JUDGMENT 1. The Petitioner in this case was convicted under sec. 448 of the Indian Penal Code, and was sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 50, and in default to be rigorously imprisoned for one month. At the time of passing the sentence an order was also made requiring the Petitioner to execute a bond of Re. 100 with one surety in a like amount to keep the peace for one year, and in default, directing that he should undergo one year's simple imprisonment under the provisions of sec. 106 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This rule was issued upon the District Magistrate to show cause why the order directing the Petitioner to furnish security to keep the peace should not be set aside on the ground that it is not in accordance with sec. 106 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 2. On looking into the judgment in the case, we find that the house-trespass is found by the Magistrate to have been committed for the purpose of causing hurt to the complainant. It is found that as a matter of fact hurt was caused to him. 3. We have been referred to the concluding paragraph of the judgment of this Court in the case of Subol Chunder Dey v. Ram Kanai Sanyasi I. L. R. 25 Cal. 628 (1867). In that case the Petitioner had been convicted of house-trespass, having entered the house for the purpose of having illicit intercourse with the complainant's wife, and it was held that the mere fact that, while in the house, the Petitioner threatened to beat the complainant was not sufficient to justify an order under sec. 106 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in the absence of a conviction for an offence of assault or criminal intimidation. On behalf of the Crown in that case, the case of Queen v. Gendoo Khan 7 W. R. Cr. R. 14 (1867) and the Queen v. Jhapoo 20 W. R. Cr. R. 37 (1873) were cited. Those were both cases in which the accused persons had been convicted of criminal trespass only, and yet had been directed under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure then in force which corresponds to those of sec 106 of the present Code of Criminal Procedure to furnish security for keeping the peace. R. 37 (1873) were cited. Those were both cases in which the accused persons had been convicted of criminal trespass only, and yet had been directed under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure then in force which corresponds to those of sec 106 of the present Code of Criminal Procedure to furnish security for keeping the peace. It was held in the case to which we have referred that both those cases were clearly distinguishable and had been rightly decided, inasmuch as it had been found in those cases that the intention of the accused in committing the trespass was to commit a breach of the peace. Similarly, in the present case, the whole and sole object of the house-trespass appears to have been the commission of a breach of the peace; and that being so, we think that the provisions of sec. 106 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are applicable to it. 4. We may mention that we have been referred to a case Reporters' note.--See the case of Baidya Nath Majumdar v. Nibaran Gope, 6 C. W. N. 293 very recently decided by ourselves, in which we held that in a case where there was a mere conviction of trespass an order passed under sec. 106 was bad for want of a finding of facts which indicated an intention to cause a breach of the peace. All that we need say is that that case was decided on its own facts and that our decision in that case does not appear to us to have any application whatsoever to the present case. We discharge the rule.