JUDGMENT 1. We have heard the learned vakils on both sides in the matter of this rule, and we are of opinion that the Munsif was right in the view that he adopted. It appears that the Plaintiff was in constructive possession of the land in suit through the Defendant No. 2, his tenant. This person was dispossessed by the Defendant No. 1 on a certain date. The Plaintiff regarding the said dispossession as affording him a good cause of action, brought the present suit to recover possession of the property under sec. 9 of the Specific Relief Act. 2. The Munsif has held that the person who was entitled to bring a suit under the Specific Relief Act was the Defendant No. 2, and not the Plaintiff, who was not in physical possession of the land. 3. We quite concur with him in this view. Our attention has, however, been drawn to a statement in the plaint to the effect that the Defendant No. 2 being gained over by the Defendant No. 1, declined to bring a suit; and it has been contended before us by the learned vakil for the Petitioner that this fact, if true, would entitle the Plaintiff to bring a suit under the Specific Relief Act. It is quite clear on looking at the plaint that the dispossession complained of was not the outcome of any collusion between the Defendant No. 2 and the Defendant No. 1. The collusion--assuming what is stated in the plaint can be regarded as an act of collusion--took place subsequent to the dispossession; and the question that arises is whether, by reason of such collusion the Plaintiff was entitled to bring a suit under the Specific Relief Act--a suit which, had it not been for this collusion, he could not have instituted. Sec. 9 of the Specific Relief Act, however, contemplates the case of a person who, being in physical possession of a property, is dispossessed. The Plaintiff was not in such physical possession, and therefore when the Defendant No. 2 was dispossessed it was no dispossession of the Plaintiff, such as would entitle him to bring a suit under the said section. The Plaintiff was not in such physical possession, and therefore when the Defendant No. 2 was dispossessed it was no dispossession of the Plaintiff, such as would entitle him to bring a suit under the said section. The learned vakil for the Petitioner frankly admitted that had it not been for the statement in the plaint, to which he has called our attention, the Plaintiff could not be held entitled to bring a suit under the Specific Relief Act; and it seems to us that anything which might have occurred subsequent to the dispossession complained of could not give the Plaintiff a cause of action, which he did not acquire when such dispossession took place. Upon these grounds we discharge this rule with costs. Pleader's fee two gold mohurs.