JUDGMENT Banerjee and Geidt, JJ. - These five appeals, Nos. 84, 138, 202, 203 and 240, arise out of certain execution proceedings. 2. Appeals Nos. 84 and 138 are on behalf of the judgment-debtor and raise the following questions, namely, first whether the Court below is right in holding that the decree-holders are entitled to execute their decree notwithstanding certain insolvency proceedings, which resulted in the judgment-debtor being declared insolvent and his property being rateably distributed amongst certain of his creditors; and second whether the Court below is right in holding that execution is not barred by limitation. 3. Upon the first question it is found and that finding has not been successfully impugned, that the moneys for which the decree-holders, Respondents, have taken out execution are not included in the scheduled debts within the meaning of Section 357 of the Code of Civil Procedure. That being so, the insolvency proceedings cannot, in our opinion, be a bar to the present execution.- The view we take is in accordance with that taken by this Court in the case of Haro Pria Dabia v. Shama Charan Sen ILR (1889) Cal. 592; and no reason is shown for our saying that that case was wrongly decided and that the question now raised should be referred to a Full Bench. On the other hand, we may observe that that case has been followed by the Allahabad High Court in the case of Sheoraj Singh v. Gauri Sahai ILR (1899) All. 227. 4. As to the second point the facts are these : after the decree-holders had applied for execution of the decree, the judgment-debtor represented that, as all his property had vested in a Receiver, proceedings in execution could not be carried on and thereupon the Court released from attachment the salary of the judgment-debtor, which had been attached at the instance of the decree-holders. What the decree-holders now ask the Court to do is to re-attach the salary of the judgment-debtor and to allow them to proceed with the execution case originally instituted by them from the point which it had reached and at which it was stopped by the order of the Court. What the decree-holders now ask the Court to do is to re-attach the salary of the judgment-debtor and to allow them to proceed with the execution case originally instituted by them from the point which it had reached and at which it was stopped by the order of the Court. That being so, the present application has rightly been held to be no fresh application for execution, but a mere continuation of the previous application; and the period of limitation applicable to it is that prescribed by Article 178 of the second schedule of the Limitation Act and not by Article 179. If that is so, the application is made within three years from the time when the decree-holders became entitled to ask the Court to revive the former application by reason of the insolvency proceedings having been brought to an end by the discharge of the Receiver. 5. The view we take is amply supported by the cases of Raghunath Sahay Singh v. Lalji Singh ILR (1895) Cal. 397 and Rudra Narain Guria v. Pachu Maity ILR (1896) Cal. 437. 6. Appeals Nos. 84 and 138 must therefore be dismissed with costs. 7. The next appeal is No. 202 of 1901. That is an appeal on behalf of the decree-holder and the point raised in that appeal is whether the Court below was right in holding that execution was barred as against the judgment-debtor No. 2. It is conceded that the present application, as against the judgment-debtor No. 2, must be treated as a fresh application, as no relief was asked for as against him in the previous proceedings. That being so, it must be shown, either that it is made within three years from any of the dates mentioned or referred to in Article 179, or that it comes within Article 178 for some reason other than that of its being a continuation of the previous application. Now, it is not shown that it is made within three years from any of the dates mentioned in Article 179. Now, it is not shown that it is made within three years from any of the dates mentioned in Article 179. It is faintly suggested that it may come under Clause (6) of that article by reason of the clause in the decree which runs in these words * * * "the Plaintiff may refrain from taking out execution of the decree until the disposal of the insolvency petition made by the Defendants or until such time as may be required for that purpose." But it would be difficult to say that this brings the case within Clause (6), which provides for a case "where the application is to enforce any payment which the decree or order directs to be made at a certain date." There is no direction in the decree that any payment is to be made at the date of the disposal of the insolvency petition, or on any other date. 8. It was next contended that the case comes within Article 178, as being a case not provided for by Article 179 or by any other article, by reason of the clause in the decree just mentioned. This raises the question whether that clause can at all have any operative effect. We are of opinion that this question must be answered in the negative. The clause in terms does not restrain the decree-holder from executing his decree until a certain date. It only gives him the liberty to refrain from taking out execution until a certain event, or a date not very certain--a liberty which he always had without any such clause in the decree. It was intended, no doubt, to be in the nature of a recommendation to the decree-holder. Nor can the decree-holder say that, as between him and the judgment-debtor who allowed the decree to contain this clause, he was at all misled by it, because we find from his own showing that he took out execution before the contingency contemplated by the clause happened, notwithstanding the existence of the clause. Appeal No. 202 of 1901 must therefore be dismissed with costs. 9. The next appeal, No. 203 of 1901, is also an appeal by the decree-holder and in this appeal, too, the same question is raised, namely, whether the Court of Appeal below was right in holding that execution was barred. Appeal No. 202 of 1901 must therefore be dismissed with costs. 9. The next appeal, No. 203 of 1901, is also an appeal by the decree-holder and in this appeal, too, the same question is raised, namely, whether the Court of Appeal below was right in holding that execution was barred. The clause in the decree that is here relied upon runs thus * * * "the Plaintiff shall not be able to take out execution of the decree until the disposal of the petition for insolvency made by the Defendants before the District Judge of Patna." Here no doubt the prohibition is imperative. 10. And as for the reasons stated in our judgment in appeal No. 202 just disposed of, the application cannot come under Article 179, it comes under Article 178 of the Second Schedule of the Limitation Act. 11. This view is in accordance with that taken by the Allahabad High Court in the case of Muhammad Islam v. Muhammad Ahsan ILR (1894) All. 237. But although that is so, the question still remains whether the present application was made within three years from the time when the right to make the application first accrued. 12. It is argued for the decree-holder (Appellant) that, that date ought to be taken to be the date of the discharge of the Receiver in the insolvency proceedings, or at any rate of the final decision of the Appellate Court in the insolvency case. 13. On the other hand, it is argued for the Respondent that the view taken by the Court below is right and that that date is the date of the order of the first Court u/s 351 granting the petition for insolvency. 14. We are of opinion that the view taken by the Court below is right. The terms of the clause in the decree relate to the disposal of the petition for insolvency. That petition was u/s 351, Code of Civil Procedure. If the clause was intended to stop execution until the final decision of the insolvency matter, it would have said so. The terms of the clause in the decree relate to the disposal of the petition for insolvency. That petition was u/s 351, Code of Civil Procedure. If the clause was intended to stop execution until the final decision of the insolvency matter, it would have said so. The learned Subordinate Judge who inserted that clause in his decree had his view, so far as we can see from the terms of the clause, limited to the disposal of the case by the Court in which it was pending and which is expressly referred to in the clause though more directly for another purpose. 15. We were asked to take a liberal view of the clause, as it is a clause which is connected with the limitation of the right of the decree-holder to take out execution; but we cannot shut our eyes to another view. If the decree-holder had applied for execution after the disposal of the application by the first Court and the judgment-debtor had urged the objection that he was not competent to do so until the period of appeal had expired, it would certainly have been a sound argument on behalf of the decree-holder to say that his right to take out execution should not be construed to be restrained longer than was necessary under the strict terms of the clause in the decree. Then again, looking to the reason of the thing, we are of opinion that the stay of execution which the order as construed by the Court below would allow, was sufficient for all purposes. If the application for insolvency was refused, there could be no objection to execution being taken out immediately. If it was granted and further stay of execution was necessary, the subsequent proceedings that were followed by the vesting of the property in a Receiver would insure such further stay as might be necessary. So that there is no reason to suppose that the Court which inserted that clause in its decree had any reason for giving to that clause any longer operation than the Court below has construed it to have. 16. For these reasons appeal No. 203 of 1901 must also be dismissed with costs. 17. So that there is no reason to suppose that the Court which inserted that clause in its decree had any reason for giving to that clause any longer operation than the Court below has construed it to have. 16. For these reasons appeal No. 203 of 1901 must also be dismissed with costs. 17. Appeal No. 240 of 1901 has been disposed of by the decision in appeal No. 84 of 1901, the only point involved being whether the present application for execution is barred by limitation. That appeal must, therefore, also be dismissed with costs.