JUDGMENT 1. In this case a rule was issued on the District Magistrate and the opposite party to show cause why the order of the Deputy Magistrate of the 25th January 1900 purporting to be made under sec. 146 of the Criminal Procedure Code should not be set aside. The facts are that there was a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace between the first and second party to these proceedings. The dispute gave rise to proceedings under sec. 145, the property being temporarily attached pending those proceedings. The parties however, instead of fighting the case out before the Magistrate under sec. 145, agreed that the dispute as to who was in possession of the land in question should be settled by an arbitrator, and the Magistrate made an order that the land should be attached under sec. 146, as both parties agreed to this ; and he goes on to add, "they ought to get their dispute settled by arbitration. If they succeed, the land will be released." The parties appear to have gone before the arbitrator, and the arbitrator made an award. The award is a very voluminous document, but we have perused it and we find that the real question which the arbitrator has decided in the award is the question of actual possession, and that was the question which was to be decided between the two parties in order to enable the Magistrate to make a proper order under sec. 145. The Magistrate, or rather the successor of the Magistrate before whom the original proceedings were taken, appears to have been of opinion that the award could only be used by its being filed in the Civil Court and an action brought upon it. 2. We are unable to agree with the view of the case. In our opinion what has happened is this :--The question of possession had to be decided between the parties. The parties agreed that it should be decided by an arbitrator, who should say which of the parties is in possession ; and it appears to us that that having been done the Magistrate was bound to take the finding of fact by the arbitrator into consideration in bringing the proceedings under sec. 145 to their proper and legal termination. 3. 145 to their proper and legal termination. 3. The result therefore is that we cannot make this rule absolute and discharge the order for attachment which remains on the property, but we remand the case to the Magistrate with a direction to him to find which party is in actual possession, and for that purpose to take into consideration the finding of the arbitrator which it was agreed should settle the question at issue between the parties. With these observations the record will be returned to the lower Court.