JUDGMENT 1. The Appellants have been convicted under sec. 395 of the Indian Penal Code, at a trial held by jury of the offence of dacoity. The first three Appellants, Jamiruddin, Meher Ali Mondul and Hadan, have been sentenced to transportation for life on the ground that they were convicted of a similar offence at a trial held a few days before the present one and were sentenced to seven years' rigorous imprisonment on that occasion. 2. The 4th Appellant, Dwarik, and the 10th Duti Kalu alias Dudh Malik have been sentenced each to 10 years' transportation on the ground that each has a previous conviction of theft standing against him. 3. The 6th Appellant, Nayan Sha, has been sentenced to 8 years' rigorous imprisonment as having taken a leading part in the dacoity. 4. The remaining Appellants have been sentenced each to seven years' rigorous imprisonment. 5. We regret to be constrained to remark that the case has been put before the jury in a manner very far from satisfactory. It is of the first importance in cases of this kind, where several accused persons are being tried together on evidence which is not identical, that the evidence affecting each individual should be clearly and carefully placed before the jury and that their attention should be prominently drawn to the considerations by which they may properly be guided in estimating the value of the evidence. To tell a jury generally, as has been done with regard to some of the Appellants in this case, that they "have the approver's deposition and the corroborative evidence" without pointing out as regards each person what the corroborative evidence is, is to give them no guidance at all. The omission is the more serious in a case like the present one, in which the principal evidence against most of the accused is that of an approver. 6. In one part of the charge to the jury the learned Sessions Judge has enumerated eight pieces of what he calls "independent corroborative evidence." Some of these are irrelevant and others do not furnish the particular kind of corroboration which is required to confirm the evidence of an approver, that is, corroboration as to the connection of the persons implicated by him with the commission of the offence with which they are charged. 7. 7. Thus the first piece of evidence mentioned by the Sessions Judge, which proves that certain of the Appellants were in the habit of meeting with some other persons for the purpose of playing cards is entirely irrelevant. While facts such as that the approver pointed out to the Deputy Magistrate the different places mentioned by him in his confession and that circumstances were found to exist (as the removal of Hakim Sha's boat, the breaking of the fence near the home of the Shas and the like) which were consistent with the approver's story as to things done by the dacoits afford no corroboration as to the part which the Appellants are said to have taken in the commission of the offence. 8. The fact is that there are only three of the Appellants whose conviction can be maintained on the record before us : Hadan and Rahim, both of whom made confessions which were separately tested by the Deputy Magistrate by going over the ground with each of them and found to agree with the statement of the approver, similarly tested, and Nayan Sha, in whose house were found two of the articles stolen in the docoity. 9. As regards none of the remaining Appellants is there corroborative evidence sufficient to connect them with the offence except in the case of Nilmoni and Duti Kalu alias Dudh Malik, and the verdict against these two men is vitiated by the fact that the effect of the evidence against them was not properly put before the jury. 10. Nilmoni is said to have been identified by Nibaran and Nabodip as having been present at the dacoity and that part of the case is put in this way to the jury.......... "You have it from the evidence of the boy Nabodip and of Nibaran that Nilmoni was among the dacoits. The defence have tried to show that Nilmoni's name was not mentioned to the Police, but if that is so, why did the Police search his house ?" 11. Now, in the first place what Nibaran said about the identification was only that "there was another man like Nilmoni" and clearly his exact words ought to have been put before the jury. Now, in the first place what Nibaran said about the identification was only that "there was another man like Nilmoni" and clearly his exact words ought to have been put before the jury. It should also have been pointed out to them, 1st, that Nibaran admits that he did not make that statement to the Sub-Inspector in the morning, though he insists that he did make it to him at some time or other, and 2nd, that the way in which the first information was given to the Police goes strongly against the theory that any of the dacoits were recognised at the time of the occurrence. The information was given by Kafiluddin, the Chowkidar, instructed, as he says, by Nibaran among others. He swears that neither Nibaran nor any body else told him that he had recognised any of the dacoits and we find as a matter of fact that in giving the information he stated that the offenders were persons unknown and that he 'could not say to what caste, or tribe, or part of the country they belonged, how they looked, or what cry they uttered.' 12. We find that Nabodip is a little boy whose age is stated as from 5 to 7 years. Being ill, he was not examined at the trial; but his deposition before the Committing Magistrate was put in. There is nothing in the charge to the jury from which these circumstances could be gathered. There is nothing to show that it was suggested to them that they should exercise any caution in acting upon the evidence of a very young child, whom they had not before them, so that they had not any opportunity of observing his demeanour, while his story as told to the Committing Magistrate had very briefly and summarily recorded and had not been subjected to the test of cross-examination. Neither was it pointed out that in his case, as in that of Nibaran, the way in which the first information was given presented difficulties which the jury were bound to take into consideration. 13. Neither was it pointed out that in his case, as in that of Nibaran, the way in which the first information was given presented difficulties which the jury were bound to take into consideration. 13. Again with regard to the searching of Nilmoni's house we see that the Sub-Inspector says that he searched "10 or 15" houses in the village, so that the suggestion that the mere fact of this particular house having been searched indicated that the owner's name must have been mentioned as that of a person recognised at the time of the occurrence was evidently misleading to the Jury. 14. The evidence against Duti Kalu alias Dudh Malik is thus summed up by the learned Sessions Judge: "Nibaran Shah thinks that he recognised this man and you have the evidence about the gamcka which he is said to have left behind at the scene of the dacoity. Then you have the evidence of his own sister, Mairam, as regards his presence at Nayan Sha's. Do you think the fact that he has had a quarrel with his sister is insufficient to induce her to depose falsely against him and the other accused? His name has been mentioned by Fatik [the approver] from the first." 15. Here, again, the attention of the jury should have been drawn, not only to the circumstances in which the first information was given, but to Nibaran's own most damaging admission in cross-examination, that he had not mentioned the name of Duti when the latter was brought by the Inspector to the village. 16. The reference in general terms to "the evidence about the gamcha" was altogether insufficient. It should have been pointed out exactly what the evidence to connect Duti with it really was. One of the two witnesses who identified it as his property was his sister and as regards her, again, the general reference to Duti's 'having had a quarrel with his sister' was not sufficient, in the face of the fact, which we find she admitted in cross-examination, that she had actually given evidence against him once before in a criminal case. 17. It does not appear to us necessary to go more fully into the evidence. We have sufficiently indicated the defects which in our opinion have vitiated the verdict against all but three of the Appellants. 18. 17. It does not appear to us necessary to go more fully into the evidence. We have sufficiently indicated the defects which in our opinion have vitiated the verdict against all but three of the Appellants. 18. As regards the question of sentence, the dacoity was a bad one and we agree with the Court below that the Appellant Nayan Sha took a very prominent part in it. We therefore maintain the sentence which has been passed upon him. The sentence of transportation for life passed upon Hadan is unnecessarily severe. We alter it to a sentence of rigorous imprisonment for seven years, to take effect from the expiry of the sentence which he is now undergoing. The sentence of seven years' rigorous imprisonment passed upon Rahim is maintained. The conviction and sentences are set aside in the case of the remaining Appellants who will be released unless they are liable to be kept in confinement on some sentence or order other than the sentences hereby set aside.