JUDGMENT Banerjee and Geidt, JJ. - This appeal arises out of a suit brought by the Plaintiffs, Respondents, for recovery of possession and mesne profits of a 4-anna-share of a certain mouzah named Fatihpur in darmaurusi jote right under a pottah granted to them by Defendant No. 2, Girija Prosanno Ghose, on the 21st of Falgoon 1301 and for a declaration that the pottah dated the 9th of Falgoon 1301, by virtue of which Defendant No. 1 had dispossessed them, was not executed in the proper way and was void of consideration and inoperative. The defence of Defendant No. 1, who alone put in a written statement, was to the effect that the suit was barred by limitation and that the answering Defendant's pottah was valid and operative and being of a prior date, should prevail against that of the Plaintiffs. 2. The Courts below have held that though the period of limitation applicable to the suit was not 12 years, but 3 years under Article 91 of Schedule II of the Limitation Act, it was not barred, because the facts entitling the Plaintiffs to have the pottah of Defendant No. 1 set aside became known to them within three years before the institution of the suit. On the merits they have concurrently found that the pottah of Defendant No. 1 had not been properly executed and was obtained by fraud and without payment of any consideration. And they have accordingly given the Plaintiffs a decree. 3. In second appeal it is contended for the Appellant, Defendant No. 1, that, upon the facts found as to the Plaintiffs' knowledge of the Defendant's pottah, the Court of Appeal below ought to have held that the suit was barred under Article 91 of Schedule II of the Limitation Act; while, on the other hand, the learned vakil for the Plaintiffs, Respondents, in answer to this contention, urges that the suit being one for recovery of possession of immoveable property and the cancellation of the Defendant's pottah being asked for only as subsidiary relief, the period of limitation applicable to the suit is 12 3-ears and that upon the facts found as to the manner in which the Defendant's pottah was signed and came to the hands of Defendant No. 1, that document was void ab initio and did not require to be set aside. 4. 4. We are of opinion that the Appellant's contention is so far correct that if the period of limitation applicable to the suit is 3 years under Article 91 of Schedule II of the Limitation Act, it is barred according to the finding of the lower Appellate Court to the effect that the Plaintiffs knew of the Defendant's pottah and of the reasons why it was inoperative, more than three years before the suit. We are also of opinion that if the immoveable property covered by the Defendant's pottah could not be recovered until that document was set aside and it was necessary to bring a suit to set it aside, the mere fact of the principal relief asked for in this suit being the recovery of possession of that property could not save it from being barred by limitation. The decision of the Privy Council in the case of Janki Kunwar v. Ajit Singh ILR (1887) Cal. 58 is clear authority on this point and their Lordships' decision in Malkarjun v. Narhari ILR (1900) Bom. 337 : L.R. 27 IndAp 216 also goes in the same direction. 5. But we think the facts found by the lower Appellate Court as to the manner in which the pottah propounded by Defendant No. 1 came to be signed by the grantor and to pass into the possession of the grantee, clearly show that it was a nullity from its inception and was never intended to be operative : it was not a voidable deed, but was one that was void ah initio and so it did not require to be set aside. The passage of the judgment of the Court of Appeal below in which those facts are to be found runs thus: As to the allegation about the lease to the Defendant being a fraudulent transaction, the onus of proving it lay on the Plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs have Bought to discharge this onus by calling Girija Prosanno Ghose and his gomastha, Ishan Chunder Mozumdar, to prove the circumstances under which the lease to the Defendant came to be executed. The Plaintiffs have Bought to discharge this onus by calling Girija Prosanno Ghose and his gomastha, Ishan Chunder Mozumdar, to prove the circumstances under which the lease to the Defendant came to be executed. Their both say that the Defendant's man, Hari Dobey, acted for the Defendant on the occasion; that Defendant has agreed to take a lease of Girija Prasanna's share in Fatihpur and Chur Ramnagore on payment of the salami and rent referred to above; that a lease was accordingly drafted by Girija Prasanna's man, Inatullah; that afterwards the draft was taken to the cutcherry of Defendant's master, Srikanta Shaha, by Hari Dobey for being fair copied; that when the fair copy was brought it was signed on the first page by Girija Prasanna and that at that time Ishan Chandra Mozumdar having turned up, he was asked by Girija Prasanna, whose eyesight was defective, to read it and that when it was discovered that it was not in accordance with the terms previously agreed to, Girija Prasanna refused to sign the other pages and asked Ishan Mozumdar to keep it. It was-then that Hari Dobey took it away on pretence of rectifying the omission, but he afterwards refused to return unless the money spent on stamps and c, was paid to him The Subordinate Judge has believed this evidence and found as a fact that the lease to the Defendant was obtained by fraud." And later on, in the judgment this finding is affirmed by the lower Appellate Court. This shows that the signature of the grantor on the Defendant's pottah is, to use the language of Byles J. in Foster v. Mackinnon (1869) L.R. 4 C.P. 704, 711, "invalid not merely on the ground of fraud, but on the ground that the mind of the signor did not accompany the signature; in other words, he never intended to sign and therefore in contemplation of law never did sign the contract to which his name is appended. 6. Thoroughgood's case (1584) 2 Co. Rep. 6. Thoroughgood's case (1584) 2 Co. Rep. 9, the case of Foster v. Mackinnon (1869) L.R. 4 C.P. 704, 711 just referred to and other cases to which reference is made in Pollock on Contracts, 5th edition, pages 441-45, are authorities for the view we take that the pottah of Defendant No. 1 must be treated as a nullity from the beginning, as a document which never had been executed in the true sense of the term and as not requiring therefore to be set aside. That a document which was never intended by the executant to be operative does not require to be set aside or cancelled in order to entitle any person to the possession of the property covered by it as against the person in whose favour it stands, has been held by this Court in the cases of Sham Lall Mitra v. Amarendra Nath Bose ILR (1895) Cal. 69 and Raghubar Dyal Sahu v. Bhikya Lal Misser ILR (1885) Cal. 69. 7. It was argued for the Appellant that as the lower Appellate Court has found that "the Plaintiffs could not recover possession of the property leased out to them until the prior lease in favour of the Defendant was set aside," it is not open to this Court in second appeal to set aside that finding and take a different view of the Defendant's lease. We do not feel pressed by this argument at all. If the so-called finding had been a finding of fact, no doubt we could not interfere with it. But it is clearly no finding of fact. It is only an inference of law deduced from the facts found, from which we have shown above the very opposite inference arises, namely, that the lease in favour of Defendant No. 1 was a nullity from the beginning and did not require to be set aside. 8. For the foregoing reasons we must hold that this suit, so far as it seeks for Recovery of possession of immoveable property, is not barred by limitation, the prior pottah propounded by the Defendant No. 1 being void ab initio and that this appeal should be dismissed with costs, the declaration by the Courts below that, that pottah is inoperative being treated merely as a finding auxiliary to the granting of the decree for possession.