Mati, but we consider that, on the evidence, Amir Khan cannot be safely convicted, we accordingly direct his release. In conclusion, it is necessary to say something regarding the nature of the proceedings taken. They were conducted for several days by a Magistrate exercising powers of the first class and from their commencement, there were an inquiry in regard to the offence of dacoity, an offence triable only by a Court of Session. In conclusion, it is necessary to say something regarding the nature of the proceedings taken. They were conducted for several days by a Magistrate exercising powers of the first class and from their commencement, there were an inquiry in regard to the offence of dacoity, an offence triable only by a Court of Session. The Magistrate who was bound by law either to discharge or commit the accused to the Court of Session, after taking all the evidence, made over the case to the Deputy Commissioner who, by reason of the powers conferred under sec. 30, C. C. P., had jurisdiction to deal with the case as a Magistrate. The reason given for this seems to have been that he had no jurisdiction to hold the trial. That must have been obvious from the very commencement of his proceedings for no other offence but dacoity or offences triable only by the Court of Sessions was under inquiry ; and although he may have had no jurisdiction to hold the trial he had jurisdiction to commit the accused to the Court of Session or to discharge them and therefore, so far as any Magistrate of the first class could act, to deal finally with the case. The proceedings taken by this Magistrate of the first class in making over this case to the Deputy Commissioner were as if he were committing to a Court of Session. The Magistrate in our opinion had no authority to act in this way. He had authority only to commit to a Court of Session. Sec. 346 does not in our opinion apply to such a case. We would further point out that the object of conferring special powers on District Magistrates is to accelerate proceedings at the trial by avoiding the delay consequent on commitment to the Sessions Court which sits only at considerable intervals. It is also intended to afford relief to those who have to attend as witnesses in the Court. In the present case the witnesses had to attend unnecessarily twice and must have been detained several days in the two Courts. Under such circumstances we think that the proceedings such as we have described are altogether without authority of law. The Appellants have, however, not been prejudiced by the trial held by the Deputy Commissioner who had jurisdiction to hold the trial.