JUDGMENT 1. This is a rule calling upon the opposite party to show cause why the order complained of by the Petitioner should not be set aside. The order complained of is an order of the Munsif of Munshigunge, dated the 27th January last. 2. There was a suit pending on the file of the Munsif's Court (No. 2 of 1901) which was a suit for foreclosure and in which a preliminary order had been passed under sec. 86 of the Transfer of Property Act. A certain period was allowed for the payment of the money and this period having expired, the Munsif was asked to make the preliminary order absolute. The Munsif, however, declined to do so, upon the application of the opposite party, Mahananda Chatterjee, who alleged that he had brought another suit (No. 624 of 1901) in which he sought to establish his right to redeem the property mortgaged. The Munsif says that he does not think it safe to make the decree absolute, as Mahananda Chatterjee alleges that this particular decree was obtained by fraud, and he therefore directs that the proceedings should be kept in abeyance until the disposal of suit No. 624 of 1901. 3. The present rule was obtained to show cause why this order should not be set aside. 4. The learned pleader who appears to show cause argues that the order of the Munsif was, in effect, passed under sec. 492, C. P. C., in the course of suit No. 624 of 1901, and that that being so, it is an appealable order and we should not exercise our jurisdiction under sec. 622, C. P. C. It appears to us, however, that the order was not passed under sec. 492, C. P. C. It does not purport to be under that section. It does not purport to be a temporary injunction. It was not passed in suit No. 624 of 1901 but in suit No. 2 of 1901. 5. Then the pleader for the opposite party says that this is an order which the Munsif had inherent jurisdiction to pass. We do not, however, think that this is so. It appears to us that under sec. 87 of the Transfer of Property Act, if the payment provided for in the previous preliminary decree be not made within the time allowed, the Plaintiff may apply for foreclosure. We do not, however, think that this is so. It appears to us that under sec. 87 of the Transfer of Property Act, if the payment provided for in the previous preliminary decree be not made within the time allowed, the Plaintiff may apply for foreclosure. And the section goes on to say that "the Court shall then pass such order and may, if necessary, deliver possession of the property to the Plaintiff." It does not appear to us that the section gives inherent jurisdiction to the Munsif to stay proceedings. On the contrary, it makes it imperative on him to pass a decree for foreclosure. The section then says that "the Court may, upon good cause shown, and upon such terms, if any, as it thinks fit, from time to time postpone the date appointed for such payment." That is a matter as between the mortgagor and the mortgagee and does not allow the Court to postpone the making of the order absolute on the application of an outsider. If the suit had been a pending suit, the Munsif might have postponed the decision of the case until such time as he thought fit. But this case is not a pending suit. In this case a preliminary decree for foreclosure has been passed and we think that the Munsif had no right to do otherwise than to pass a decree for foreclosure. 6. We therefore make this rule absolute and setting aside the order of the Munsif, we direct that the decree for foreclosure be made absolute. This order will carry costs, three gold mohurs.