JUDGMENT Maclean, C.J. - This is a suit by a childless Hindu widow against the executors of her late husband's Will and her sister-in-law, one Kadambini Dassi, in which she seeks to have certain documents, viz., a deed of trust dated the 24th of May 1877, an award dated the 16th of July 1889, a decree dated the 29th of August 1889, and certain leases dated the 1st of March 1891, declared fraudulent and void as against her ; to have the Will of her husband construed, for an account on the basis of wilful default ; for the appointment of a receiver and other consequential relief. As a bar to that suit, the Defendant Nunda Lal Bose, who is the principal Defendant, sets up a variety of defences. The Defendant Pasupati supports the Plaintiff, and the Defendant Kadambini is sued as the surviving trustee of the deed of trust of the 24th of May 1877. It will be convenient before stating the nature of the various defences, to give a short outline of the case. 2. The Plaintiff was born in the year 1861, and at the age of 11, in January 1872 was married to the testator Mohendra Nath Bose. He died on the 16th of August 1874, leaving her a childless widow. By his Will, dated the 9th of August 1874, he gave out of certain zemindaries and other immoveable properties and also moveable properties,--all that he possessed,--one-third to his brother the Defendant Nunda Lal, another third to his brother Pasupati, and directed that the remaining third should be managed by his executors,--I am only stating the Will for the present purpose very succinctly--to pay certain legacies and monthly allowances and debts : and, subject thereto, to pay the income of such share to the Plaintiff for life, with a gift over, to which I shall have to refer later on. He appointed one Kali Churn Bhuttacharji, the Defendants Nunda Lal Bose and Pasupati Nath Bose executors of his Will. Kali Churn Bhuttacharjee renounced and probate was granted to Nunda Lal and Pasupati alone on the 4th of September 1874. At that time the Plaintiff was about 13 years of age and 'purdanashin' lady. She then lived, and for many years after continued to live, in the family dwelling-house with her brothers-in-law Nunda Lal Bose and Pasupati and her mother-in-law. Kali Churn Bhuttacharjee renounced and probate was granted to Nunda Lal and Pasupati alone on the 4th of September 1874. At that time the Plaintiff was about 13 years of age and 'purdanashin' lady. She then lived, and for many years after continued to live, in the family dwelling-house with her brothers-in-law Nunda Lal Bose and Pasupati and her mother-in-law. As the head of the family Nunda Lal would appear, after his brother the testator's death, to have managed the whole of the property of the joint-family. Pasupati, as an executor of his dead brother's Will, took little, if any, part in the management, and Nunda Lal managed the property, apparently, without any interference or check from any one. 3. On the 24th of May 1877 Nunda Lal and Pasupati settled their moveable and immoveable properties by a deed of trust dated the 24th May 1577, and it is of that deed Kadambini Dassi was appointed a trustee and as such trustee, is a party to the present suit. It is now conceded on all sides that this deed does not affect the one-third of the testator's estate in which the Plaintiff is interested. At this time, in May 1877, Pasupati was a young man of about twenty-one years of age, while Nunda Lal was about thirty or thirty-one. After the execution of this deed Nunda Lal still continued to manage the whole of the joint estate and Pasupati did not interfere. 4. In the year 1881 Pasupati became dissatisfied with the deed of the 24th May 1877, and, in the result, it was agreed between them, Pasupati and Nunda Lal, that with the object of setting this deed aside and of partitioning their property there should be a friendly reference to arbitration, and with this object a 'salisinamah' of the 27th day of July 1888 was prepared to which the Plaintiff's signature was obtained. Except so far as she was made a party to this reference as interested in the proposed partition, it is difficult to appreciate why she was made a party the share of her husband's estate in which she was interested under his Will, was not affected by the trust-deed of the 24th of May 1877. Except so far as she was made a party to this reference as interested in the proposed partition, it is difficult to appreciate why she was made a party the share of her husband's estate in which she was interested under his Will, was not affected by the trust-deed of the 24th of May 1877. The Plaintiff, on the 27th of Joista 1296, corresponding with the 9th of June 1889, was induced to sign a letter in which she expressed concurrence in having the said trust-deed set aside : and on the 12th of June 1889, a further 'salisinamah' was executed, to which the Plaintiff was a party, by which she purported to empower the arbitrators to cancel the deed of trust, to partition the estate and to settle the trust accounts. The arbitration proceedings commenced, and on the 16th of July 1889 the arbitrators made their award by which they purported to cancel the deed of the 24th of May 1877 and decided various other matters, in many serious particulars in a manner very adverse to the interests of the Plaintiff. On the 27th of July 1889 Nunda Lal filed a petition in the Court of the 24-Pergunnahs at Alipur for the confirmation of the award : and on the 27th of August a petition signed by Pasupati, Kadambini Dassi, Thakurani Dassi and the Plaintiff was filed in the same Court in which they said they bad no objection to the award being filed and enforced. On the same date, a vakalatnamah was signed by Pasupati, Kadambini, Thakurani and the Plaintiff purporting to authorize two pleaders, one of whom was the son-in-law of the Defendant Nunda Lal, to consent to the application. On the 29th August 1889 a consent decree was made in terms of the award. On the 1st of March 1891, two permanent leases were executed by Nunda Lal and Pasupati as executors of the Will of Mohedra Nath Bose, one in favour of Nunda Lal and the other in favour of Pasupati, and the signature of the Plaintiff was also obtained to these leases. Thakurani died in 1892. This is a history of the case. 5. Thakurani died in 1892. This is a history of the case. 5. The Plaintiff says that her supposed assent to the arbitration proceedings, to the award, to the decree and the vakalatnamah were each and all obtained by the fraud of Nunda Lal Bose ; that she believed that he was protecting her interests whilst in fact he was betraying them : that she was entirely under his influence and did what he told her to do : that she knew nothing about the transactions in question : that the various documents were never explained to her, and that, in fact, she put her name and gave her assent to any and every document which Nunda Lal Bose put before her, and told her to sign. That is in short her case. 6. Pasupati in substance supports that case ; Kadambini who, as I pointed out, is interested only as a trustee under the deed of the 20tb May 1877, put in a defence very late in the day. So far as she has taken any part in the litigation, she must be regarded as supporting the case of her brother Nunda Lal. 7. The Defendant Nunda Lal raised a variety of preliminary points which I will deal with in a moment ; and, as regards the merits, he relies upon the arbitration proceedings, the award and the decree, relies upon the mokurari leases and says, in effect, that the Plaintiff thoroughly understood what she was doing: that she was not under his influence in any way ; that there was no fraud on his part, that she was throughout a perfectly voluntary agent in the transactions, that she executed all these documents, and was a party to all the proceedings, with an accurate knowledge, on her part, of their meaning, their purport and effect ; that everything had been fully explained to her and that this suit was vexatious and was brought at the instance of Pasupati. But before I deal with the merits, I propose to deal with the various preliminary points which have been raised, for if Nunda Lal be successful on these, it will be unnecessary to go into the merits. 8. What are these preliminary objections? But before I deal with the merits, I propose to deal with the various preliminary points which have been raised, for if Nunda Lal be successful on these, it will be unnecessary to go into the merits. 8. What are these preliminary objections? First, he says that this Court has no jurisdiction to set aside the decree, that the only Court that can set it aside is the Court which pronounced it, viz., the Court at Alipur. He says as regards the setting aside of the mokurari leases of the 1st of March 1891, that there is no jurisdiction in this Court, as the suit, so far as they are concerned, is a suit for the recovery of immoveable property and so ought to have been brought in the Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the property is locally situated, and that it is not locally situated in Calcutta. He also says that the suit is barred by limitation and that it is multifarious under sec. 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Other questions were raised upon the true construction of the Will, and some minor questions as to costs with which I propose to deal later on. 9. Upon the first point, the Court, in my opinion, had jurisdiction to entertain the suit so far as it seeks to set aside the decree of the Alipur Court. We have been referred to a variety of cases in the Courts of England upon the question whether it is open to one Court to set aside on the ground of fraud, the decree of another Court. These cases have been dealt with, with great minuteness by the learned Judge who tried the case in the Court below : and especial reliance has been placed before us upon the case of Allen v. Macpherson 1 H. L. Cas. 191 : s. c. 5 Beav. 469 (1841). For the reasons I am about to give, I do not think it will be necessary to go into these cases. 191 : s. c. 5 Beav. 469 (1841). For the reasons I am about to give, I do not think it will be necessary to go into these cases. The jurisdiction of the High Courts in India is the creation of the Letters Patent and the Code of Civil Procedure, and it seems to mo that before we discuss the English cases, it would be at least desirable to ascertain what jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court by the Letters Patent and Code, inasmuch as upon this head the constitution of the Courts here may be very different from that of the Courts in England. 10. In this connection I would first refer to sec. 12 of the Letters Patent of 1865. Under that, this Court in the exercise of its Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction which was the jurisdiction invoked in the present case, may receive, try and determine suits of every description in all cases "if the cause of action shall have arisen, either wholly, or in case the leave of the Court shall have been first obtained, in part, within the local limits of the Ordinary Original Jurisdiction of the said High Court." I pause there for a moment. Hero the leave of the Court was obtained to the institution of this Suit, and here the cause of action, so far as it relates to the setting aside of the decree,--I am only dealing at present with the objection to that part of the suit,--was the fraud of the Defendant Nunda Lal, which certainly in part, if not wholly, was committed within the local limits of the Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction of the Court. The parties were undoubtedly residing in Calcutta, when the alleged fraud was practised by Nunda Lal : and as regards the suggestion that if any fraud were practised, a portion of it, that is as regards the obtaining of the decree, was practised at Alipur, which is outside the local limits of the Ordinary Original Jurisdiction of this Court, the answer is that any objection on that head is met by the fact that the leave of the Court to bring the action was previously obtained. And from another point of view as regards sec. 12, it may be said that the Court derived jurisdiction to deal with the suit. And from another point of view as regards sec. 12, it may be said that the Court derived jurisdiction to deal with the suit. Nunda Lal, undoubtedly, at the time of the commencement of the suit was dwelling in Calcutta : Kadambini was also residing there : whilst Pasupati was ordinarily dwelling there, though at times, apparently, he lived in a garden-house outside Calcutta. But at the time of the commencement of the suit, the real Defendant in the suit, the one against whom the real relief was sought, viz., Nunda Lal, was dwelling within the local limits of the Court. In my opinion then, under this section, the Court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit. Apart, however, from this, the Plaintiff places reliance upon sec. 11 of the Code which runs as follows :--"The Court shall (subject to the provisions herein contained) have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is barred by any enactment for the time being in force." This High Court on its Ordinary Original Civil Side is a Court within the meaning of that section, and I am not aware of any enactment which bars such Court from taking cognizance of a suit of this description. Reliance is also placed by the Plaintiff upon sec. 17 of the Code, and in my opinion, these two sections of the Code give support to the Plaintiffs contention. On these grounds I consider that this Court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit, to set aside the decree of the Alipur Court on the ground of fraud. But it has been urged before us for the Plaintiff that, if this were not so, the Court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit, so far as it was one for the administration of the estate of the testator. As to this, there has not been any serious contention, and, in fact, the present Appellant offered no opposition to such a decree if based on the validity of the award, and the subsequent decree of the Alipur Court. As to this, there has not been any serious contention, and, in fact, the present Appellant offered no opposition to such a decree if based on the validity of the award, and the subsequent decree of the Alipur Court. This being so, it is urged for the Plaintiff that, as the Court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit as an administration suit, if the Defendant Nunda Lal relied upon the decree of the Alipur Court as an answer to that suit, it was open to the Plaintiff to show that that decree had been obtained by fraud, and reliance was placed upon a variety of cases in the Courts of England, which have been very carefully considered by the Court below, of which Bondon v. Becker 3 Cl. and Fin. 479 (1835) and Queen v. Saddler's Co. 10 H. L. Cas. 404 (1863) may be regarded as prominent illustrations as giving effect, in the Courts of India, to the views laid down in the English cases I have mentioned. Reliance is placed upon sec. 44 of the Indian Evidence Act. To this the Appellant replies that we must look at the law as it is in India and not as it is in England ; that sec. 44 codifies the law and is exhaustive upon this particular point, and that inasmuch as the decree in this case, though relied upon, was not proved by Nunda Lal, sec. 44 can have no application. It is not very clear upon the evidence whether the Alipur decree was proved by anybody in the suit in the Court below : it seems to have been treated as admitted by both parties. It was, however, not the Plaintiff but the Defendant Nunda Lal, who relied upon that decree as a bar to the suit. In the view I have previously expressed that the Court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit, it becomes unnecessary to decide this point, though under the circumstances of this case, I should not be disposed to hold that the Plaintiff was unable in this suit to show that the Alipur decree was obtained by fraud. I should be disposed rather to think, upon the facts of this case, that the Court might regard both the suit and the decree in the Alipur Court as a nullity. 11. I should be disposed rather to think, upon the facts of this case, that the Court might regard both the suit and the decree in the Alipur Court as a nullity. 11. In this connection I desire to say, to prevent future misapprehension, that some observations of mine in the case of Rajib Panda v. Lakhan Singh Mahapatra 3 C. W. N. 660 : s. c. I. L. R. 27 Cal. 11 (1899)--I am alluding to what I Said at the top of page 16 as to the English Practice--may be regarded as going too far, bearing in mind the English cases to which I have already referred. The observations were unnecessary for the decision of that particular case. 12. The next question is that so far as regards the relief sought in respect of the two leases of the 1st of March 1891, it was a suit for laud, and, therefore, ought to have been brought not in this Court, but in the Court which exercised jurisdiction within the local limits where the land was situated. The answer to this contention seems to me to be twofold, first, this is not a suit for land. It is a suit for administration, and, as incidental to that suit, for a declaration that certain leases which the executors of the estate granted to themselves, cannot stand as against the Plaintiff the beneficiary. The testator's estate consisted of lands in Calcutta, Gya, Patna and other places. Secondly, the defect, if defect there were, has been cured by the leave given by the Court, for it has been held in the case of Prosunnomoyee Dassi v. Kadambini Dassi 3 B. L. R. O. J. 85 (1868) which was decided many years ago and which has since been consistently followed, that, if the leave of the Court be given, in cases in which part of the land is within and part is without the local limits of the High Court the defect is cured. And I may, here, parhaps, conveniently deal with the further objection that the suit is not maintainable, having regard to sec. 44 of the Code of Civil Procedure. And I may, here, parhaps, conveniently deal with the further objection that the suit is not maintainable, having regard to sec. 44 of the Code of Civil Procedure. I think it is sufficient upon this head to say that it is not a suit for the recovery of immoveable property or to obtain a declaration of title to immoveable property, and, even if it were, the leave of the Court was obtained to the bringing of the suit. 13. The last point is one of limitation. The Plaintiff says the case falls within sec. 10 of the Indian Limitation Act : The Defendant Nunda Lal denies this. I think it does. The property was vested in the executors in trust for a specific purpose, that purpose being to pay the legacies, the allowances and the debts and to pay the residue of the income of the one-third share of the testator's estate to the Plaintiff for life. There can be no doubt that the estate did vest in the executors, and it is difficult to say that the purpose for which it was so vested is not specific. Then it is said that the object of this suit is not for the purpose of following in the hands of the executors such property. I think it is : it is clear that the purpose of the suit was to follow the property which come to the hands of the two executors, to make them account for it, and to hand over to the Plaintiff, as the result of that account, what may be found due to her. The case of Saroda Perhsad Chattopadhya v. Brojo Nath Bhuttacharji I. L. R 5 Cal. 910 (1880) cited for the Appellant is for the foregoing reason distinguishable from oases like the present, as has been pointed out by Mr. Justice Wilson in Hurro Coomaree v. Tarini Churn I. L. R. 8 Cal. 766 (1882). The case of Saroda Perhsad Chattopadhya v. Brojo Nath Bhuttacharji I. L. R 5 Cal. 910 (1880) cited for the Appellant is for the foregoing reason distinguishable from oases like the present, as has been pointed out by Mr. Justice Wilson in Hurro Coomaree v. Tarini Churn I. L. R. 8 Cal. 766 (1882). But even if this were not so, so far as it is a suit which is based on the fraud of the Defendant Nunda Lal,--and virtually the whole suit is based upon that ground,--the Defendant's objection is met by Art. 95 of the Second Schedule of the Limitation Act, which says that the period of limitation for a suit based on the ground of the present suit is three years from the time when the fraud was known to the party wronged. Here it has been found by the Court below,--a finding with which I agree,--that the fraud did not become known to the Plaintiff until a short time before the institution of the suit. 14. I have now disposed of all the preliminary points. But, perhaps, before I deal with the merits of the case it may be convenient if I deal with two or three points which have been raised upon the construction of the Will. The first question raised was whether the Court below was right in saying that there was an intestacy as to the testator's moveable property. It is practically conceded that the testator had no moveable property other than that which was joint. The Court below held that there was an intestacy : but I doubt if the Court would have arrived at this conclusion, if it had known, as is now conceded by all the counsel in the case, that the translation of the Will at page 12 of the paper-book is not accurate. It ought to run in this way. After the words, "whatever property there is," ought to come the words "all that one-third is my own share. Two-thirds out of the said my own share, etc." I think that in the description of the property the testator was referring to all the properties which were joint, immoveable and moveable. It ought to run in this way. After the words, "whatever property there is," ought to come the words "all that one-third is my own share. Two-thirds out of the said my own share, etc." I think that in the description of the property the testator was referring to all the properties which were joint, immoveable and moveable. I think this is the true interpretation of the words "whatever property there is." Then he says "of all that property,"--that is to say, whatever property there is,--"one-third is my own share." Two-thirds of that share, i.e., of his one-third share of whatever property there is, he gives to his brothers, and the remaining third he deals with in the way I have mentioned. Upon the construction of the Will, I think he disposed, and intended to dispose, of his share in all the joint property, moveable and immoveable, and that he did not die intestate as to the joint moveable property. It has not been suggested that he had any moveable property other than what was joint. In this respect, then, the decree of the Court below must be varied, and it must be declared that the testator's joint moveable property passed by his Will. 15. The next point is whether the ultimate gift after the death of the Plaintiff is bad on the ground that at the death of the testator it would be impossible to predicate who might, at the date of the death of the widow be his heir, and, consequently, that, at the date of the testator's death, there was no person, who, either in fact or in contemplation of law was in existence, so as to be able to take a gift inter vivos. I think the case is governed by the decision of the Tagore case and the view of the Court below on this point is well founded. 16. The next point is that the Court below was wrong in directing an enquiry as to what was a fit and proper sum to be allowed as expenses for the pujahs, etc., the contention being, that, inasmuch as the language of the Will was, "you are to pay my share of the expenses whatever that may be," no discretion was vested in the executors, and whatever his share was they were to pay it. It must be borne in mind that the total sum to be paid for these "deb-sheba" expenses would in the main be decided by Nunda Lal and Pasupati in conjunction, though the Mitra families apparently had a say in the matter. But if the Defendant's contention be sound, the result would be that the executors could expend every portion of the Plaintiff's interests in these expenses and practically leave her nothing. That was pointed out in the case of Mullick v. Mullick 1 Knapp. 245 (1829 -31). Although the language of the Will in that case is not identical with the language of the Will in the present, the principle upon which the Privy Council proceeded in that case appear to me to be applicable to the present. I do not think the testator by the use of the expression "my share of the expenses whatever that may be," intended to give them,--seeing that they were in a great measure the parties to decide what the expenses should be,--such an absolute discretion in the matter as might deprive the Plaintiff of any beneficial interest in the estate. 17. The only other question upon the construction of the Will is as to the footing upon which the account is to be taken. It is said that it ought to be taken as against Nunda Lal, as the karta of the family, upon the footing of a joint family account. I do not take this view : I think the Plaintiff is entitled to have an account between herself and the Defendant upon the footing of a beneficiary against the executors of the Will. 18. I have now disposed of all the preliminary points and the points upon the construction of the Will, and I now propose to deal with the merits of the case. But, agreeing as I entirely do with the reasoning of the lower Court, and the conclusion upon the evidence at which it has arrived, I propose to do so as briefly as I can. 19. At the death of her husband, the Plaintiff was a child of thirteen. She was living with her brothers-in-law, Nunda Lal, Pasupati, and her mother-in- law as a member of a joint Hindu family. Nunda Lal, as I have said, was the karta of the family, and, I have no doubt, was managing its property and affairs. 19. At the death of her husband, the Plaintiff was a child of thirteen. She was living with her brothers-in-law, Nunda Lal, Pasupati, and her mother-in- law as a member of a joint Hindu family. Nunda Lal, as I have said, was the karta of the family, and, I have no doubt, was managing its property and affairs. The Plaintiff used not to appear before Nunda Lal and notwithstanding what he and his witnesses say, I have no hesitation in concluding that at that time she knew nothing about the Will of her husband or what her rights and interests were under that document. She was a purdanashin child, and, in the position in which she was then situated, I entertain no doubt that she was entirely under the influence of Nunda Lal, the senior member of the family, and entirely incompetent to understand the documents or the effect of the documents which she was signing or to which it is said she gave her assent. 20. It is unnecessary to refer to the many cases in the Privy Council and in this Court which illustrate the amount of especial protection which the Court throws round Hindu ladies situate as was the Plaintiff. That was her position at the time of her husband's death. When the trust-deed of the 24th of May 1877 was executed although some attempt was made to show that she was aware of it because there was Some conversation in the family about it one may point out that, at that time she was only sixteen years of age she had nothing whatever to do with the trust-deed, and she was not a party to it, and if she had nothing whatever to do with it, it is not an unreasonable inference that nothing was said to her about it. 21. I have already pointed out what was the position of the Plaintiff at the time she signed the various documents which are now assailed. 22. I now propose to deal, as briefly as I can, with each document separately and the evidence upon the question of whether the Plaintiff when she signed them had any independent advice, whether she understood the contents of the documents, whether they were ever explained to her and whether she was acting Throughout under the influence and at the instance of Nunda Lal. 23. 23. In the first place it is difficult to see why she was made a party to the first "salisinamah" of the 27th July 1888. 24. She had nothing to do with the quarrels between Nunda Lal and Pasupati, she had nothing to do with the trust-deed. Nunda Lal no doubt thought it advisable to make her a party and she was made a party to that "salisinamah" ostensibly with the view of obtaining her assent to the partition which is referred to in that document. I have said generally that I accept the statement of the lady that she did not understand the purport and the effect of these documents but that relying upon the integrity of Nunda Lal and believing that he would adequately protect her interest, she in effect did whatever she was told to do. I am disposed to regard her as a mere puppet in his hands doing what he suggested and signing all the documents he told to her sign. And upon this question of partition I may point out and I think the evidence establishes it that in order to avoid the expense of a partition deed and from motives of economy, Nunda Lal adopted the device of the so-called arbitration and consequent award and there can I think be very little real doubt but that the terms of the partition between the two brothers had been in substance and in effect agreed upon before the matter was referred to the arbitrators and the so-called reference to arbitration was merely a device to save the stamp-duty on a deed of partition. 25. Now although the reference to arbitration is dated the 27th of July 1888 according to the letter of the arbitrators of the 8th of June 1889, no meeting was held until the 7th of June 1889 neatly a year afterwards when it was apparently discovered that the reference to arbitration of the 27th July 1888 would not work unless and until the trust-deed of the 24th May 1877 was cancelled. With a view to that cancellation a somewhat extraordinary letter, dated the 8th of June, was sent to the Plaintiff in which she was asked to send her views with regard to the proposed cancellation and a second agreement for arbitration is suggested. With a view to that cancellation a somewhat extraordinary letter, dated the 8th of June, was sent to the Plaintiff in which she was asked to send her views with regard to the proposed cancellation and a second agreement for arbitration is suggested. To this the Plaintiff is induced to reply in the terms of the 10th of June 1889 what had she to do with the cancellation of the trust-deed of 1877. It is conceded that it did not affect the one-third share of her husband's estate in which she was interested. In this letter she was made to say that "it deserved to be cancelled as it was made without her presence." 26. Can any one doubt that both this letter and the reply were prompted by Nunda Lal and that the Plaintiff's reply was proved by him and feigned by the Plaintiff at his instance and under his influence ? 27. Then the second agreement for reference is executed, dated the 12th of June 1889. It is unnecessary to deal in detail with the terms of the second reference. It is sufficient to say that under it, so far as her interest under her husband's Will went, the Plaintiff would appear to have left herself unreservedly in the hands of the arbitrators. It was eminently a document in respect of which the Plaintiff ought to have been separately and independently advised. Upon the evidence I am satisfied she received no such advice and no such explanation as she was entitled to. 28. Then came the so-called arbitration proceedings. The letter I have referred to from the Plaintiff was dated the 10th of June 1889, and the arbitrators made their award on the 16th July 1889. 30. It is a very elaborate document and by it amongst other things all arrears of rent--and the arrears were substantial in amount--were in effect handed over to the two brothers and the accounts as between the Plaintiff and the executors were treated settled : and there were provisions made for the granting of the mokurari leases which the Plaintiff now seeks to set aside. 31. 31. It seems to me impossible, having regard to the shortness of the time occupied by the so-called arbitration, that the arbitrators could, as arbitrators, have gone into the complicated matters referred to them, for instance the partition, the settling of the executorship accounts, which extended over many years and the terms upon which the mokurari leases were to be granted. I conclude from the evidence that they were not permitted to do so and I do not think they were ever intended to do so. It is reasonably clear upon the evidence that as regards the partition and as regards the executorship accounts the whole matter was cut and dried by Nunda Lal before it was laid before the arbitrators and that the latter were merely puppets in his hands to make just such an award as Nunda Lal himself required. The time occupied in the arbitration could not have permitted of their going, as independent arbitrators, into elaborate question to which I have referred. I entirely agree with the criticism of the Court below upon the evidence relating to this part of the case. The story told of the Plaintiff and the other ladies of this joint Hindu family coming and sitting behind a screen and of communication passing from the arbitrators to these ladies and from the ladies to the arbitrators and the Plaintiff being asked to consent to the various matters to be dealt with by proposed award is to my mind one which it is impossible to credit. 32. On the best consideration I can give to the evidence I do not think that the Plaintiff can be said to have been represented at the arbitration or to have understood what was being done, or to have assented to what was being done. 33. And there is this further element in the case. According to the evidence of some of Nunda Lal's own witnesses, several of the terms of the award were made part of the award with the Plaintiff's consent. They say it was a consent award. If so, the arbitrators did not act judicially in the matter, but merely recorded a consent award. According to the evidence of some of Nunda Lal's own witnesses, several of the terms of the award were made part of the award with the Plaintiff's consent. They say it was a consent award. If so, the arbitrators did not act judicially in the matter, but merely recorded a consent award. I do not believe the evidence of Nunda Lal and his witnesses who tell us that the Plaintiff, having regard to her position in the family, could have understood, or did understand, or did actually give any consent, with any real knowledge of what she was consenting to, to this arbitration or to the award which the arbitrators purported to make. Of the three arbitrators one is dead, and Nunda Lal has not ventured to call either of the two arbitrators who are alive. They could have told us whether the arbitration was a real arbitration or whether it was a mere sham, got up by Nunda Lal in order to meet any possible future claim by the Plaintiff in relation to the testator's estate. 34. In any opinion, the whole of these proceedings commencing with the reference to arbitration, the circumstances of the arbitration itself and the award were a mere sham and no arbitration, in the true and proper sense of the term, was ever held. 35. What happened afterwards? Nunda Lal, no doubt, thought that it would be a wise and prudent thing on his part, in order still further to bind the Plaintiff, in regard to these matters, to have this award embodied in a decree of some Court, and for that purpose he goes to the second Court of Alipur, not it will be observed to this Court, although all these proceedings took place in Calcutta, and on the 22nd of July 1889 be applies to that Court for the confirmation of the award. But it was necessary to obtain the consent of the Plaintiff to this move on his part, and, accordingly, on the 27th of August 1889 the Plaintiff is made to present a petition consenting to a decree in the terms of the award, and to execute a 'vakalatnamah' appointing a gentleman to act as her vakil, who was a near relative of Nunda Lal Bose for the purpose of giving her consent to such a decree. 36. 36. This again, to any mind, was eminently a matter in which she ought to have been carefully and separately advised : but she had no independent advice, legal or otherwise. I do not believe that the Plaintiff understood what she was doing when she signed these two documents, and, here again, I entirely disbelieve the evidence of the Defendant Nunda Lal and his witnesses that she understood what she was doing. 37. There is only one other matter to which I need refer : I allude to the two permanent leases of the 1st of March 1891, to which the signature of the Plaintiff was obtained. These are permanent leases of certain portions of the trust estate granted by the two executors to themselves. 38. It is difficult to see how these leases by the executors to themselves can stand as against the Plaintiff. Nunda Lal and Pasupati, upon whom the onus rests, have absolutely failed to substantiate that when the Plaintiff's signature was obtained to these leases, she had any true conception of their nature or effect. 39. We should be going far, having regard to the evidence if we were to hold that these leases, executed under these circumstances could be binding upon the Plaintiff. 40. In my opinion, then, all these documents, the 'salisinamahs,' the petition of the Plaintiff to the Alipur Court, the 'vakalatnamah' signed by her and the 'mokurari' leases, each and all of them ale documents to which when the Plaintiff put her signature she was in ignorance of their true effect and bearing, and they were not in any adequate sense explained to her. Nor do I think that she understood or was a party to the so-called arbitration and award. 41. Further, I regard this so-called arbitration and award, and the documents to which the Plaintiff's signature was obtained as part and parcel of a fraudulent scheme on the part of Nunda Lal with the object of binding the Plaintiff and preventing her afterwards from setting up, with success, that she had not assented to the partition of the estate, to the settlement of the accounts and to the other matters dealt with by the award. I have abstained from discussing in detail the evidence ; it was read to us at length and commented upon in great detail during the course of the argument, and it has been dealt with very minutely and with great care by Mr. Justice Stanley in his judgment and as I have said before, agreeing so fully both in his reasoning and the conclusion I think it would now be superfluous for me again to go through the evidence in detail. Upon the merits, the conclusion of the Court below was perfectly sound ; and even if we could accept as true the evidence of Nunda Lal and his witnesses, as to the knowledge and consent of the Plaintiff, which I certainly do not, I do not think that in the case of a purdanashin lady, situated as the Plaintiff was, such evidence would have been sufficient to discharge the heavy burden which rests upon him in the matter, and to satisfy us that the transactions were binding upon her. 42. I may notice that, even according to his own statement, given in cross-examination, Nunda Lal is a gentleman who would not shrink from signing a false document if there were a particular reason for doing so. I have no doubt that the Plaintiff did not understand what she had done until, as she says, she was separately advised after consulting her attorney in March 1898. 43. I conclude this part of the case by quoting the following passage from Mixon v. Payne 8 Ch. App. 887 (1884). 44. "It is true that when a case is based on fraud, the fraud must be proved and no relief could be given in this suit on any different ground. But the obtaining of property, or of any benefit, through the undue and unconscientious abuse of influence by a person in whom trust and confidence are placed, has always been treated as a fraud of the gravest character." 45. There are one or two minor questions as to costs with which I can deal very shortly. It is said that the costs of the application for a further examination of the Plaintiff on commission ought not to have been made costs in the suit. I think that was quite right. 46. There are one or two minor questions as to costs with which I can deal very shortly. It is said that the costs of the application for a further examination of the Plaintiff on commission ought not to have been made costs in the suit. I think that was quite right. 46. Then, it is said that Nunda Lal who made an application for the appointment of a receiver, which application failed ought not to have been ordered to pay the costs of that application. I think that order was right. It was his application, it failed and no reason has been shewn why he should not pay the costs. 47. Then it is said that Pasupati ought to have been ordered to pay the costs of the suit jointly with the Appellant Nunda Lal. His position was this : His action as an executor is open to grave censure, but he did not resist the Plaintiffs present claim. The Court below was right in not making him pay the costs of the Plaintiff but in making him pay his own costs. 48. I have now dealt with the many points which have been raised in the case. In my opinion the judgment of the Court below was quite right, save that it must be varied by a declaration that the testator did not die intestate as to his joint moveable property, and with that slight variation, which does not deal with a very substantial matter, the appeal must be dismissed with costs. Such slight variation ought not to affect the costs of the appeal. 49. As regards Appeal No. 29 of 1900 the appeal by Kadambini Dassi, it is only on the question of costs. It is said that she ought to have had her costs either from the Plaintiff or out of the testator's estate. Now, what has been her attitude in this litigation ? So far as the suit sought to set aside the trust-deed of the 24th of May 1877, she as surviving trustee of that deed, was a necessary party to the suit. But she has supported Nunda Lal Bose not only in her pleadings but also by her evidence. Nunda Lal Bose has singularly failed in his defence, and I do not see how under such circumstances Kadambini can properly ask for costs from the Plaintiff or out of the testator's estate. But she has supported Nunda Lal Bose not only in her pleadings but also by her evidence. Nunda Lal Bose has singularly failed in his defence, and I do not see how under such circumstances Kadambini can properly ask for costs from the Plaintiff or out of the testator's estate. The Court below was perhaps rather generous in not making her pay some costs. This appeal also must be dismissed with costs. Banerjee, J. I am of the same opinion. Hill, J. I concur. Babu H.N. Dutt Attorney Messrs. R.C. Bose, J.G. Dutt, G.C. Chunder & Co., Attorneys