JUDGMENT Francis W. Maclean K.C.L.E., C.J. - As I was a party to the decision In the matter of Jogendra Narayan Bose (1900) 5 C.W.N. 48, which put the more narrow construction on the words, "any other reasonable cause" in Section 13 of the Legal Practitioners Act, I only propose to say that, alter the much fuller discussion in the present case, I resile from my earlier opinion and concur in the judgment about to be delivered by Mr. Justice Hill, which accords with the view taken in the case of In the matter of Puran Chunder Pal ILR (1899) Cal. 1023. The case, to the judgment in which I was a party, was not very fully discussed before us and on more mature reflection I think the words "other reasonable cause" may be fairly read in their ordinary and literal sense, and if so read, need not be confined to reasonable cause of the same description or class as is referred to in the preceding portion of Section 13. And if the words will, read as I have said, fairly and reasonably bear this construction, as I think they will, I do not see why we should place the narrower construction upon them, which would have the effect of cramping the very useful and salutary jurisdiction which the Legislature intended to confer upon the Court in the case of mis-conduct by legal practitioners. 2. Concurring as I do in Mr. Justice Hill's reasoning and conclusion, I do not think it is necessary to add anything more. Prinsep J. 3. I have had the advantage of reading the judgment of Mr. Justice Hill, about to be delivered and I agree with him. I have nothing to add. Ghosh J. 4. I have had the advantage of perusing the judgment which Mr. Justice Hill has prepared, but I regret I am unable to come to the same conclusion at which he has arrived. 5. I adhere to the views I expressed in the case of Purna Chunder Pal ILR (1899) Cal. 1023. I then discussed somewhat fully the question referred to the Full Bench and it is not necessary to go over the same grounds again. There are, however, a few observations which, in view of the contrary opinion expressed by some of the learned Judges, I consider it desirable to make. 6. 1023. I then discussed somewhat fully the question referred to the Full Bench and it is not necessary to go over the same grounds again. There are, however, a few observations which, in view of the contrary opinion expressed by some of the learned Judges, I consider it desirable to make. 6. The learned Judges, who have referred the question to the Full Bench, have expressed the opinion that the words "for any other reasonable cause," occurring in Section 13, Clause (f) of the Legal Practitioners Act, before it was amended by Act XI of 1896, might be properly interpreted as meaning any other cause "ejusdem generis," but that the amending Act has expanded the section so as to include "any" kind of misconduct other than professional misconduct. I desire to say that what Section 13 of the Act, of 1896 does is simply to divide the section, as it stood in the Act of 1879, into so many paragraphs or clauses and to introduce in it other cases of professional misconduct as were mentioned in Section 36 of that Act. These other cases were regarded in the Act of 1879 as offences for which the offender was liable, to be punished by imprisonment or fine or both and the Legislature in 1896 thought that they should not be so regarded, but as professional misconduct ; and they accordingly rescinded Section 36 and incorporated the cases of misconduct in a pleader or mukhtear, as mentioned there, in Section 13 of the Act, In doing so, it was evidently found convenient to divide the section into so many clauses, keeping the position of Clause (f) as it stood in the old Act. And it seems to me therefore that the Legislature did not intend to make any modification in the law in respect to the matter now before us. It has, however, been said that each of the clauses of the section, preceding Clause (f), is generally distinct from the rest and to be exhaustive of its own genus and that being so, the doctrine of ejusdem generis cannot apply. It has, however, been said that each of the clauses of the section, preceding Clause (f), is generally distinct from the rest and to be exhaustive of its own genus and that being so, the doctrine of ejusdem generis cannot apply. But it will be observed that they all involve cases of professional misconduct in different shapes and phases and some of them are akin to each other; and when Section 14 of the Act, which empowers the Subordinate Courts to take proceedings against a legal practitioner for misconduct, when and if, committed, speaks of "any such misconduct as aforesaid," it can only refer to the cases of misconduct as are in Section 13 mentioned, i.e., professional misconduct. 7. I would here refer to the canon of construction as laid down by Lord Esher in the case of Anderson v. Anderson (1895) 1 Q.B. 749, 753, a case referred to by Hill J.-where, after referring to the reservations of Lord Eldon and Knight Bruce in two earlier cases upon the question, he stated as follows: Nothing can well be plainer than that to show that prima facie general words are to be taken in their larger sense, unless you can find that in the particular case the true construction of the instrument requires you to conclude that they are intended to be used in a sense limited to things ejusdem generis with those which have been specifically mentioned before. 8. The question now before the Court is whether the true construction of Section 13 requires us to hold that the general words in Clause (f) were intended by the Legislature to be used in a sense limited to matters ejusdem generis with those enumerated in the previous clauses of the section. 9. As bearing upon this question, I desire to refer to the case of the Sun Fire Office v. Hart (1889) L.R. 14 App. Cas. 98, 103 : 58 L.J. (N.S.) Pt. 3. 9. As bearing upon this question, I desire to refer to the case of the Sun Fire Office v. Hart (1889) L.R. 14 App. Cas. 98, 103 : 58 L.J. (N.S.) Pt. 3. 69 where the conditions of a fire policy, after providing that, if after a risk undertaken the risk was increased or any property removed without the consent of the insurers, the insurance should cease to attach, provided that if by reason of change or from any other cause whatever the insurers desired to terminate the insurance, it should be lawful so to do by notice to the insured and to require the policy to be given up to be cancelled, provided the insurers refunded a ratable proportion of the premium for the unexpired time. In determining the question of construction of the words "or from any cause whatever" raised before him, Lord Watson had to consider the doctrine of ejusdem generis and he observed as follows: It was a well-known canon of construction, that where a particular enumeration is followed by such words as or other, the latter expression ought, if not enlarged by the context, to be limited to matters ejusdem generis with those specially enumerated. The canon is attended with no difficulty, except in its application. Whether it applies at all, and if so, what effect should be given to it, must in every case depend upon the precise terms, subject-matter and context of the clause under consideration. 10. His Lordship then referred to the particular condition in the policy and held that the words "or from any other cause whatever" must be read in the literal and natural sense of the language which the contracting parties had chosen to employ and that it included any and every cause which would reasonably induce the insurer to desire the determination of the policy. 11. It will he home in mind that Section 13 of the Legal Practitioners Act, after enumerating various cases of professional misconduct, says in Clause (f), "or from any other reasonable cause." The words are not "or from any other reasonable cause whatever;" and it seems to me that the observations of Lord Watson, which I have quoted, are such as lend support to the view that the doctrine of ejusdem generis is applicable in this case. 12. 12. The next case that I should desire to refer to is In re Suburban Hotel Company (1867) L.R. 2 Ch. App. Cas. 737, 741. There Lord Cairns had to consider the meaning of the general words in the 5th clause of Section 79 of the Company's Act-the words being "whenever the Court is of opinion that it is just and equitable that the Company should be wound up." 13. The question then raised was whether the Court was authorized to wind up a solvent Company against the wish of the majority of share-holders, because the business had been carried on at a loss and appeared likely to continue to be a losing concern. The section in question, in the first place, enumerated the circumstances under which a Company could be wound up-and then followed in the 5th clause-the general words to which I have referred. Lord Cairns, in holding that those words should be read as ejusdem generis with the constitutions specially mentioned in the earlier clauses and therefore the Court had no authority to wind up the Company for the reason alleged, adopted the ruling of Lord Cottenham in the case of Spackman (1849) 1 Mac. and G. 170, 173 and what that learned Judge is reported to have said is as follows: This clause This refers to the 8th clause of the 5th Section of the Joint Stock Companies Winding Up Act, was, no doubt, thus worded in order to include all cases no before mentioned, but of course it cannot mean that it should be interpreted otherwise than in reference to matters ejusdem generis as those in the previous clauses. There must be something in the management and conduct of the Company which shows the Court that it should be no longer allowed to continue and that the concern ought to be wound up. 14. In this connection I may also refer to the case of (1891) ILR 13 93 (Privy Council) where a certified pleader having been suspended by the Court of Allahabad, the Judicial Committee had to consider the terms of Section 13 and they observed as follows: The letters produced appear to their Lordships to afford ample evidence under the hand of the Appellant, that in his professional capacity, he was guilty of grave improprieties which the Court could not overlook where the matter was regularly brought under its notice. Such conduct, in the opinion of their Lordships, amounts to reasonable cause' for suspending a certificated pleader within the meaning of Section 13 of the Act XVIII of 1879. 15. The words in Section 13 of the Act of 1879 were the very words that we have now to consider "or for any other reasonable cause;" and the Judicial Committee held that the grave impropriety of the pleader in his professional capacity was a "reasonable cause" within the meaning of the section. The view thus expressed, no doubt, is not decisive upon the question of construction we have now to consider; but, as it appears to me, it rather supports the view I have adopted than goes against it. 16. I am here confronted by the decision of this Court in the case of Gholab Khan (1871) 7 B.L.R. 179 where a Mukhtear was dismissed for misconduct other than professional, in that he had instigated a dacoity. He had been prosecuted criminally, but was acquitted by the Sessions Judge on account of the insufficiency of evidence against him and this Court considering the evidence brought against the Mukhtear in the dacoity case, was of opinion that the verdict of acquittal was improper and that it was proved that the Mukhtear did instigate the attack that was made on the house where the dacoity took place; and that this was a sufficient and reasonable cause for his dismissal and they accordingly dismissed him. Whether the course which the learned Judges adopted was right, it is unnecessary to discuss. It has, however, been said that when the Act of 1896 repeated the same words, which had received a certain construction from this Court, the Legislature must be taken to have used them in the same sense. I am, however, unable to say whether the Legislature, while framing the Act of 1896, had in view the interpretation put upon the words "or for any other reasonable cause" in the case of In the matter of Gholab Khan (1871) 7 B.L.R. 179. But supposing they had that interpretation in view, it must be presumed that they had also ] before them the remarks of the Judicial Committee in the case of (1891) ILR 13 93 (Privy Council) to which I have already referred. But supposing they had that interpretation in view, it must be presumed that they had also ] before them the remarks of the Judicial Committee in the case of (1891) ILR 13 93 (Privy Council) to which I have already referred. It has also been said that the Legislature, while framing the Legal Practitioners Act, could not be supposed to have omitted to provide a machinery for dealing generally with cases of misconduct, other than professional, involving moral turpitude and disqualifying a person from holding the office of a legal practitioner, while a practitioner in England has often been removed from such disqualifying cause and the Letters Patent of the High Court empowers this Court to remove or suspend an advocate, vakil or attorney for such a cause. The rule of law laid down in the Letters Patent is that a practitioner of the High Court is liable to reasonable cause," and the law in England I take to be the same. But the Legal Practitioners Act, which is only applicable to practitioners in the mofussil, has not been worded in the same way; but it enumerates the oases in which a practitioner is liable to be removed or suspended with the addition of the words "or for any other reasonable cause." And so far as I can gather from the whole of that Act, the only case of moral turpitude, not being professional misconduct, rendering a legal practitioner liable to dismissal or suspension, which the Legislature had apparently in view, is the case where the practitioner is convicted of a criminal offence ; and that, except in such a case, they seem to have provided in Section 13 for oases of professional misconduct only, in some shape or other. It is to my mind a case of omission on the part of the Legislature and the law should therefore be amended so as to impower the Courts to dismiss or suspend a legal practitioner for misconduct other than professional. 17. I must, however, confess that the question of construction that has been raised before us is not free from difficulty. But having regard to the whole scope of the Legal Practitioners Act and the provisions of Section 13, read with Sections 14 and 12, in particular, I am disposed to think that Clause (f) was not meant to refer to other than professional misconduct. 18. But having regard to the whole scope of the Legal Practitioners Act and the provisions of Section 13, read with Sections 14 and 12, in particular, I am disposed to think that Clause (f) was not meant to refer to other than professional misconduct. 18. There is one other matter to which I desire here to refer. The misconduct of the Mukhtear before us occurred before he was enrolled as a Mukhtear. He produced from the Board of Examiners a certificate of good character and in the usual course he appeared at the examination, passed it and was enrolled as a Mukhtear and the question arises-a question which has, however, not been specifically referred to the Full Bench-whether the misconduct in question comes within the Legal Practitioners Act. Looking at the whole scope of the Act, it seems to me that it aims at dealing only with cases of misconduct committed by a legal practitioner enrolled under the Act and not to acts committed by him before he was so enrolled and this, to my mind, appears clear enough on a reference to Section 12 of the Act, which deals with the suspension and dismissal of a legal practitioner, who is convicted of a criminal offence. This question was also dealt with by me in the case of Puma Chunder Pal ILR (1899) Calc. 1023. 19. It seems to me that the fact of the Mukhtear having procured a certificate *of good moral character by concealing his previous history and thereby having improperly obtained admission to the examination, is perhaps a ground for canceling his examination, but I externally doubt whether for his moral delinquency antecedent to the examination, he could be dismissed or suspended u/s 13 of the Act. Such moral delinquency might have occurred twenty years before his enrolment as a legal practitioner and it might lead to rather extraordinary results, if for such cause he be liable to be dismissed or suspended. Hill J. 20. I adhere to the view of the question submitted to us by this reference, which I took in the case of In the matter of Purna Chunder Pal ILR (1899) Calc. Hill J. 20. I adhere to the view of the question submitted to us by this reference, which I took in the case of In the matter of Purna Chunder Pal ILR (1899) Calc. 1023, but in consequence of its importance to the public generally and to the members of the subordinate grades of the legal profession, it is, I think, proper that I should state the reasons for my opinion again and somewhat more fully. 21. The primary question is whether the general words of Clause (f) of Section 13 of the Legal Practitioners Act, 1879, as amended by Act XI of 1896, "for any other reasonable cause" are to be read, by the operation of the rule of ejusdem generis, as applying only to misconduct of a strictly professional kind, or as embracing what may be called for the sake of convenience disqualifying causes of a different kind; and the case before us raises a further question, which is not indeed within the express terms of the reference, namely, whether, assuming that the wider construction is to be put upon the words in question, a "disqualifying cause," which was in existence prior to the admission of the Pleader or Mukhtear, falls within them. It is necessary to consider these questions separately, for although they are intimately connected, they are governed in some measure by different considerations. As regards both, however, what has to be ascertained is the intention of the Legislature as it is to be gathered from the language and scope of the Act. And looked at from that point of view, I have been unable after very full consideration to come to any other conclusion than that the words of Clause (f) ought to be read in the wider sense indicated above and that the second question ought to be answered affirmatively. 22. I do not propose now to refer to the many authorities in the English Courts from which the rules for the construction of statutes have been derived. But I shall give their result as it is, I think, correctly stated by Wilberforce in his work on Statute Law. I refer now to what may be described as the cardinal rules, leaving the more particular doctrine of ejusdem generis to be dealt with hereafter. But I shall give their result as it is, I think, correctly stated by Wilberforce in his work on Statute Law. I refer now to what may be described as the cardinal rules, leaving the more particular doctrine of ejusdem generis to be dealt with hereafter. He says at page 112:-"The result of these several statements is that in construing any Statute the Court should adhere to the ordinary meaning of the words used and to their grammatical construction, unless the words when so read produce some manifest absurdity of injustice, inconsistency, inconvenience or incongruity ; or unless the meaning so given be repugnant to the context, or at variance with the intention of the Legislature as it is stated expressly or by implication, or as it may be collected from other parts of the same Statute." 23. In applying this test to the present case the first question is whether, according to their ordinary meaning and grammatical construction, the words of Clause (f) of Section 13 are capable of being so read as to include causes for the dismissal or suspension of a Mukhtear other than misconduct in his professional capacity. The section in question provides in effect that the High Court may dismiss or suspend a Mukhtear for certain specified causes of a professional kind or "for any other reasonable cause." According to their grammatical construction there is nothing here to limit the words "or any other reasonable cause" to professional misconduct; nor is there I think anything so to limit them, if read in their ordinary meaning. The criterion prescribed so far as the language used is concerned, is the reasonableness of the cause and unless, therefore, it would be unreasonable that a Mukhtear should be dismissed or suspended for a cause other than professional misconduct, the words taken in their ordinary sense must be sufficient to cover such a cause. I do not, however, think that it will be asserted that it would be unreasonable to dismiss a Mukhtear who, for example, has committed a grave crime, such for instance, as forgery, though it lay outside the scope of his profession. If so, a Mukhtear must enjoy a very exceptional position. I do not, however, think that it will be asserted that it would be unreasonable to dismiss a Mukhtear who, for example, has committed a grave crime, such for instance, as forgery, though it lay outside the scope of his profession. If so, a Mukhtear must enjoy a very exceptional position. For there can be no question but that an advocate, vakeel or attorney of this Court would be liable to removal for the commission of such a crime and the law is mutatis mutandis administered in England and the British Colonies on the same principle. See In re Weave (1893) 2 Q.B. 439 and In re Wallace (1866) L.R. 1 P.C. 283. The commission of the offence of dacoity although not followed by a conviction was moreover considered by the learned Judges who decided the case of In the matter of Gholab Khan (1871) 7 B.L.R. 179 to afford reasonable cause for the dismissal of a Mukhtear-and it is obvious that if extra-professional offences do not constitute reasonable cause for dismissal, persons of the worst and vilest livelihood may, when once admitted into the profession, be irremovable. I do not, therefore, think that it could well be contended that the words now in question are not in their ordinary meaning capable of being so read as to include extra-professional offences of a criminal kind, and if this be so, it seems to follow that other causes besides such offences and besides professional offences may be included within them. 24. There is then the question whether the wider reading of the words of Clause (f) would lead to repugnancy, inconsistency, inconvenience, incongruity or would be at variance with the intention of the Legislature as it is to be gathered from a consideration of the Act as a whole. Now the Act which was passed for the purpose of consolidating and amending the law relating to Legal Practitioners is, as amended by the Act of 1896, the final outcome of legislation, which had extended over many years. Among its more prominent objects are the removal and suspension of Pleaders and Mukhtears for causes rendering them unfit for the continued exercise of their profession and it deals and no doubt was intended to deal, exhaustively with these subjects. There is no other machinery provided for the dismissal and suspension of Pleaders and Mukhtears than that which is prescribed by the Act. There is no other machinery provided for the dismissal and suspension of Pleaders and Mukhtears than that which is prescribed by the Act. Presumably, too, it was the intention to secure as high a standard of character in the subordinate grades of the profession as practicable and this being so, it seems to me that so far from its involving an incongruity or inconsistency or a departure from the intention of the Legislature, it would be a surprising thing, if there were not to be found in the Act the means of dealing generally with cases of moral turpitude unconnected with the discharge by a practitioner of his professional duty. That the Legislature had in its contemplation, when it passed the Act, cases of that description is clear from Section 12, for it is not the fact of conviction for an offence which under that section renders a practitioner liable to dismissal. It is the defect of character which a conviction may imply and it is only when a conviction carries with it the implication of a disqualifying defect of character that it may be made the ground for dismissal. Now, if it be assumed that a practitioner has committed an offence for which he has not been brought to trial but which, if followed by a conviction, would justify his dismissal u/s 12, as implying a disqualifying defect of character, could it reasonably be said to be inconsistent with anything in the. Act or with its purpose that on the facts having been ascertained by means of the inquiry provided for by Section 13, he should be dealt with as if he had been actually convicted? The moral defect is the same whether there has or has not been a conviction, the difference lying only in the machinery employed in establishing it. In England, I may observe, in the case of an attorney, the fact that an indictment might be, but has not been preferred, is no reason for the Court to stay its hand, if the fact of misconduct is brought before it. W.H.B. (1882) L.J. 165 and see Re H ll (1868) L.R. 3 Q.B. 543. And in this country, if the law be as I conceive it to be, I think the same mew would be taken. W.H.B. (1882) L.J. 165 and see Re H ll (1868) L.R. 3 Q.B. 543. And in this country, if the law be as I conceive it to be, I think the same mew would be taken. The ease of In the matter of Gholab Khan (1871) 7 B.L.R. 170, to which I have already referred is, it appears to me, also a strong authority for saying that the Court will act on proof of facts from which a moral defect of character may be implied, although they amount to a criminal offence for which the offender has not been convicted and have no connection with his professional avocations. For there the Court dismissed the Mukhtear, although he had been tried and acquitted on a charge of dacoity, on being satisfied on an enquiry held under the Act then in force (Act XX of 1865), that the acquittal was wrong and although that Act contained a provision of a kind similar to that contained in Section 12 of the present Act. I may here notice the argument which was advanced at the hearing, that if a practitioner who has committed a criminal offence of the kind now in contemplation may be dealt with under Clause (f) of Section 13, then Section 12 would be superfluous, as Clause (f) would be large enough to embrace all eases of the commission of a criminal offence. The argument is, however, I think fallacious. What is required is proof of the facts from which the Court may properly infer a disqualifying defect of character. Where there has been a conviction, the facts constituting the offence have already been proved and the Court is accordingly authorized to act summarily on the basis of the conviction provided it carries with it the necessary implication. But when there has not been a conviction then resort must be had to other means of ascertaining the facts and if the view which I take of the meaning of Section 13 be correct, the enquiry, which it authorizes, would under such circumstances be the proper method of ascertaining them. Such, I conceive, was the reason which led the Legislature to place offences in respect of which there has and those in respect of which there has not been a conviction on a different footing. 25. Such, I conceive, was the reason which led the Legislature to place offences in respect of which there has and those in respect of which there has not been a conviction on a different footing. 25. It seems to me, therefore, that consistently with the rest of the Act and with the intention of the Legislature as it is to be gathered from the Act, the words of Clause (f) may be read in the wider sense, which I would venture to assign to them. 26. There are one or two other considerations of a like tendency to which I may briefly refer before passing to the ejusdem generis aspect of the question. Firstly it seems to me important that this Court, when framing rules under the Legal Practitioners Act 1879, has apparently placed the wider construction on the words now under consideration. The Court is authorized by Section 7 of the Act to make rules "consistent with this Act" with respect to the renewal by the Judge of the District of Pleader's and Mukhtear's certificates. By Rule 18 of these rules, a Pleader or Mukhtear when applying to the Judge for the renewal of his certificate, is required, with his application, to file a certificate of character from the Judge presiding in the Court in which he ordinarily practices. And although the rule does not expressly say so, it has always been understood that the Judge is not authorized to renew the certificate, unless such a certificate of character is produced. Without the statutory certificate a practitioner is, however, debarred from practicing by Section 10, so that when the renewal of his certificate is refused, he is in effect suspended from the practice of his profession*. Now the certificate of character required by Rule 18 is not restricted to purely professional matters and the rule accordingly must authorize the suspension of a practitioner for causes other than purely professional misconduct. But if the Act did not contemplate the suspension of a practitioner for such causes, the rule, consistently with it, could not make such causes a ground for suspension. 27. Then again, in seeking to ascertain the intention of the Legislature, there is another principle which should not, 1 think, be overlooked. It is stated thus by James L.J., in Ex parte Campbell (1870) L.R. 5 Ch. App. Cas. 27. Then again, in seeking to ascertain the intention of the Legislature, there is another principle which should not, 1 think, be overlooked. It is stated thus by James L.J., in Ex parte Campbell (1870) L.R. 5 Ch. App. Cas. 703, 706:- "When once certain words in an Act of Parliament have received judicial construction in one of the Superior Courts and the Legislature has repeated them without any alteration in a subsequent statute, I conceive that the Legislature must be taken to have used them according to the meaning which a Court of competent jurisdiction has given to them." In Gholab Khan's (1871) case the words "or any other reasonable cause," occurring in Section 15 of the Act of 1865, were construed by this Court so as to include an extra-professional offence. The same words have been repeated in a context which is, in all material respects, similar in the Act of 1879 and ought, I, therefore, think, on the above principle, to be construed in the same way. And it may again, I think, be regarded as at least probable that the Legislature, when enacting a clause in pari materia with Section 10 of the Letters Patent of this Court, which empowers the Court to remove or suspend an Advocate, Vakeel or Attorney "on reasonable cause," should have intended to attach to the similar words of Section 13 of the Legal Practitioners Act the same meaning as these words bear; and as I have already had occasion to remark the words in the Letters Patent have never been understood to be limited to purely professional misconduct. 28. In concluding this branch of the subject, I may refer to the case of (1891) ILR 13 93 (Privy Council) , which is the only other case besides that of In the matter of Gholab Khan (1871) 7 B.L.R. 179, of which I am at present aware in which the words now in question came under judicial consideration-prior to the cases which led to this reference. The case indeed cannot, I think, be said to be decisive one way or the other of the present question. The case indeed cannot, I think, be said to be decisive one way or the other of the present question. But it is so far perhaps instructive that the Privy Council in dealing with certain "grave irregularities" of which the pleader had been guilty in his professional capacity held that such conduct amounted to "reasonable cause" for his suspension within the meaning of Section 13 of the Legal Practitioners Act. They did not put it on the ground that it was conduct ejusdem generis with the other kinds of misconduct specified in the section or indeed refer to that aspect of the question at all. 29. It seems to me, therefore, as the result of the foregoing considerations that the wider interpretation of the words of Clause (f) is the one which ought to be adopted and that the words are large enough to embrace and were intended by the Legislature to embrace all causes, whether professional or otherwise, which would afford reasonable ground for debarring a practitioner from exercising his profession either temporarily or permanently. 29. It is said, however, that, inasmuch as the causes for suspension or dismissal specified in the clauses of Section 13 preceding Clause (f) all involve professional misconduct in one form or another, the general words of the last mentioned clause must, on the ejusdem generis principle, be restricted to misconduct of which the practitioner has been guilty in his professional capacity, 30. I still venture to think with very great deference to the learned Judges, who have taken the contrary view, that the principle upon which I decided the question in the case of In re Puma Chunder Pal (1899) ILR 27 Calc. 1023 is the correct one and that each of the clauses of Section 13, which precede the general words of Clause (f), being exhaustive of the kind of offence or misconduct to which it relates, there is no room for the application of the ejusdem generis rule; or as it was put by Willes, J., in the case of Fenwick v. Schmalz (1868) L.R. 3 C.P. 313, 315 "if the particular words exhaust a whole genus, the general words must refer to some larger genus." Similarly in the case of Sun Fire Office v. Hart (1889) L.R. 14 App. Cas. 98, 104 : 58 L.J. (N.S.) Pt. Cas. 98, 104 : 58 L.J. (N.S.) Pt. 3 69, it was said by Lord Watson in delivering the judgment of the Privy Council-"The canon i.e., the rule of ejusdem generis is attended with no difficulty," except in its application. Whether it applies at all and if so, what effect should be given to it, must in every case depend upon the precise terms, subject-matter and context of the clause under consideration. In the present case there appears to be no room for its application * * * *. The antecedent clause does not contain a mere specification of particulars, but the description of a complete genus, if not of two genera. The first of these is any and every act done to the insured property, whereby the risk of fire is increased. Taking that as a particular, none of the learned Judges has suggested what circumstances would constitute alia similia." Applying the test applied in these cases to the present case, it seems to me that it would be difficult to suggest other kinds of professional misconduct which are similar in kind to those enumerated specifically in the clauses of Section 13 preceding Clause (f). I shall content myself with referring to Clauses (a) and (b). It seems to me impossible to find (a) a case of professional misconduct which resembles in kind the taking of instructions from persons other than those from whom it is lawful to take them, or (b) a ease of professional misconduct which is similar in kind to fraudulent or grossly improper professional misconduct, which is not itself fraudulent or grossly improper and it is so throughout the series as it seems to me But I may add, in order to avoid possible misconception, that I think the general words of Clause (f) are amply sufficient of their own inherent force and effect to cover all cases of professional misconduct, other than those enumerated in the section, which would afford reasonable ground for suspension or dismissal and this would seem to be the view taken by the Privy Council in the case of (1891) ILR 13 93 (Privy Council) to which I have referred above. 31. 31. Be this, however, as it may and assuming that the rule in question is not altogether excluded by the principle to which I have now referred, I think on general principles that this is not a case for its application. The rule is not an inflexible one to be applied in every case irrespective of the result. It is an expedient for ascertaining the intention of the Legislature where that is doubtful and it would seem from the tendency of modem decisions that it is to be applied with caution and that prima facie general words following upon particular are to be interpreted in their larger sense. I cannot do better than cite what was said on this subject by Lord Esher M.R. and Rigby L.J., in Anderson v. Anderson (1895) 1 Q.B. 749, 752, 753, 755. 32. Lord Esher said: No doubt many cases are to be found in the reports in which the meaning of general words in deeds and wills has been thus limited : But I am not surprised to find that the modern tendency of the Courts has been to construe general words in their ordinary sense. It cannot, however, be doubted that there are cases in which such words must be construed in a limited or restricted sense and the question is how the rules of construction are to be applied. I will take first the rule as stated by Lord Eldon in Church v. Mundy (1808) 15 Ves. 396, 406. He said the best rule of construction is that which takes the words to comprehend a subject that falls within their usual sense, unless there is something like declaration plain to the contrary. That is, as I understand him, prima facie you are to give the words their larger meaning unless you find something which plainly shows that they were intended to be read in a more restricted sense. 33. And then after citing a passage from the judgment of Knight Bruce V.C. in Parker v. Marchant (1812) 1 Y. and C. Ch. That is, as I understand him, prima facie you are to give the words their larger meaning unless you find something which plainly shows that they were intended to be read in a more restricted sense. 33. And then after citing a passage from the judgment of Knight Bruce V.C. in Parker v. Marchant (1812) 1 Y. and C. Ch. 290, he goes on to say: Nothing can well be plainer than that, to show that prima facie general words are to be taken in their larger sense, unless you can find that in the particular case the true construction of the instrument requires you to conclude that they are intended to be used in a sense limited to things ejusdem generis with those, which have been specifically mentioned before. 34. Then Rigby L.J., puts it in this way: The main principle upon which you must proceed is, to give all the words their common meaning; you are not justified in taking away from them their common meaning, unless you can find something reasonably plain upon the face of the document itself to show that they are not used with that meaning and the mere fact that general words follow specific words is certainly not enough. 35. As to the caution (and the reason for it) necessary in the application of the doctrine, reference may be made to what was said by the same learned Judge in Smelting Company of Australia v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue (1897) 1 Q.B. 173, 182. 36. Prima facie then the general words now in question are to be taken in their ordinary sense and should be so read, unless it is plain from the Act itself that they were intended to be read in a more restricted sense and the fact that they follow a specific enumeration of cases is not enough to show this. I venture to think that there is nothing in the Act to suggest much less to make it plain that it was intended to use the words of Clause (f) in any other than their ordinary sense. On the contrary, it seems to me, for reasons which I have stated in the earlier part of my judgment and which I need not now repeat, that to read them otherwise would defeat in a large measure the purpose of the Act and the intention of the Legislature. 37. On the contrary, it seems to me, for reasons which I have stated in the earlier part of my judgment and which I need not now repeat, that to read them otherwise would defeat in a large measure the purpose of the Act and the intention of the Legislature. 37. I would, therefore, answer the question referred to us by saying that the words of Clause (f) are not confined to misconduct of which a practitioner is guilty in his professional capacity, but embrace all causes which may afford reasonable ground for his suspension or dismissal. 38. There remains the other question which was raised in the case itself, though not by the reference, whether a practitioner, who, prior to his admission, has committed an offence, which, if it had been committed after his admission, would render him amenable to the provisions of Section 13, can be dealt with by the Court under that section. This is, I think, how the question has been stated and I may say that I should not perhaps have considered it necessary to discuss it but for the order which we made after the hearing of the reference, from which it might possibly be inferred that the view of the Court was in favour of a negative answer to the question. So far, however, as I am myself concerned, I do not hold that view. The question no doubt tarns upon whether the words of Clause (f) are or are not to be read in the wider sense, which I would attribute to them. If they are and I must assume that they are, then I think the proper answer is plain. But I should say that the question as stated above does not appear to me to raise the true issue. The argument no doubt appears to have much to commend it, that, inasmuch as the Act professes to deal with legal practitioners as such, it cannot have been intended to render a practitioner liable to punishment for an act done before he became a practitioner. But I think there is a fallacy involved in supposing that it is the act of misconduct alone that the Legislature regards. It looks also, as it appears to me, at the inferences which may justly be drawn with respect to the character of the person, who does the act. But I think there is a fallacy involved in supposing that it is the act of misconduct alone that the Legislature regards. It looks also, as it appears to me, at the inferences which may justly be drawn with respect to the character of the person, who does the act. Some acts imply an enduring defect of character and where the act is of that kind, it is, I think, as I endeavoured to show in the case of In re Purna Chunder Pal (1899) ILR 27 Calc. 1023 immaterial that the act itself was committed before admission. The question, in fact, as it seems to me, simply comes round to this. Is it reasonable that a Pleader or Mukhtear who, before his admission, has done something which implies a defect of character that unfits him to be a Pleader or Mukhtear, should be permitted to continue in the profession? And I think that anything which before admission would have afforded a good ground for refusing to admit ought, speaking generally, after admission has taken place, to be regarded as a reasonable ground for dismissal. Cases might no doubt arise in which the inflexible application of such a rule might work injustice or hardship; as, for example, where an offence had been committed at a remote time and the offender had ever since borne a good character. But I propose it merely as the statement of a general principle and the power reposed by Section 13 in the High Court is discretionary and will no doubt always be exercised so as to meet the justice of individual cases. But unless the section is to be construed in the sense which I am now advocating, it is clear that a criminal or one who has gained his admission through fraud and deception, when once admitted to the profession, must be irremovable ; which is a conclusion that, if avoidable, I should be glad to avoid. Henderson J. 39. I agree with the view expressed in the judgment of Mr. Justice Hill, In the particular circumstances of this case, no further punishment was deemed necessary.-Rep.