JUDGMENT Stephen, J. - We show that the Petitioner's present income is Rs. 500 a month and that he has promised to pay us Rs. 100 a month. By sec. 36 of the Divorce Act the Court can order him to pay a fifth of his income to his wife. As however he does not admit our statements, the proper course is for the Court to refer the matter to the Registrar to enquire and report what will be a proper sum for him to pay to his wife by way of alimony pendente lite. Such sum will be payable as from the date of service of the citation upon us nearly two years ago : see Thomas v. Thomas I. L. R. 23 Cal. 913 (1896). Although the parties are subject to sec. 4 of the Indian Succession Act, 1865, the Petitioner must pay in advance or secure his wife's costs of this suit, Allen v. Allen L. R. (1894) Pr. 134, Natall v. Natall I. L. R. 9 Mad. 12 (1885), Mayhew v. Mayhew I. L. R. 19 Bom. 293 (1894). 2. It is true that there are decisions of this Court to a contrary effect, Thomson v. Thomson I. L. R. 14 Cal. 580 (1887), but they should not be preferred to the unauimous decisions of the Courts in England, Bombay and Madras. The Calcutta cases merely follow the decision in Proby v. Proby I. L. R. 5 Cal. 357 (1879). That case was wrongly decided owing to the Judges who decided it laying too much stress upon the origin of the old rule from which they then decided to depart and too little upon the reason for its continuance. This has been pointed out by Farren, J., at p. 296 in Mayhew v. Mayhew I. L. R. 19 Bom. 293 (1894). Even in this Court Pigot, J., has expressed disapproval of the course adopted in Proby v. Proby I. L. R. 5 Cal. 357 (1879). Moreover the earlier cases are distinguishable from the present one, as here admittedly the wife has no means, whilst in the other cases she must be taken to have had means of her own, as the reports are silent on the point. Hence in the present case there are special circumstances, such as were contemplated even in Proby v. Proby I. L. R. 5 Cal. Hence in the present case there are special circumstances, such as were contemplated even in Proby v. Proby I. L. R. 5 Cal. 357 (1879) to take the case out of the ordinary rule of this Court. If absence of means does not constitute such special circumstances, the exception made by the Court is an empty one. Mr. Bell 3. The fatal objection to Mr. Mittra's able argument on the question of payment of costs is that it comes a quarter of a century too late. It is useless now to go into the question, whether the principle on which the decisions of the Courts in England and the other Indian Presidencies are based is the correct one, as here in Calcutta there has been an unbroken series of decisions in Petitioner's favour since Proby v. Proby I. L. R. 5 Cal. 357 (1879) was decided in 1879. That case too is of peculiarly great authority as it was determined not by a single Judge, but by two Judges sitting together finally to settle this very point. It is true that Pigot, J., in Yong v. Yong I. L. R. 23 Cal. 916 note (1886), expressed doubts as to the soundness of this decision, but he considered himself bound by it and he followed it. That course should be adopted here. Even Court of Appeal is very slow to interfere with a long-established current of decisions in Courts inferior to itself. The argument that there are special circumstances distinguishing the present case from the earlier ones is not maintainable. The fact that the reports of the earlier cases are silent on the question whether the wife had any means of her own goes to show that she had none, as if she had been possessed of means, that naturally would have been stated. The nature of the "special circumstances" which authorize a departure from the general rule is clearly indicated by Pontifex, J., in Proby v. Proby I. L. R. 5 Cal. 357 (1879), who evidently had not in contemplation the present case of mere absence of means. 4. The nature of the "special circumstances" which authorize a departure from the general rule is clearly indicated by Pontifex, J., in Proby v. Proby I. L. R. 5 Cal. 357 (1879), who evidently had not in contemplation the present case of mere absence of means. 4. As regards alimony I do not deny that, though it will be a great hardship, the Petitioner will have to pay something, but, having regard to his circumstances, which are frankly and clearly disclosed in his affidavit in answer, and also to the fact that by reason of his wife's long delay in making this application he will have to may down arrears for two years, the sum ordered should be a small one, especially as the parties' station in life is such that the wife, when living apart from her husband, ought to continue to support herself, at least in part, by her own earnings. The alleged promise to pay her Rs. 100 per mensem at any time subsequent to discovery of her adultery was denied by the Petitioner so soon as it was brought to his notice. There should not be any reference in this case, having regard to the facts that the wife's statements as to the Petitioner's income are most vague and general, while he in his affidavit in answer, the statements in which have not been challenged in any affidavit in reply, has made a full and clear disclosure of the amount and of all the sources of his income and of the expenses necessarily incurred by him. Under these circumstances I submit that a reference would be a needless expense and waste of time and that the Court should follow the course adopted in Stevenson v. Stevenson I. L. R. 26 Cal. 764 (1899) and direct that the Petitioner do attend in Court to be cross-examined upon his affidavit and fix the amount of alimony upon such examination being completed. It is true that in Stevenson v. Stevenson I. L. R. 26 Cal. 764 (1899) and in the English cases which it followed Gaynor v. Gaynor 31 L. J. P. & M. 144 (1862) the husband alleged that he had no means at all, whereas here he admits an average and Fletcher v. Fletcher 2 Sw. & Tr. 434 (1862) monthly nett income of Rs. 764 (1899) and in the English cases which it followed Gaynor v. Gaynor 31 L. J. P. & M. 144 (1862) the husband alleged that he had no means at all, whereas here he admits an average and Fletcher v. Fletcher 2 Sw. & Tr. 434 (1862) monthly nett income of Rs. 269, but the principle upon which Stanley, J., based his decision in Stevenson v. Stevenson I. L. R. 26 Cal. 764 (1899) applies here, namely, that the Court will not order an idle reference. Stephen, J. 5. This seems to be a very proper suggestion, Mr. Mittra Mr. Mittra 6. I do not oppose the adoption of this course. Stephen, J. 7. That being no, I adjourn the matter to this day three weeks for the Petitioner to attend Court for examination as to his means. I will deal with the other question, as to security for costs, at the adjourned hearing. 8. On the day fixed the Petitioner attended as ordered and was put into the box and examined by Mr. Bell and was cross-examined by Mr. Mittra, who then briefly addressed the Court and asked that an early date should be fixed for the payment of arrears of such alimony as the Court might think fit to grant. Stephen, J. 9. On the present application I make an order for payment of Rs. 40 a month to run from the 30th April 1900. As regards expedition of the case I think it is obviously one which should be expedited but as the co-Respondent is not here that application must be renewed on notice to him.