JUDGMENT 1. This appeal arises out of a suit brought by the Plaintiff-Respondent for recovery of khas possession of certain land, on the allegation that the Defendants had wrongfully kept him out of possession thereof. The defence, so far as it is necessary to consider it for the purposes of this appeal, is that the Defendants were tenants on the land and purchased it from the former tenants, who had transferable rights in the same, and that the suit of the Plaintiff was not maintainable. 2. The first Court found for the Defendants, and dismissed the suit. 3. On appeal by the Plaintiff, the lower Appellate Court held that the Plaintiff's right to the land was established and that the Defendants had failed to show that they had acquired any valid right by their purchase from the former tenants, or that they had been recognised an tenants by the landlord. 4. In second appeal it is contended on behalf of the Defendants-Appellants, first, that the Court of Appeal below ought to have held that when it was proved that the Defendants' vendors had held the lands at a rate of rent which had not been changed for twenty years, the presumption referred to in sub-sec. (2) of sec. 50 of the Bengal Tenancy Act arose, and the holding ought to have been treated as one at a fixed rent, and therefore transferable under secs. 18 and 11 of that Act, and that the Defendants ought to be held to have acquired a valid right therein ; secondly, that the lower Appellate Court ought also to have held that the Defendants had been recognised as tenants by acceptance of rent from them by the landlord and that this suit, not having been brought by or on behalf of all the joint landlords, was not maintainable according to the provisions of sec. 188 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. 5. In support of the first contention we were referred to the case of Dulhin Golab Koeri v. Bulla Kurmi 2 C. W. N. 580: S. C. I. L. R. 25 Cal. 744 (1898) as showing that the presumption under sec. 50 should be given effect to, not merely in suits for rent but also in other classes of suits. That may be so far quite true; but sec. 50, sub-sec. 744 (1898) as showing that the presumption under sec. 50 should be given effect to, not merely in suits for rent but also in other classes of suits. That may be so far quite true; but sec. 50, sub-sec. (2) itself contains an important limitation to the application of the section, for sub-sec. (2) says:--"If it is proved in any suit or other proceeding under this Act that either a tenure-holder or raiyat and his predecessors in interest have held at a rent or rate of rent which has not been changed during the twenty years immediately before the institution of the suit or proceeding, it shall be presumed, until the contrary is shown, that they have held at that rent or rate of rent from the time of the permanent settlement;" thus showing that its application is limited to a suit or proceeding under the Bengal Tenancy Act. The proceeding before the Court in the case of Dulhin Golab Koeri v. Bulla Kurmi 2 C. W. N. 580: S. C. I. L. R. 25 Cal. 744 (1898), though not a suit for rent was a proceeding under Ch. X of the Bengal Tenancy Act: so that there could be no possible objection to sec. 50 applying to that case. But does the suit before us answer the description of being a suit or other proceeding under the Bengal Tenancy Act ? On the face of the plaint it is a suit by the Plaintiff for recovery of possession against certain persons alleged to be trespassers. The Defendants claim to be tenants. If that is made out, the suit would be a suit under the Bengal Tenancy Act, being a suit for ejectment of a tenant. But until that is proved, the suit cannot be said to be a suit or proceeding under that Act. It will therefore have to be made out, independently of sec. 50, that the suit is a suit against tenants. Until that is made out, sec. 50 can have no application to the suit. The view we take is in accordance with that taken by this Court in the case of Nilmani Maitra v. Mathura Nath Joardar 4 C. W. N. n. 159 (1900). 6. 50, that the suit is a suit against tenants. Until that is made out, sec. 50 can have no application to the suit. The view we take is in accordance with that taken by this Court in the case of Nilmani Maitra v. Mathura Nath Joardar 4 C. W. N. n. 159 (1900). 6. This brings us to the consideration of the second point raised in the case, namely, whether the Defendants are shown to have been recognised as tenants by the acceptance of rent from them by the landlord. The lower Appellate Court has answered that question in the negative. The dakhilas upon which the contention of the Defendants is based give the names of the former tenants under the head of "tenant's names" and under that give the name of the purchaser but not as tenant, but as Sarbarahakar, sometimes in full, some times in abbreviated form; and the question is whether these heads can be construed to mean recognition of the Defendants as tenants. We are of opinion that the question must be answered in the negative. It could not be said, as a matter of law, that the terms of the rent receipts imply that the Defendants have been recognised as tenants. The very fact of the old tenant's name occurring under the heading "tenant's names" and the Defendant's name occurring under a different heading, which does not mean tenant or the successor in interest of the former tenant, whatever else it may mean, would go to show that the landlord did not by these receipts mean to recognise the Defendants as his tenants. Several cases have been referred to upon this point. We do not think it necessary to consider them in detail. The rule deducible from those cases, of which we may notice only two, namely, those of Bhojohuree Bunick v. Aka Golam Ali 16 W. R. 97 (1871) and Gaur Lal Sirkar v. Rameswar Bhumik 6 B. L. R. App. 92 (1870), is that the mere fact of rent having been received from a certain person does not amount to a recognition of that person as a tenant. As for the two cases relied upon by the vakeel for the Appellants, namely, Gudadhur Banerji v. Khettur Mohun Surmah 7 W. R. 460 (1867) and Ram Gobind Roy v. Dushoobhoojah Debiee 18 W. R. 195 (1872), those are cases of a very different description. As for the two cases relied upon by the vakeel for the Appellants, namely, Gudadhur Banerji v. Khettur Mohun Surmah 7 W. R. 460 (1867) and Ram Gobind Roy v. Dushoobhoojah Debiee 18 W. R. 195 (1872), those are cases of a very different description. There the transferee deposited rent in the Collectorate in his right as transferee of the holding, and the landlord accepted the money so deposited ; and it was held that that amounted to a recognition of the transfer. In the present case the landlord has in the receipts deliberately refrained from recognising the person who paid the rent as a transferee. We may also in this connection refer to a very recent case, namely, that of Ismail Khan Mahomed v. Kali Krishna Mondol 6 C. W. N. 134 (1901), in support of the view we take. That being so, we think that the Defendants have rightly been held by the Court of Appeal below to have failed to show that they were tenants and that this appeal fails and must be dismissed with costs.