JUDGMENT 1. These rules Nos. 959 and 1028 arise out of the same judgment of the Sessions Judge in a case in which the Petitioners were tried together, and they are practically identical in terms except in one particular. It will be convenient therefore to dispose of them together. The Petitioner in Rule 959 Sarat Chandra Shah Chowdhry holds an 8 anna share in the Parasdanga zemindary in the district of Pabna known as the Chota taraf while the Petitioners in Rule 1028 Gobinda Nath Shah Chowdhry and Prasannath Shah Chowdhry are the owners of the remaning 8 annas share, known as the Bara taraf. 2. It appears that on the 18th April 1901 a riot took place at a village named Bhanjara and on the following day another riot took place at another village named Katanga, and it is alleged that the adherents of the two tarafs were arrayed on opposite sides in these riots. There is no question that at that time the Bara taraf and Chota taraf were on very bad terms, and disputes were going on with regard to the collection of rent. 3. Prosecutions were instituted against a number of persons alleged to have taken part in the riots, but these resulted in the acquittal of all the persons charged. 4. After, and it has been suggested in consequence of the failure to obtain the conviction of any one in respect of the riots, charges were laid on the 1st November 1901 at the Thana under secs. 150, 154, 155 and 157 of the Indian Penal Code against the three shareholders representing the Bara and Chota tarafs jointly with one Tarak Nath Mozumdar, the Naib of the Chota taraf, A prosecution followed at Pabna, but it was transferred to Kustea and was there tried by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate. 5. There were two sets of charges under each section, one dealing with the riot at Katanga and the other with the riot at Bhangara. Eventually on the 30th July 1902 Tarak Nath Mozumdar was acquitted on all the charges on the ground that there was no evidence that he was present at either riot. The other accused persons were acquitted of the charges under secs. 150 and 157 of the Indian Penal Code but were convicted of the offences under secs. Eventually on the 30th July 1902 Tarak Nath Mozumdar was acquitted on all the charges on the ground that there was no evidence that he was present at either riot. The other accused persons were acquitted of the charges under secs. 150 and 157 of the Indian Penal Code but were convicted of the offences under secs. 154 and 155, Indian Penal Code, in respect of each riot and sentenced to pay fines aggregating in each case Rs. 2,000. 6. Although the sections under which the convictions were passed render the owner or occupier of land where an unlawful assembly is held or a riot takes place liable for certain acts or omissions in cases where "he or his agent or manager" knowing or having reason to believe that such unlawful assembly or riot is taking place or has taken place or is likely to take place. The charges framed by the Magistrate of Kustea and upon which the accused were tried, referred only to the knowledge or belief, and acts or omissions of the accused themselves and not of their agents or managers, the words "or their agents or managers" being omitted from the charges. It is important to refer to this matter because the Magistrate has found that the zemindars themselves were not present, and had no knowledge as to the riots, and that the acts or omissions within the terms of the sections were the acts or omissions of their agents or managers, holding that it was sufficient if it were shown that the agents or managers acted negligently, and it is clear that it was for the acts or omissions of the latter that the accused were convicted. On appeal the Sessions Judge held that the accused had been prejudiced in consequence of a number of irregularities at the trial, amongst which were the holding of a joint trial of the contending shareholders, the joint trial of separate offences committed in respect of two riots committed at different places on different days, the refusal of the Magistrate to allow the accused to recall or resummon and examine certain witnesses, and the treatment of the charges as if they had reference not only to the acts or omissions of the accused themselves but of their agents or managers. He was of opinion that by reason of the omission to insert the words "or their agents or managers" in the charges the accused had been seriously prejudiced in their defence. He considered the case stronger than that of Behari Mahton v. Queen-Empress I. L. R. 11 Cal. 106(1884). "The charges," he said, "do not speak of agents. But it is for their agent's acts and omissions that the accused are punished." On these grounds he set aside the convictions and sentences and he directed that the Appellants before him should be retried. 7. He directed that the members of the Bara taraf should be retried under sec. 154, Indian Penal Code, and that Sarat Chandra Shah Chowdhry should be retried under secs. 154 and 155, I. P. C, all of them in respect of both riots--the two latter jointly and the first separately--separate trials in each case to be held as to the offences in respect of each riot. 8. The Sessions Judge notwithstanding that he held the original trial was had, and that the convictions could not be sustained, entered into a consideration of the evidence, with reference to the charges as framed. In his judgment he mentions that the Government pleader had admitted before him that the prosecution had not been able to bring home the charges to the zemindars on account of their own acts and omissions but only on account of those of their agents and he appears to have concurred in this view. 9. Two rules were granted by this Court, one at the instance of the members of the Bara taraf and the other at the instance of Sarat Chandra Shah Chowdhry to show cause why the order of the Sessions Judge should not be set aside on the grounds (1) that the Appellate Court had no power under the law to order a retrial, and (2) that having regard to all the circumstances of the case no retrial ought to have been ordered. 10. It has been contended that under sec. 423 (b) of the Criminal Procedure Code an Appellate Court has no power to order a retrial except in cases when the previous trial has been held by a Court which had no jurisdiction, and we have been referred to sec. 284 of the Criminal Procedure Code of 1872 from which it would appear that the words in sec. 423 (b) of the Criminal Procedure Code an Appellate Court has no power to order a retrial except in cases when the previous trial has been held by a Court which had no jurisdiction, and we have been referred to sec. 284 of the Criminal Procedure Code of 1872 from which it would appear that the words in sec. 423 (b) of the present Code "order him to be retried by a Court of competent jurisdiction subordinate to such Appellate Court" have been borrowed. It is said that having regard to the origin of these words it must be taken that they apply only to an order for a retrial in a case where the original trial was bad on the ground of want of jurisdiction on the part of the Magistrate who tried the case. 11. In dealing with the interpretation of an Act intended to codify a particular branch of the law "the proper course" it was said by Lord Herschell in the Bank of England v. Vagliano L. R. Cr. C. 107 (1891) "is in the first instance to examine the language of the statute and to ask what is its natural meaning uninfluenced by any considerations derived from the previous state of the law and not to start with enquiry how the law previously stood." Examining the language of the section it appears to us that there is nothing in sec. 423 (b) to limit the power of an Appellate Court to direct a retrial to cases in which the trying Magistrate had no jurisdiction. In this view we are supported by the cases of Satis Chandra Das Bose v. Empress 4 C. W. N. 166 : s. c. I. L. R. 27 Cal. 172 (1899), Queen-Empress v. Maula Bakhsh I. L. R 15 All. 205 (1893) and Empress v. Jabanulla I. L. R. 23 Cal. 975 (1896). In one case Gobinda Pershad Panday 5 C. W. N. 819 : s. c. I. L. R. 28 Cal. 63 (1900), it was doubted whether an Appellate Court had under sec. 423 (b) a general power to order a new trial but the question did not really arise. 12. 975 (1896). In one case Gobinda Pershad Panday 5 C. W. N. 819 : s. c. I. L. R. 28 Cal. 63 (1900), it was doubted whether an Appellate Court had under sec. 423 (b) a general power to order a new trial but the question did not really arise. 12. Apart from these circumstances we think that the Sessions Judge was under the special circumstances of the case empowered by sec 232, Criminal Procedure Code, to direct a retrial to be had upon a charge framed in whatever manner he thought fit, on the ground that the accused had been misled in their defence by the absence of a charge or a defect in the charges. 13. It has also been contended that the Magistrate having based his decision upon the knowledge and belief, and the acts and omissions of their agents and not of the accused themselves, his findings in law amount to an acquittal of the offences actually set forth in the charges, as the Sessions Judge was of opinion that upon the charges as framed no conviction could take place, he was not competent to order a retrial upon charges having reference to the agents and managers of the accused as such an order would not be really an order for a retrial but an order for a fresh trial upon other and different charges which had not formed the subject of the previous trial. In such a case it was said it was open to the Crown to institute proceedings in respect of any other offence disclosed and not previously the subject of a charge. It appears to us that argument is met by the answer that the Magistrate did not (though it may be was wrong) acquit the accused on the charges preferred against them, and that the Sessions Judge having held the trial to be bad in law had no occasion to express any opinion upon the facts. Moreover, the Sessions Judge did not, and under the circumstances appearing before him could not, acquit the accused upon the charges as framed, nor did he direct a second trial upon charges not the subject of the previous trial. His order is a general one for a retrial under secs. Moreover, the Sessions Judge did not, and under the circumstances appearing before him could not, acquit the accused upon the charges as framed, nor did he direct a second trial upon charges not the subject of the previous trial. His order is a general one for a retrial under secs. 154 and 155, I. P. C., though it is clear that in his view the charges framed have to be amended so as to have reference to the acts and omissions of the agents of the zemindars. It will be open to the Magistrate to whom the case is remanded for retrial to frame general charges under the sections using apt words with reference not only to the accused but to their agents or managers. 14. In this view we must hold that the order for retrial in this case was not illegal and so far the rule must be discharged. We are unable with reference to the second branch of the rule to say that having regard to the circumstances of the case a retrial ought not to have been granted. It is a question for the Crown to determine whether in view of the fact that the riots which gave rise to the prosecution occurred on the 19th and 20th April 1901, it is desirable to proceed with the trials now ordered. 15. In the case of Rule 959 there was a third branch, namely, to show case why if the retrial is to take place it should not be directed to be held by some competent Court other than the Court which tried the Petitioner in the first instance. By inadvertence this was omitted from the other rule. In our opinion we think it is very desirable that the trials should be held by some other Magistrate if they are to be proceeded with and we direct that they be sent to the Magistrate of Nuddia District to try them himself or make them over to some Magistrate competent to try them other than the Magistrate indicated. This direction will apply to both cases. Subject as above the rules will be discharged.