Judgement Appeal from a decree of the High Court (May 17, 1897) reversing a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Midnapore (Feb. 26, 1895). The suit was brought by the appellant, one of the two widows of Purna Chunder, Raja of Jamboni, who died without male issue, to recover his estate from Iswar Chunder, his half-brother. The suit was brought on the assumption that the family was governed by Dayabhaga law. Iswar Chunder resisted the claim, asserting that the family was governed by Mitakshara law, under which the widow was only entitled to maintenance, and that in any case the other widow, Radha Kumari Debi, who was joined as second defendant, was the senior widow, and, as such, the preferential heir. The Subordinate Judge awarded to the appellant possession of all the properties in suit, as manager the High Court in lieu thereof gave the appellant a decree for maintenance from the date of suit. The parties to this suit belonged to the Ghatsila family, the senior member of which was the Raja of Dhalbhoom. The family admittedly had its origin in the North-West Provinces, from which it emigrated to Bengal at some distant period, of which no record is preserved. The Raj of Jamboni in suit came by marriage into the possession of a junior member of the same family in the early part of the eighteenth century, and has since descended in his line. The fifth in ascent from Purna Chunder was Gopinath, Raja of Jamboni. On the death of Gobindmoni, Gopinaths widow, his daughters son maintained his right of succession against a stranger who had taken possession of the Raj. In that suit the judgments, it was contended on behalf of the appellant, proceeded on the ground that the Dayabhaga law prevailed in the locality, and was applicable to the Raj. On the death of Purna Chunder, which occurred on August 23, 1886, Iswar Chunder presented an application for a certificate under Act XXVII. of 1860, alleging that under the Mitakshara law he was the heir to his deceased brother. Objections were put in by both widows. They agreed in stating that Iswar was not entitled as heir, first, because the family was not governed by Mitakshara but by Dayabhaga law ; and, secondly, because he was separate in estate from the late Raja. Each claimed the certificate for herself. Objections were put in by both widows. They agreed in stating that Iswar was not entitled as heir, first, because the family was not governed by Mitakshara but by Dayabhaga law ; and, secondly, because he was separate in estate from the late Raja. Each claimed the certificate for herself. On January 4, 1887, the District Judge decided in favour of Iswar Chunder. He found upon the evidence that he had remained joint in estate with Purna Chunder. As to the governing law, he considered that, as it was admitted the family had originated in the North-West Provinces, it must be assumed that they carried with them the Mitakshara law, and it rested upon those who asserted that they were governed by Dayab haga law to establish the fact. This, he held, the widows had failed to do. The High Court dismissed the appeal. On April 14, 1893, the appellant brought this suit against Iswar Chunder and Radha Kumari, praying for certain declarations of right in the estate, movable and immovable, left by her late husband, and for such possessor relief as followed from the declarations that might be made. She alleged that it had been decided in the litigation which ensued on Gobindmonis death that the family of Raja Gopinath was governed by the Bengal school of Hindu law, and not by the Mitakshara. She claimed that she and her co-widow were under the Bengal school entitled, as co-heiresses of her husband, to both his ancestral and self-acquired estate. She further alleged that her co-widow had fraudulently and collusively assigned all her rights in the said estate to the said Iswar Chunder in consideration of a maintenance allowance, and had thereby forfeited her right to possession of the said estate, to which, in the circumstances, she, the said Parbati, claimed to be alone entitled; and she submitted, in the alternative, that if the said Iswar Chunder should be held entitled to the said estate, she was at all events entitled to a sufficient maintenance allowance out of the same for herself, and accordingly prayed for a decree declaring her entitled either to the whole of the estate in suit, or to a half-share thereof, or to maintenance. Iswar Chunder in his written statement alleged that Gopinath was an up-country Rajput Khettri, and that he and his descendants were governed by the Mitakshara, and not the Dayabhaga; and that both by that law and by family custom he was entitled to succeed to the estate in suit as heir to Purna Chunder. He asserted that the Raj was impartible, and would go, if to any widow, to the senior, Radha Kumari, who had released all her rights to him. He denied that the mouzahs in suit were self-acquired, and alleged that they represented savings by the Court of Wards during the minority of the late Raja, and were the joint property of both brothers. Radha Kumari in her written statement alleged that she had, after the decision of the certificate case, entered into arrangements with Iswar Chunder as to her maintenance; but that if it was held that the family was governed by the Dayabhaga school of law, she claimed to be entitled either, as the first-married wife, to the whole estate, or, in any event, to one-half of the estate of her husband. The main issue was the fourth, as to the law governing the family, and under it evidence was given directed to two classes of fact (1.) cases of succession which had followed the rules of either Mitakshara or Dayabhaga law; (2.) the observance on particular ceremonial occasions of rules peculiar to either system of law. As to the local law of the district in which Jamboni and Manbhoom are situated, the Subordinate Judge made the following statement— "Dhalbhoom and Jamboni originally formed part of what was known as the Bengal Jungle Mehals. Admittedly they do not lie in Orissa, where the Mitakshara and the works of Sumbhu Kara Bajpai and Udai Kara Bajpai are of paramount authority. Jamboni has always been included in the district of Midnapore. Dhalbhoom, which had formerly been in Midnapore, was for some time in Manbhoom, and is now a part of Singbhoom. The Dayabhaga is the prevailing authority both in Manbhoom and Midnapore. Plaintiffs witnesses, Raja Natobar Singh, of Simlapal, and Raja Hara Lal Singh, of Bhalaidiha, whose veracity cannot be impeached, swear that the Mitakshara law prevails on the south of the river Subarnarekha and the Dayabhaga on the north of it, and that they are governed by the latter system of law. Plaintiffs witnesses, Raja Natobar Singh, of Simlapal, and Raja Hara Lal Singh, of Bhalaidiha, whose veracity cannot be impeached, swear that the Mitakshara law prevails on the south of the river Subarnarekha and the Dayabhaga on the north of it, and that they are governed by the latter system of law. That their place of residence as well as Dhalbhoom and Jamboni lie on the north of the Subarnarekha goes without saying. Such being the case, Dhalbhoom and Jamboni cannot but be taken to be a place where the Dayabhaga is in force." The Subordinate Judge upon issue 4 found that Jamboni, which had belonged to Raja Gopinath, had been permanently settled by the Government with Gobindmoni, his widow, in a.d. 1791; that she was succeeded by Kamala Kant, the grandson of Raja Gopinath; and that the present Jamboni Raj family was a branch of the Ghatsila Dhal family; that the original place of residence of the family could not be ascertained; that there was no reliable evidence to shew whether the family of the Dhal Rajas was originally governed by the Mitakshara or by the Dayabhaga school of Hindu law; that under these circumstances there could be no pre sumption from the place of origin of the parties as to the law by which they were to be governed. He then took up the consideration of whether, by reason of the place where the estates Dhalbhoom and Jamboni are situated, the law which governed their descent was the Mitakshara or the Dayabhaga. He found that they did not lie in Orissa, but that if they did the case would be governed by the Mitakshara, as in Orissa that system of law was of paramount authority. He held (see the passage above cited) that the Jamboni zemindary had always been included in the distrit of Midnapore, and that the Dhalbhoom zemindary, which had been in Manbhoom, was now in Singbhoom, and that both Midnapore and Manbhoom are districts where the Dayabhaga and not Mitakshara law prevails. He held (see the passage above cited) that the Jamboni zemindary had always been included in the distrit of Midnapore, and that the Dhalbhoom zemindary, which had been in Manbhoom, was now in Singbhoom, and that both Midnapore and Manbhoom are districts where the Dayabhaga and not Mitakshara law prevails. He also found that in this family the rites and ceremonies ordained by the Dayabhaga were observed, and that therefore the succession to the Raj must be regulated by that school of Hindu law, and under that law he held that the appellant was entitled to the estate of her late husband, Raja Purna Chunder, as Radha Kumari had assigned away her rights in the same. He accordingly decreed in favour of the plaintiff that she should recover all the properties sued for, not as full owner, but as manager, rendering to the Court a full account of the income at the end of each year, and paying to the second defendant the maintenance which she had agreed to accept from the first defendant. As regards priority between the two Rani, he found that Radha Kumari had precedence over Parbati, though the latter was senior in age. " For since the defendant No. 2, acting in collusion with defendant No. 1, has renounced her rights as heir after the disposal of the certificate case on the allegation that, the family being governed by the law of Mitakshara,, Iswar Chunder was entitled to succeed by the law of survivorship, she has no longer any claim to her husbands estate, and the plaintiff, as the next in rank, has the right to step in and succeed to the entire Raj\" With regard to the properties scheduled to the plaint as self-acquired by the deceased, he held that their acquisition by the Court of Wards for Purna Chunder with the income of his ancestral estate, while it was under their management, did not make them the self-acquired properties of Purna. " The true test in cases of fresh acquisitions to an impartible estate is a question of intention as to whether the zemindar by whom they were acquired meant to incorporate them with the parent estate, or treat them as his separate property; and where they are not alienated during his lifetime either by will or otherwise, the presumption is that his intention was to add them to the estate. (Lak shmipathi v. Kandasami, ( 1892) Ind. L. R. 16 Madr. 54; Ramasami Kamaya Naik v. Sundaralingasami, ( 1894) Ind. L. R. 1.7 Madr. 422.) On the Contrary, there is direct evidence in this case as to these properties having been treated by Purna Chunder as part and parcel of the zemindary. That being so, this issue must be found against the plaintiff." Iswar Chunder appealed from this decree, the appellant filing a memorandum of cross-objections. The High Court came to the conclusion that the family came from the North-West, and were Khettris by caste, and that ever since they had succeeded to the Raj of Jamboni the descent of property had been the same as in the Ghatsila family, and had been governed by the Mitakshara law; that this descent was in the male line not confined to the direct issue, and that there had been no instance in which the estate had been inherited by a woman. They further held that, even if they had not come to that conclusion, the appellant had no present right to possession of the property, or to maintain the suit. The material passages in their judgment are as follows " We think that there can be no doubt whatsoever that this family must be dealt with as Khettris who had come from the North-West, where the Mitakshara law prevails, and settled down in Orissa some hundred years ago, where the Mitakshara, with the Commentaries of Sumbhukara Bajpai and Udaikara Bajpai, is an authority; and the question we have to decide is whether this up-country family, governed by the Mitakshara law, who settled down in another country also governed by the Mitakshara, has abandoned that law and adopted the law of a foreign province. Where a family governed by one law migrates into a country where another law of inheritance is prevalent, the supposition is that they carry their own personal law with them, and strong proof is required from the person making the assertion that they have abandoned the one and adopted the other. But in this case the onus of proof is much heavier. But in this case the onus of proof is much heavier. This is not, as we have said, a case of people leaving a province governed by one law and residing in a province governed by another it is the case where they leave a province governed by the Mitakshara, and migrate to another where the Mitakshara is the law of the land; and this - requires much more proof than the other. They then examined the evidence, and came to conclusions opposed to those of the Subordinate Judge, that the rites and ceremonies observed in this family in marriages, births, shradhs, and periods of impurity were those of the Mitakshara, or at least more consonant with those of the Mitakshara than with the law of Bengal. Mayne, for the appellant, contended that this judgment was wrong, and that on the whole evidence the Court ought to have held that succession to the estate was governed by the Dayabhaga law. So far as locality is concerned, the High Court was wrong in finding that the Mitakshara prevails in Midnapore, which, at all events as far as its southern district including the estate in dispute is concerned, is in Bengal, and not, as the High Court thought, in Orissa see fifth report of the Select Committee, Madras ed. p. 465, and Hunters Gazetteer, vol. ix. p. 423. The Dayabhaga prevails in the Bengal provinces, and therefore in Midnapore see Morleys Digest, Introd. p. 190, and Bishen Pirea Munee v. Ranee Soogunda ((1801) 1 Sel Rep. 37), and note at the end of the case, said in the preface to have been approved by the judges. No doubt the evidence as to actual successions is somewhat meagre. The only previous case with regard to the Jamboni Raj, i.e., in the family which traces its descent from Gopinath, in which a failure of male heirs in the direct line has occurred, was on the death of Gopinath. He left an undivided brothers son named Abhiram, who was excluded by his widow Gobindmoni. On her death there were two suits, one by Abhiram, and the other by Kamala Kant and Roghunath, Gopinaths daughters sons, to recover the zemindary, which had been taken possession of by one Madan Mohun Mahapatra, who claimed partly as next heir of Gopinath, partly as assignee of his widow. Abhirams suit was compromised, but the terms are unknown. On her death there were two suits, one by Abhiram, and the other by Kamala Kant and Roghunath, Gopinaths daughters sons, to recover the zemindary, which had been taken possession of by one Madan Mohun Mahapatra, who claimed partly as next heir of Gopinath, partly as assignee of his widow. Abhirams suit was compromised, but the terms are unknown. It appears from the District Judges judgment in the other suit that the defendant therein contended that the Dayabhaga law was not applicable, but that the decision was that, according to the Shastras of the Bengal school prevailing in the Midnapore district, daughters sons succeeded in the absence of sons and grandsons. This decision was in 1822, and it was confirmed by the Provincial Court of Calcutta in 1826. In the Ghatsila family two cases occurred, one on the death of Baikant II., where a brother succeeded in preference to the widow under circumstances which do not appear. The other was in 1887, when Ramchunder II. died. His senior widow and a male collateral disputed the succession, the question being whether it was regulated by the Dayabhaga or Mitakshara. In that litigation the widow who claimed under the Dayabhaga failed. On the other hand, in the Raipore and other families in the neighbourhood it was not disputed that they were governed by the Dayabhaga, and that the widow was preferred to the brother. The other ground on which, it was contended that the Dayabhaga prevailed in this family was that the evidence of ceremonial usages therein at marriages, births, shradhs, and deaths shewed that they had adopted those which were peculiar to the Dayabhaga, and which materially differed from those under the Mitakshara. The probability of families migrating to a district where Bengal law prevailed adopting the ceremonies and usages of the neighbouring families was very great, and should be allowed due weight in comparing the copious and contradictory evidence of the witnesses on either side. It was contended that the preferential title of the widow over that of the brother was made out. With regard to her preferential title over her co-widow, it was contended that, as the first-married wife of Purna Chunder, she was entitled to the sole possession of the impartible zemindary. She and the second respondent, Parbati, would be joint owners of all partible property. With regard to her preferential title over her co-widow, it was contended that, as the first-married wife of Purna Chunder, she was entitled to the sole possession of the impartible zemindary. She and the second respondent, Parbati, would be joint owners of all partible property. But it was contended that after the successive renunciations of her title which Radha Kumari had. made in 1889 and 1891 in favour of the respondent Iswar, neither he, nor she could still assert that she had any title prior to that of her co-widow. The effect of those documents was that she admitted that she never had any title. With regard to the scheduled properties, which admittedly represent the savings made by the Court of Wards during the minority of Purna Chunder, it was contended that they were not property which could pass by survivorship to Iswar Chunder. The only evidence relating to them did not point to any incorporation of them with the bulk of the estate, or intimate any intention on the part of Purna Chunder that the succession thereto should be the same as to his ancestral estate. They were his self-acquired property, and in the absence of any contrary intention, well ascertained by the evidence, must devolve, on the assumption that the Mitakshara applied, according to the rule of that law applicable to self-acquisitions, which rule was in favour of the appellant see Ramasami Chetti v. Seshama Nayanivara. (( 1881) Ind. L. K. 3 Madr. 145, 150,154.) Of course, if they were treated as a joint acquisition governed by the Mitakshara, the brother would succeed in preference to the widow see Ramanna v. Venkata. (( 1888) Ind. L. R. 11 Madr. 246,) Asquith, K.C., and Branson, for the first respondent, namely, Iswar Chunders heir, contended that the High Court had rightly held that the descent in the Jamboni family was governed by the Mitakshara, and not by the Dayabhaga. The family came from the North-West, where the Mitakshara prevailed, and the presumption was that they carried their usages and religious ceremonies, and therefore their law, with them see Soorendra Nath Roy v. Heeramonee Burmoneah (( 1868) 12 Moores Ind. Ap. Ca. 81.); Ram Bromo Pandah v. Kaminee Soonduree Dossee. (( 1866) 6 Suth. W. K. 295. The family came from the North-West, where the Mitakshara prevailed, and the presumption was that they carried their usages and religious ceremonies, and therefore their law, with them see Soorendra Nath Roy v. Heeramonee Burmoneah (( 1868) 12 Moores Ind. Ap. Ca. 81.); Ram Bromo Pandah v. Kaminee Soonduree Dossee. (( 1866) 6 Suth. W. K. 295. 248.) The true inference from the evidence is that Jamboni is in Orissa; but that merely goes to the improbability of a Mitakshara family migrating from one Mitakshara district to another adopting Dayabhaga customs. It has to be proved affirmatively that this family did so. The evidence is all the other way. According to the appellants case, the only instance of a widow apparently succeeding is a doubtful one, and occurred nearly a century ago. The more recent instances in this family are in favour of the brother. The oral evidence also shews that the rites and ceremonies observed by this family at births, marriages, and deaths are more in accordance with the Mitakshara than with the Dayabhaga. The appellant has failed to shew that they were either originally or by choice governed by the Bengal law. With regard to the four mouzahs, there was no evidence that they were intended to be treated as self-acquisitions. The evidence is that they were intended to be added to and form part of the Raj estate. Even if the Dayabhaga prevailed, the appellant would have no right as against the co-widow, for she is not the first-married wife of Purna Chundr, though senior in age to Radha Kumari. Mayne replied. 1902. Feb. 22. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD ROBERTSON. The questions raised by this appeal relate to the succession of Raja Purna Chunder, who died on August 23, 1886. He left no issue, but was survived by two widows and a half-brother. One of the two widows, Rani Radha Kumari Debi, granted a release, and, although appearing as a defendant in this suit, raised no claim adverse to the interest of the half-brother, and does not appear in this appeal. The half-brother has died since this suit was instituted, and is now represented by his son, the minor respondent. One of the two widows, Rani Radha Kumari Debi, granted a release, and, although appearing as a defendant in this suit, raised no claim adverse to the interest of the half-brother, and does not appear in this appeal. The half-brother has died since this suit was instituted, and is now represented by his son, the minor respondent. The present controversy is between the appellant, who is the other widow, on the one hand, and the son of the brother on the other hand, and relates to two subject-matters of very different values. Those are—(1.) the ancestral estates of the deceased Purna Chunder, which are situate in the Jungle Mehals of Midnapore, and are claimed by the appellant on the ground that the succession is governed by the Dayabhaga law, which would give it to her; and (2.) four mouzahs, bought by the Court of Wards with the savings of Purna Chunders estate while it was under their management, which the appellant claims, even assuming the Mitakshara law to govern the succession. The respondents answer to the claim to the ancestral estate is that the Mitakshara and not the Dayabhaga law rules, and under the Mitakshara law he is the undoubted heir; but he says further that, even if the Dayabhaga law governed, the right to compete with him would lie, not in the appellant, but in the other widow, who has renounced her rights in his favour. On the question of the four mouzahs, he maintains that the conduct of Purna Chunder in dealing with this property shewed his intention that it should go with the ancestral properties. By much the most important and complicated question thus raised is as to which system of law governs this succession, the Mitakshara or the Dayabhaga. The suit was brought by the appellant, whose plaint was filed on April 14, 1893, the lands in dispute having by this time been taken possession of by the half-brother. The defendants were Iswar Chunder (the half-brother) and Radha Kumari, the other widow. The suit was brought by the appellant, whose plaint was filed on April 14, 1893, the lands in dispute having by this time been taken possession of by the half-brother. The defendants were Iswar Chunder (the half-brother) and Radha Kumari, the other widow. The appellant prayed for a declaration that she was entitled, either jointly with the other widow or exclusively, to the whole estate, movable or immovable, of the deceased Purna Chunder, or for a similar declaration as regards his self-acquired property, or to maintenance The appellant alleged that upon the death of her husband, who (as she averred) like his ancestors had lived under and was governed by the Bengal school of the Hindu law, she and the other widow, as his co-heiresses, became entitled to the Jamboni Raj, which was the ancestral estate, and also to his self-acquired properties. It was further averred that the second defendant (the other widow) had granted to the first defendant a release and declaration, which transaction was characterised as fraudulent and collusive. The plaint, and by consequence, all the proceedings were greatly inflated and complicated by a number of questions, now extinct, which it would be superfluous to rehearse. Written statements were filed on behalf of both defendants. The first defendant, Iswar Chunder, claimed the Raj as heir under the Mitakshara law, and also the long-standing custom and usage of the family. He explained that his ancestors were originally inhabitants of Dharanuggur in the North-West Provinces, where the Mitakshara Shastra was in force; that they came from there and took possession of the lands now in question; that since then, and to the present time, their family ceremonies have been performed according to the Mitakshara; and that the right of inheritance is determined according to it. As to the second defendant (i.e., the other widow), Iswar Chunder alleged that the release granted by her was executed in good faith, and because she knew, and thereby acknowledged, that the Mitakshara law governed the succession, that any rights she had were vested in the first defendant, and could not be held to be acquired by the plaintiff. As to the second defendant (i.e., the other widow), Iswar Chunder alleged that the release granted by her was executed in good faith, and because she knew, and thereby acknowledged, that the Mitakshara law governed the succession, that any rights she had were vested in the first defendant, and could not be held to be acquired by the plaintiff. As regards the four mouzahs, the first defendant (Iswar) alleged that the right to them had been acquired by the Court of Wards (when the Raja Purna was under that Court in minority) out of the profits of the Raj Jamboni, and must be " taken as a ... part of the joint original impartible estate." A written statement was also filed for the second defendant, the other widow, in which she made no claim adverse to the first defendant, and took his side in denying the appellants claim. Her fourth and sixth statements set out a further obstacle in the appellants way, strongly insisted on in argument by the respondent, the representative of the first defendant, but which only arises for consideration if the Dayabhaga law applies— "4. This defendant further submits, that if the Court holds that the family of this defendants husband was governed by the Dayabhaga Shastra, this defendant, by reason of her being the Pat-Mohisi and of the zemindari being impartible, is alone entitled to get the said zemindari, &c, and the plaintiff cannot acquire any right therein, and the said right cannot at all be taken to have been extinguished in connection with or in favour of the plaintiff, and no right can accrue to the plaintiff." "6. This defendant is the elder wife, i.e., the first-married Pat-Mohisi of her husband, and she is older than the plaintiff. The statement made by the plaintiff in paragraph 12 of the plaint, that she is older than this defendant, is not true." Her fifth statement also must be noted, having regard to eventualities— "5. If the Court holds that the movable and immovable properties mentioned in Sched. The statement made by the plaintiff in paragraph 12 of the plaint, that she is older than this defendant, is not true." Her fifth statement also must be noted, having regard to eventualities— "5. If the Court holds that the movable and immovable properties mentioned in Sched. C were the self-acquired properties of my late husband, and that the plaintiff and this defendant both were our husbands heirs with regard to the same, this defendant submits that this defendant is entitled to get an eight annas share of the said properties, and the said right cannot be taken to have been extinguished or relinquished in favour of the plaintiff by the deed of release mentioned above executed by this defendant. Accordingly, the plaintiffs claim with regard to the sixteen annas of the same is wholly improper." Various issues were settled and tried; but of these the fourth (as to the law governing the succession), the ninth (as to the effect of the defendants widows release), and the eleventh, whether the four mouzahs were self-acquired, state the only questions argued under the present appeal. After much procedure, the examination of many witnesses, and the production of several documents, the first Subordinate Judge of Midnapore on February 26, 1895, gave judgment. He held that the Dayabhaga law governed the succession, and ordered that the plaintiff (appellant) do recover possession of all the properties in suit. This order was qualified by a declaration (not satisfactory to the appellant, and not very clearly explainable) that, instead of being full owner, the plaintiff should recover possession as manager. Against this decree appeals were taken both by the present respondents (for Iswar was now dead) and the present appellant; and on May 17, 1897, the High Court at Fort William set aside the decision and dismissed the suit as regards possession of movables and immovable, and ordered an allowance of maintenance. The main ground of judgment was that the Mitakshara law governed the succession; and this superseded the question as to the rights of the appellant in relation to the other widow, even assuming the Dayabhaga to prevail. The question of the four mouzahs is not discussed in the judgment. The main ground of judgment was that the Mitakshara law governed the succession; and this superseded the question as to the rights of the appellant in relation to the other widow, even assuming the Dayabhaga to prevail. The question of the four mouzahs is not discussed in the judgment. In comparing the judgment of the Subordinate Judge, which was in favour of the appellant, on the main question between the Mitakshara and the Dayabhaga with the judgment of the High Court, which was for the respondents, their Lordships take note of two facts. The first and most important is that the Subordinate Judge fell into the grave error of holding that the origin of this family was unknown and its original place of residence unascertainable ; that there was no evidence worthy of reliance to shew whether they were originally governed by the Mitakshara or by the Dayabhaga; and, " that being so, the defendant is not entitled to the benefit of the presumption Lald down in, Soorendra Nath Roy v. Mussumat Heeramonee Burmoneah (12 Moores Ind. Ap. 81; S.C. 10 W. R. P. C. 35), and in the other cases cited by the defence." So far are the facts on this matter (which the High Court has justly treated as of primary importance) from being uncertain, that it was not disputed at their Lordships bar that this family came originally from the North-West, where the Mitakshara undoubtedly prevailed, and that the only question was whether it was not to be inferred from the facts that they had divested themselves of their original customs and adopted the rule of the Mitakshara. The other criticism to be made on the judgment of the Subordinate Judge is that, holding himself to be thus exempt from any presumption in favour of the respondents, he has not merely based himself upon testimony which has been handled with great caution by the party whom it purports to support, but he has accepted as credible and rejected as incredible large numbers of witnesses with a freedom and on grounds which would have commanded more confidence if the learned judge had had the advantage of seeing the witnesses. As matter of fact, the great majority of the witnesses were examined before his predecessor and very few before himself. As matter of fact, the great majority of the witnesses were examined before his predecessor and very few before himself. Accordingly, the High Court have felt justified in forming their own conclusions as to the effect and quality of the evidence; and after careful examination their Lordships see no ground for disputing the soundness of their appreciations. This necessarily goes far towards deciding the case, once the broader conditions of the controversy are fully realized. The question of succession now in dispute depends upon the custom of the family; and in families observing the Mitakshara Shastra the brother, and not the widow of a childless man, takes an ancestral estate. The tenacity of such customs, even under the strain of migration, has been repeatedly recognised by the law in questions such as the present. Accordingly, the question being primarily one of personal as distinguished from geographical custom, it is of the first importance to inquire of the origin of the family. Now, amid a mass of contradiction on almost everything else, it is undisputed that these people came from the North-West. Tradition names Dharanuggur as their original home ; but the precise place is of no moment, for it is not suggested that in any place in the North-West does the Dayabhaga prevail. The presumption, therefore, is that the family continued to observe the Mitakshara, and it remains to see whether the contrary has been proved. The occasions which afford the most direct evidence are successions. Now, with the doubtful exception of the succession of Gobindmoni about a century ago, the appellant has no such case to point to, while, as regards Gobindmoni, it is not satisfactorily proved that her competitor had any genuine right such as would have brought him under the Mitakshara rules of succession. On the other hand, in at least two more recent instances, widows have been passed over in favour of brothers, where none but conjectural explanations can be offered, consistent with the Dayabhaga rule. When, returning from successions, regard is had to the evidence relating to ceremonies at marriages, births, and shradhs, it cannot be disputed that there is a strong body of affirmative evidence in support of the continuance and against the relinquishment of the Mitakshara in this family. When, returning from successions, regard is had to the evidence relating to ceremonies at marriages, births, and shradhs, it cannot be disputed that there is a strong body of affirmative evidence in support of the continuance and against the relinquishment of the Mitakshara in this family. The High Court, in a careful analysis, have stated their reasons for preferring the respondents evidence to that adduced for the appellant, and the able arguments at their Lordships bar have satisfied them of the soundness of this conclusion. Nor do their Lordships see that the most abundant caution need restrain them from accepting as authentic the several documents which have been relied on by the High Court, and the import of which is unmistakable. The learned counsel for the appellant placed before their Lordships an elaborate argumentative demonstration of the history and geographical application of the name Orissa. The bearing of this upon the present question is only that the estate in dispute being (according to the argument) in a district where the Dayabhaga prevailed, the family would be more likely to fall in with the customs of their neighbours and adopt the Dayabhaga. Their Lordships, satisfied on the evidence bearing directly on the family in question, do not require to pronounce on a matter relating to a district on which they have not complete materials, and their opinion on which might needlessly affect other interests. On the question of the four mouzahs, their Lordships regret that they have not the assistance of the High Courts judgment; but they find themselves unable to reject the appellants claim. The property in dispute was bought for Purna Chunder by the Court of Wards out of savings of the zemindary, and must be considered as Purna Chunders savings. All that the respondents can point to as indicating Pumas intention to deal with them as part of the Raj is that the rents were collected by the same servant, and the collection papers kept with the papers of the Raj. Their Lordships do not find in these meagre facts adequate grounds for holding that the Raja intended to incorporate the four mouzahs with the ancestral estate for the purposes of his succession. The four mouzahs must, therefore, follow the rule of the Mitakshara law as to self-acquired property. Their Lordships do not find in these meagre facts adequate grounds for holding that the Raja intended to incorporate the four mouzahs with the ancestral estate for the purposes of his succession. The four mouzahs must, therefore, follow the rule of the Mitakshara law as to self-acquired property. The argument addressed to their Lordships about the four mouzahs was confined to the question whether they were self-acquired, and it might perhaps be inferred that the success of the appellant on that issue involved her right to possession of the mouzahs. But, in face of the claim made by the respondent Rani Radha Kumari Debi in the fifth article of her written statement, their Lordships deem it well, before reporting to His Majesty, to give the parties an opportunity, if they so desire, of being heard on the disposal of the four mouzahs, on the footing that they are held by their Lordships to be self-acquired property, and on the High Courts order for maintenance, which was made on a footing now displaced. The following addendum to their Lordships judgment was delivered by Lord Robertson on March 19, 1902— Their Lordships have further considered this appeal with reference to the points raised in the last paragraph of their judgment of February 22, and the observations of counsel thereon on March 1, and they will humbly advise His Majesty that, subject to the recommendation below, the decree of the High Court of May 17, 1897, ought to be affirmed and this appeal dismissed. And they will further humbly recommend His Majesty to make a declaration that the four mouzahs in question are self-acquired property, and to remit the suit to the High Court with directions to try or cause to be tried any issues which may be raised by the parties to the suit, or any one or more of them, for the purpose of having determined any question consequent on the declaration, more especially as to the right to the four mouzahs, or to maintenance out of the impartible estate. The appellant will pay the first respondent (who alone appeared in England) three fourth parts of his costs of the appeal.