JUDGMENT 1. The Defendant No. 1, who is found by the lower Courts to be an occupancy-raiyat in respect of certain specific lands representing his 1/3rd share of a holding executed and registered a permanent lease thereof, dated the 3rd Sraban 1302, in favour of the Defendant No. 2. About two years after, i.e., on the 21st May 1897, the Plaintiff in execution of a money-decree purchased the right, title and interest of the Defendant No. 1, but when he went to take possession of the land, he was resisted by Defendants Nos. 1 and 2. The Plaintiff accordingly sued for a declaration of his title and for eviction of the Defendants, The first Court found that the registered lease in favour of Defendant No. 2 was invalid and inoperative under cl. (2) of sec. 85 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, that the Plaintiff was not estopped by the conduct of the Defendant No. 1, and that the Defendants were trespassers and therefore not entitled to notice. He accordingly decreed the Plaintiff's claim. The Defendant No. 2 alone appealed. The learned Subordinate Judge having affirmed the decision of the first Court, the Defendant No. 2 prefers this second appeal on the following grounds:--(1) That the lower Courts have not correctly interpreted sec. 85 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. (2) That Plaintiff is the representative in interest of Defendant No. 1 and is therefore estopped from questioning the validity of the lease to the Appellant. (3) That as the holding purchased by the Plaintiff is, as described in his sale-certificate, a kaimi one, the Defendant No. 1 was empowered to make a permanent assignment to the Appellant under the provisions of secs. 18 and 11 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. (4) That even on the facts found by the lower Courts the Appellant is not a trespasser but an under-raiyat, and is not liable to eviction except under the provisions of sec. 49 (6) of the Bengal Tenancy Act. 2. We think there is no validity in any of the first three contentions. The document of title on which the Appellant relies is altogether void, having regard to the provisions of sec. 85 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. No such sub-lease purporting to create a term exceeding nine years may be admitted to registration, since the passing of the Bengal Tenancy Act. The document of title on which the Appellant relies is altogether void, having regard to the provisions of sec. 85 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. No such sub-lease purporting to create a term exceeding nine years may be admitted to registration, since the passing of the Bengal Tenancy Act. Without registration a permanent lease is invalid under the Indian Registration Act, and if registered contrary to an express provision of law, the registration is void and the document must be regarded as unregistered. Reference has been made to the case of Gopal Mondal v. Eshan Chunder Banerjee ILR 29 Cal. 148 (1901). In that case a sub-lease had been granted by a registered instrument before the passing of the Bengal Tenancy Act, and it was held that cl. (3) of sec. 85, which restricts the validity of such a lease to a period not exceeding nine years from the commencement of the Act, had reference only to the interests of the landlord and that such a lease, though invalid against the landlord for more than nine years after the commencement of the Act, was valid as against the lessor after that period. We are asked in this case to apply to cl. (2) a qualification similar to that applied to cl. (3) in that case. This we are unable to do. To judge by the wording of cl. (1) it would seem probable that in enacting sec. 85 the Legislature had in mind the interests of landlords alone as affected by sub-leases, but in safeguarding those interests it thought fit to prohibit in absolute terms the registration of any sub-lease exceeding nine years. While therefore it is possible from the nature of the case to interpret cl. (3) as affecting the interests of landlords alone; it is impossible to apply a similar construction to cl. (2) which expressly forbids a definite executive act. A violation of that prohibition is unlawful, and it is for this reason that we are constrained to hold that a document registered in violation of that prohibition cannot be regarded as in any better position than an unregistered document. 3. (2) which expressly forbids a definite executive act. A violation of that prohibition is unlawful, and it is for this reason that we are constrained to hold that a document registered in violation of that prohibition cannot be regarded as in any better position than an unregistered document. 3. Moreover, as was pointed out in the judgment of the case under reference, an under-raiyat taking a sub-lease for more than nine years after the commencement of the Act is put upon his guard by the express term of the Act and the prohibition against registration; whereas an under-raiyat who bad taken a lease before the Act is in a very different position as he paid the bonus upon a contract which when entered into was perfectly valid in law, and if the Act ipso facto put an end to such a sub-lease at the end of nine years, the under-raiyat has no remedy against his lessor. 4. Our conclusion that the registered sublease in the present case is altogether void is in accordance with the view expressed in the case of Srikant Mandul v. Saroda Kant Mandul ILR 26 Cal. 46 (1898). Secondly, no question of estoppel arises in this case. The Plaintiff is not bound by a sub-lease which is void in law, and which the Defendant No. 1 was not empowered to grant. Thirdly, we agree with the lower Courts that the word kaimi does not import fixity of rent, and therefore secs. 18 and 11 of the Bengal Tenancy Act are not applicable to the holding in question. Lastly the question arises what is the status of the Appellant. He has been treated by the lower Appellate Court as a trespasser, and ordered to be evicted without notice. It appears from the finding of the Subordinate Judge that the Appellant had been let into the land in perfect good faith long before the Plaintiff's auction-purchase, and as a matter of fact he was in possession as an under-raiyat for a period of about three years previous to suit. He was therefore by no means a trespasser but must be taken to be an under-raiyat holding otherwise than under a written lease, inasmuch as his written lease was void in law. He was therefore by no means a trespasser but must be taken to be an under-raiyat holding otherwise than under a written lease, inasmuch as his written lease was void in law. It has been held in several cases that a tenant can prove his tenancy without proving his lease, if he has one which is inadmissible for want of registration. See Surabh Narain Lal v. Catherine Sophia 1 C.W.N. 248 (1896). In the present case the lease goes out and cannot be put in evidence, but the tenancy subsists, being bond fide and legitimate in its inception. In these circumstances the Appellant cannot be evicted except after service of notice as prescribed by cl. (6) of sec. 49 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, and as, admittedly, no such notice was served, we must set aside the decree for khas possession as against the Appellant, while affirming the decree so far as it is declaratory of the Plaintiff's right by purchase. We also direct that the parties to this appeal do pay their own costs in all the Courts.