JUDGMENT 1. The Petitioners were ordered by the Deputy Magistrate to give security for good behaviour, and that order was maintained in a modified form by the District Magistrate on appeal. The Petitioner then applied to this Court for the issue of a rule to show cause why the orders passed against them should not be set aside. A rule was accordingly issued by this Court to show cause why the order of the Deputy Magistrate modified by the District Magistrate on appeal should not be set aside on the ground, first, that the Petitioners had not had a fair trial owing to the proceedings of the Magistrate in committing certain witnesses for intentionally giving false evidence inasmuch as they had deposed in favour of the Petitioners, and, secondly, that the Magistrate had, on insufficient grounds, rejected the sureties tendered by the Petitioners. The first ground has not been pressed before us by the learned counsel for the Petitioners. The second ground does not appear to us to affect in any way the question whether the order requiring the Petitioners to give security for good behaviour was a good one or not, and no application has been made to us, nor has any rule issued from this Court directed to the question whether the sureties who were tendered but were rejected by the Magistrate ought now to be accepted by that officer. 2. In this state of the case we have no alternative but to discharge the rule. We see, however, that certain persons who were tendered as sureties to the Deputy Magistrate were rejected by that officer on such grounds as that "they were unfit to control the Defendant;" that they were not residents of the village, and, in one case, that two persons were members of the same firm. 3. We think that we ought to point out to the Deputy Magistrate that these are not valid grounds for refusing to accept a surety under sec. 122 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. As regards the question of residents or non-residents, we may refer the Deputy Magistrate to the case of Abinash Malabar v. The Empress 4 C. W. N. 797 (1900). The question is not whether or not a surety can supervise a person for whom he stands surety, but whether he is a person of sufficient substance to warrant his being accepted. The question is not whether or not a surety can supervise a person for whom he stands surety, but whether he is a person of sufficient substance to warrant his being accepted. With these observations we discharge the rule.