JUDGMENT Hill, J. and Prinsep, J. - The Appellant in this case is the holder of a decree obtained by him on the 6th June 1899 upon a mortgage against certain of the Respondents. The decree was in the form prescribed by sec. 88 of the Transfer of Property Act for the sale of the mortgaged property, and at the time when the order was passed against which this appeal has been preferred there was due under it a sum of considerably more than two leas of rupees. Pending the suit on the mortgage the mortgagors had conveyed to two persons Sukhan Singh and Banki Behari Singh a large portion of the mortgaged property by deeds of sale, dated respectively the 6th and 24th March 1899, and out of the purchase-money for the earlier conveyance they left a sum of Rs. 77,500 in the hands of the purchasers to be paid to the mortgagee in reduction of the mortgage debt. On the 21st February 1900 and before the mortgagee had taken any steps to procure an order absolute for sale under sec. 89 of the Transfer of Property Act, the judgment-debtors and their vendees brought this sum of Rs. 77,500 into Court petitioning the Court (by separate petitions) that they might be allowed to deposit it in Court, and that it might be applied towards the liquidation of the amount due under the decree. The petition of the judgment-debtors went on to pray that the properties purchased by Sukhan Singh and Banki Behari Singh might be exempted from sale under the decree, and that certain properties mentioned in one of the schedules to the petition might, in the event of a sale becoming-necessary, be first sold, and then other properties in the possession of the Petitioners--they undertaking that if the whole of the decretal amount should not be thereby satisfied, they would pay the remaining amount immediately. Notice of these petitions was served on the decree-holder, and on the 14th March he put in his answer, which, in so far as it is now material, was to the effect that he was unable to receive a part of the decretal amount and consent to the release of the properties sold to Sukhan Singh and Banki Behari Singh ; but that if the judgment-debtors and their vendees agreed to forego the release of those properties he had no objection to receiving the sum brought into Court in part satisfaction of his decree. Neither the judgment-debtors nor their vendees however agreed to this proposal, and on the 2nd June 1900 the matter came before the Subordinate Judge for disposal. The Subordinate Judge, while refusing at that stage, that is to say, before an order absolute for sale had been made, to deal with the question of the order in which the mortgaged properties should be brought to sale, held that the decree-holder was bound under the law to take away the sum deposited in Court by the judgment-debtors in part satisfaction of his decree, and that the interest on that amount should cease from the date of deposit. He also ordered that the parties should bear their own costs. It is against this order that the present appeal has been preferred and I cannot help saying that it seems to me much to be regretted that in a case of this kind a period of nearly two years from the date of the order appealed against should have been allowed to elapse before the appeal was brought to a hearing. Upon the merits it appears to me that the order is wrong in more than one particular and indeed Dr. Asutosh Mukerjee who appeared for the Respondents conceded that he was unable to support it. He relied however on an objection to the competency of the appeal to which it is now necessary to refer. The question whether the appeal lies depends on whether the order of the learned Subordinate Judge is a decree in the sense of the definition contained in sec. 2of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is certainly an order, which in the language of that section, determines a question mentioned or referred to in sec. The question whether the appeal lies depends on whether the order of the learned Subordinate Judge is a decree in the sense of the definition contained in sec. 2of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is certainly an order, which in the language of that section, determines a question mentioned or referred to in sec. 244, for it determines a question relating to the discharge or satisfaction of the decree, and it consequently falls strictly within the definition. But it was argued that the orders contemplated by sec. 2 are orders made by the Court which is given by sec. 244 jurisdiction over the matters provided for by that section, that is to say, by a Court executing a decree, or in other words a Court to which a formal application for the enforcement of a decree has been made by the decree-holder, and reference was made in support of this argument to see 258 where a distinction is drawn between the Court executing a decree and the Court whose duty it is to execute it. I think however if the language of the definition of sec. 2 be not conclusive that where a Court is dealing, as the Court in the present case was dealing, with a question relating to the discharge or satisfaction of a decree, it may be said to be executing the decree in the sense of sec. 244 although no formal application for execution may have been made to it, and this view derives support from the case of Rangji v. Bhaiji I. L. R. 11 Bom. 57 (1886) and Lingayya v. Naranmha I. L. R. 14 Mad. 99 (1890) In my opinion, therefore, the objection to the appeal fails. 2. With respect to the merits of the case it appears unnecessary to say anything, as it has been conceded by the learned vakil for the Respondents as already mentioned, and I think rightly, that the order of the lower Court is erroneous in law and cannot be sustained. The appeal ought accordingly, I think to be decreed with costs. I would assess the hearing fee in this Court at 5 gold mohurs.