JUDGMENT Prinsep, J. - The Plaintiffs brought a suit to recover one and half bighas of land in the possession of the Defendants alleging that possession to be an unlawful possession, but they admitted that that possession had been acquired under a kobala executed by their father. The Court of first instance held that the suit was barred under Art. 91, Sch. II of the Limitation Act, inasmuch as the Plaintiffs could not recover except by setting aside the kobala on which the Defendant's title depended. 2. In appeal, the District Judge held that Art. 91 "does not apply to cases where the Plaintiffs sued for possession of property even when it is accompanied by a prayer to set aside a spurious or invalid document." Now, whether this document is or is not open to the objection taken by the Plaintiffs, it is quite clear that until any objection taken to its operation is sustained, it is a valid and operative document and that, in order to avoid the effect of its operation against the Plaintiffs, the Plaintiffs must prove their objection. Consequently, unless the Plaintiffs obtain a declaration from a Civil Court that the kobala is not a valid and binding document, they could not succeed in defeating the titles on which the Defendants hold through it. The cases on which the District Judge relies are not in point. Indeed, it may be observed that some of them and notably the case of Shamlall Mitra v. Amarendro Nath Bose ILR 23 Cal. 460 (1895) are directly against the principle laid down by him. In the case mentioned, the title set up depended on certain deeds which were found to be benami, and the learned Judges held that sec. 91 did not apply to a case of that description because it applied only to suits in which the documents sought to be set aside were intended to be operative against the Plaintiff or his predecessor in title and would remain operative if not set aside. The deeds being benami were not operative and therefore were no bar to a suit to recover possession. In the present case unless the title conferred by the kobala is declared null and void, the Plaintiffs cannot succeed. We may also refer to the judgment of their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case of Janki Kunwar v. Ajit Singh ILR 15 Cal. In the present case unless the title conferred by the kobala is declared null and void, the Plaintiffs cannot succeed. We may also refer to the judgment of their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case of Janki Kunwar v. Ajit Singh ILR 15 Cal. 58 : s.c. L.R. 14 IndAp 148 (1887) in which the Privy Council held that Art. 91 did apply. The same principle was laid down by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Jagadamba Chaodhrani v. Dakkina Mohun Roy Chaodhri ILR 13 Cal. 308 (1886). We are consequently of opinion that this suit which is not brought within three years of the period provided for by Art. 91, Sch. II of the Limitation Act is barred. The order of the lower Appellate Court holding that it is not barred and remanding the case for trial on its merits is, therefore, set aside and the suit is dismissed, the order of the first Court being restored. The Defendants are entitled to receive their costs in this Court and also their costs in the lower Appellate Court, the costs of that Court being assessed by the District Judge. Hill, J. I am of the same opinion. I only wish to observe that the case set up by the Defendants was that the deed in question and which stands in the Plaintiffs' way was a deed of (sic) for valuable considers (sic) case of the Plaintiffs being that in point of fact no consideration whatever passed.