JUDGMENT 1. In this case a rule was granted calling on the opposite party to show cause why certain proceedings of the District Judge of Gaya, i.e., an order dated October, 1896, together with subsequent proceedings thereunder, and also an order dated May 24th, 1901, should not be set aside. The rule was applied for on behalf of one Inder Narain Singh on the refusal of the District Judge of Gaya to grant the prayer of his petition for the removal of Mr. E.E. Adlam from the poet of manager of an estate known as the Haswa estate. It appears that prior to 1896, 8 annas of this estate was in the hands of Inder Narain Singh, 4 annas belonging to himself, and 4 annas to Gopi Nath Singh, a minor, who was under Inder Narain's guardianship. The persons interested in the remaining 8 annas appear to have been Mussamat Doorga Dai and her minor sons Kali Pershad Singh and Baij Nath Pershad Singh whose guardian she was. 2. Disputes and difficulties arose as to the management of the property. Mussamat Doorga Dai was removed from her position as guardian. Mussamat Pakwanli Koer, the mother of the minor Gopi Nath Sinha, applied for the appointment of a manager to the whole estate. This was opposed by her son's guardian. It is unnecessary to refer in detail to the proceeding or to the applications which were made with reference to their estate prior to July 1896. In that month as appears from the order-sheet of July 31st it was proposed that the whole 16 annas be made over to the Court of Wards or to any manager appointed by the Court, after an equitable settlement as to the minor's debts. For this the District Judge is asked to act as arbitrator, so that technicalities as to the minor's liabilities should be as far as possible avoided. The order also sets out that Inder Narain expresses his entire willingness to have Mr. R. Howard appointed manager. Inder Narain agrees that Mr. W.J. Howard should be employed to represent the minor at the enquiry. Following this it appears that on September 19th Inder Narain was called on under sec. 34 of the Guardian and Wards Act to produce his accounts and the matter was finally dealt with on October 1st on which day the 1st of the orders complained of was made. W.J. Howard should be employed to represent the minor at the enquiry. Following this it appears that on September 19th Inder Narain was called on under sec. 34 of the Guardian and Wards Act to produce his accounts and the matter was finally dealt with on October 1st on which day the 1st of the orders complained of was made. The entry in the order-sheet for that day is extremely lengthy : after setting out that the Court goes through the items, it purports to deal with the accounts sent up with the order. "The Nazir will take charge from to-day and Inder Narain Singh will be hereby declared nominal guardian of the property of, Gopi Nath Singh only, as I am not aware that he was ever removed from such guardianship." 3. On the same date the agreement executed by Inder Narain as to the appointment of manager was registered and the only other two orders and consequence which follow are dated January 31st, 1900, and January 29th, 1901, and set out that Babu Nundo Lal hands over to Mr. Adlam, and that on that Mr. Adlam's death his brother Mr. E.E. Adlam applied for and received the appointment of receiver. 4. The history of the case, as it appears on the order-sheet, requires to be supplemented. Mr. Howard acted as manager until his death in 1897, then the Nazir was appointed and remained in charge until Mr. W.F. Adlam was appointed and was succeeded on his death by the present manager. 5. In May 1901, Inder Narain filed a petition for the removal of Mr. E.E. Adlam from the management; this petition was dismissed by an order, dated May 24th of 1901, which is one of the orders as to which the rule is specifically granted. The argument in support of the rule is that the whole of these orders is void. That District Judge had no jurisdiction to appoint a manager to the estate. The argument for the Respondent is that the orders were not made by the District Judge acting as such : but by Mr. Holmwood in his personal capacity as an arbitrator appointed by the parties, under the terms of the agreement of October 1st, 1896, and that the Court has therefore no jurisdiction to interfere with them. 6. The argument for the Respondent is that the orders were not made by the District Judge acting as such : but by Mr. Holmwood in his personal capacity as an arbitrator appointed by the parties, under the terms of the agreement of October 1st, 1896, and that the Court has therefore no jurisdiction to interfere with them. 6. To decide which of these contentious is correct, it becomes necessary to examine the agreement of October 1st, 1896, the orders passed and the explanation of the learned Judge. 7. By the agreement of October 1st to which Mr. Holmwood is a party Inder Narain Singh and Teknarain Singh who describe themselves as the nominal guardians of the minors by order of the Court agree to the appointment of Mr. R.E. Howard as manager and undertake not to interfere in his management of the property or in the education of the minors, if they do interfere they may be removed by the District Judge: they also agree that the same conditions are to apply to any persons appointed by the District Judge to act for the manager or to succeed him, the District Judge is not to remove the manager except for incapacity or for the reasons set out in sec. 46 of the Guardian and Wards Acts, the estate is to be managed as if the manager was guardian of the persons and properties of the minors and the manager is to lay all accounts and schemes in which he requires assistance before the Court and the orders of the Court shall be final. These provisions alone are sufficient to dispose of the contention that the agreement can be treated as an appointment of Mr. Holmwood as arbitrator. The document purports to contain an agreement by the guardians appointed by the Court to abstain from doing the duties which are imposed on them under secs. 24-27 of the Guardian and Wards Act: and it purports to enable the District Judge to remove a guardian appointed by the Court, if the guardian performs his statutory duties and it provides for the control of the manager's accounts not by the above but by the Court. 8. 24-27 of the Guardian and Wards Act: and it purports to enable the District Judge to remove a guardian appointed by the Court, if the guardian performs his statutory duties and it provides for the control of the manager's accounts not by the above but by the Court. 8. These provisions clearly indicate an attempt by agreement to give the District Judge as such a jurisdiction to remove the guardians under circumstances which would not enable him to remove them under the Guardian and Wards Act, and to give him powers which no District Judge has under the law, and which no persons could by consent confer on any arbitrator. Again in referring to the order-sheet it is to be observed that it is headed in "the Court of the District Judge of Gaya." Had the orders been made by Mr. Holmwood as an arbitrator acting under the agreement of October 1st it is difficult to see why the orders should have been inserted in the order-sheet of the Court. The only reference to an arbitration is to be found in the order-sheet of July 31st, 1896, by which it appears that the Judge was asked to act as arbitrator for the equitable settlement of the minor's debts, and a note of the proceedings of the arbitration dated the September 19th, 1896. The orders which are now complained of are such as could not have been made in an arbitration for the equitable settlement of the minor's debts. 9. The order of October 1st contains no reference to any arbitration or arbitrator, but by it, it appears that it is the Court which passed the accounts and sanctioned the payments made by the manager. It does not appear whether the Court were then acting under the consent given on July 31st to an arbitration for the equitable settlement of the minor's debts, or whether the Court was acting under the Guardian and Wards Act in pursuance of the requisition which had been made under sec. 34, Guardian and Wards Act, on September 19th. It does not appear whether the Court were then acting under the consent given on July 31st to an arbitration for the equitable settlement of the minor's debts, or whether the Court was acting under the Guardian and Wards Act in pursuance of the requisition which had been made under sec. 34, Guardian and Wards Act, on September 19th. However that may be, the last part of the order could never have been made by an arbitrator, for an arbitrator could never have the power of taking the property out of the custody of the guardian appointed by the Court under the Act and placing it in charge of the Nazir, nor would any order of any arbitrator declaring the legally appointed guardian a nominal guardian have any effect. A reference to the order-sheet of May 1901 puts the matter beyond question. A petition is filed praying for the removal of Mr. Adlam. On May 24th the order dismissing the petition is drawn up and begins with this paragraph. "Babu Inder Narain Singh of his own free will placed his estate in the hands of this Court, and transferred the guardianship of the properties of his minor brothers to an European manager." 10. The reference to the Court shews clearly that it is an error to say that the guardians had placed themselves under the control of an arbitrator, even if it could be said that they had the power. 11. The terms of the agreement of October 1st and of the order of that date, and the order of May 24th, 1901, leave no doubt on our mind that the learned District Judge has exercised a jurisdiction not vested in him by law which no consent of parties could enable him to exercise. 12. It has been argued by the learned vakil who has shown cause against the rule that the orders of the District Judge are only extra cursum curice and that therefore being consented to by the parties the Judge was ipso facto in the position of an arbitrator and orders so made are not appealable. 13. In support of this argument four cases were cited to us: viz., Birket v. Morris L.R. 1 H.L. Sc. 47, White v. The Duke of Buccleuch L.R. 1 E.L. Sc. 71, Darham County Permanent Benefit Building Society L.R. 7 Ch. 45 (1871), and Burgess v. Morton [1896] A.C. 136 (1895). 13. In support of this argument four cases were cited to us: viz., Birket v. Morris L.R. 1 H.L. Sc. 47, White v. The Duke of Buccleuch L.R. 1 E.L. Sc. 71, Darham County Permanent Benefit Building Society L.R. 7 Ch. 45 (1871), and Burgess v. Morton [1896] A.C. 136 (1895). These cases show that where the order of a Court is extra cursum curice and is consented to by the parties, it is in the nature of an arbitrator's award and cannot be reversed on appeal, but it is unnecessary to examine these cases seriatim for they are all distinguishable from the present as in each case the order made by the Court was one which could legally have been made by an arbitrator appointed by the parties: in no case did the Court, though acting extra cursum curice do that which the parties could not have legally authorized an arbitrator to do. 14. Further the learned Judge's explanation throughout contains references to the control exercised by the Court. It is the Court which has acted not Mr. Holmwood as arbitrator, and, in our opinion the Court has passed orders which it had no jurisdiction to pass, and which no agreement of parties could enable it to pass. The result, therefore, is that in our opinion the orders were made by the District Court and were orders which that Court had no jurisdiction to make. The rule therefore for setting them aside must be made absolute.