Judgement Appeal from a decree of the above Court (April 4, 1899) reversing a decree of the Civil Judge of the Ellichpur District (March 26, 1898). The main questions raised in the appeal were whether the plaintiff Balabux was joint in estate with his uncle Girdhari Lall on the death of the latter in 1882; and as to the effect of a division of the property in 1889 between the respondent Rukhmabai (widow of Girdhari Lall) and Birjubai, who was mother of the plaintiff and widow of Girdharis brother Ladhuram. The plaint alleged that on Girdhari Lalls death the plaintiff was a minor, and the family business was managed by Rukhmabai and Birjubai; and that in consequence of disputes between them the business was divided in the year 1889. The right of Birjubai to have made the division was challenged. The plaint then referred to the mismanagement of the half under Rukhmabais control; and a refusal to deliver possession to the plaintiff in July, 1894; it also referred to the removal of the safe containing money and securities, and stated that Motiram, Rukhmabais brother, was helping her in preventing the plaintiff from obtaining possession of his property, and was in possession of the safe, in consequence of which he was impleaded as a defendant. The relief sought was a declaration that the plaintiff was the owner of the business carried on under the name and style of Amarchand Girdhari Lall, and the delivery of possession of the assets of the firm including the safe and its contents, wiiich were in the possession of the defendants. No written statement of defence was put in by the defendants, but their pleader orally pleaded to the suit. The defence raised the following points — (1.) That up to the year 1869 Girdhari Lall, Kunyaram and Ladhuram were undivided and the joint owners of the business of the parent firm. (2.) That in 1869 there was a complete separation between the brothers; that Ladhuram, after the partition started a shop at Bhorteda, in Marwar, nothing being known of his assets; and that after the partition Girdhari Lall alone became the owner of the business known as Amarchand Girdhari Lall. (3.) That on Ladhurams death in 1872 Girdhari Lall sent for the plaintiff and his mother and supported them. (3.) That on Ladhurams death in 1872 Girdhari Lall sent for the plaintiff and his mother and supported them. (4.) That before his death Girdhari Lall verbally directed Rukhmabai to give one half the property to the plaintiff; and in 1889 she, in pursuance of this request, divided the property and gave one half to the plaintiff. (5.) That the division is final under any circumstances, and the suit barred by limitation. (6.) That the safe did contain Rs.10,000 and was removed, but that the money did not belong to the firm. (7.) That even if Girdhari Lall had died joint in estate with Ladhuram and Balabux, yet Rukhmabai was entitled to possession of Girdhari Lalls half-share by special custom of the Khandelral Marwadees, to which caste the parties belong. The nature and effect of the partition in 1869 was thus the subject of dispute. The Civil Judge decided that, " Reading the whole mass of evidence together, it appears that there was a partition between Girdhari and his two brothers in 1869. But it is an admitted fact that soon after the said partition the plaintiff and his mother were brought back to Girdharis house, and there was union in them some years before Girdhari died, and the reunion continued for some years after Girdhari died, so the effect of this reunion must be taken as cancelling the first division between them." He then decided that the division in 1889 was not a regular and complete partition, but a family arrangement made without the plaintiffs consent, which he was at liberty to impeach. The Appellate Court found that there was a complete partition of all property of every sort in the year 1869 ; that after this partition Girdhari Lall and Ladhuram agreed to carry on only the trade business of the firm of Amarchand Girdhari Lall in partnership ; and that Ladhuram died as joint owner of this business with Girdhari Lall being separate from him in every other respect. The Judicial Commissioner was also of opinion that the division of 1889 was confined to the business of the firm, and was really a dissolution of partnership between Rukhmabai and Balabux with the full knowledge and consent of the latter. In accordance with these findings he passed a decree dismissing the suit with costs against both defendants. The Judicial Commissioner was also of opinion that the division of 1889 was confined to the business of the firm, and was really a dissolution of partnership between Rukhmabai and Balabux with the full knowledge and consent of the latter. In accordance with these findings he passed a decree dismissing the suit with costs against both defendants. Jardine, K.C., and Be Gruyther, for the appellant, contended on the evidence that it was proved that Girdhari and Ladhuram were members of a joint undivided family till the death of the latter in 1873. There had been a partial partition in 1869 when Kunyaram separated from his brothers. That did not effect partition amongst the others. The presumption is that those who do not sever their interests remain united until it is proved they also have effected a partition see West and Buhlers Hindu Law, p. 665, Upendra Narain Myti v. Gopinath Beza (( 1883) Ind. L. R. 9 Calc. 817, 822.), Balgobind Das v. Narain Lal (( 1893) L. R. 20 Ind. Ap. 116.), and Sudarsanam Maistri v. Narasimhulu Maistri. (( 1901) Ind. L. R. 25 Madr. 149, 156) The evidence here is to the effect that Girdhari Lall and the appellant, who with his mother continued to live with Girdhari till his death, continued to be joint. The transaction of 1889 had not the effect of a partition, and did not amount to a dissolution of partnership as found by the Court below. Obbard, for the respondent Rukhmabai, contended that the Judicial Commissioner was right in his estimate of the evidence and as to the onus probandi. The appellant was suing to recover possession of property admittedly in the possession of the respondent, and had to prove his title to it. In this he had failed. Both Courts had found that there had been a partition between the three brothers in 1869 and 1870. Against this the evidence of subsequent reunion was wholly insufficient. The ascertainment of shares followed by the separation of one of the members was quite sufficient to effect partition of title amongst all the coparceners. Even if a separation in 1869 or 1870 was not proved, it was contended that the transaction of 1889 was a permanent and complete severance of the interests of the parties thereto. The appellant knew of the transaction and consented to it, and it was binding upon him. Jardine, K.C., replied. Even if a separation in 1869 or 1870 was not proved, it was contended that the transaction of 1889 was a permanent and complete severance of the interests of the parties thereto. The appellant knew of the transaction and consented to it, and it was binding upon him. Jardine, K.C., replied. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD DAVEY. Prior to and in the year 1869 three brothers, Girdhari Lall, Kunyaram, and Ladhuram, lived together as an undivided family and owned a shop which had been founded by their father, Amarchand, at Ellichpur, in the Hyderabad Assigned Districts. At some time in 1869 or 1870 (for the date is uncertain) Kunyaram separated from his brothers, took out his share amounting to about Rs.11,000, and started a shop of his own. There is no direct evidence of any agreement between Girdhari Lall and Ladhuram. Girdhari Lalls widow, Rukhmabai (who is the first respondent in the present appeal and will hereafter be referred to as the respondent), says she was at Ellichpur at the time of the separation and heard there was a document about their partition, and that it had been prepared by a panchayet, but she des not know what has become of that document. And there is no further evidence whether any such document was signed, or what were the contents of it, if any such document there were. There is also no evidence that Ladhuram drew out his share of the family property, or any part of it, and the fair inference would seem to be that he left it in the family shop, which continued to be carried on by Girdhari Lall under the firm name of Amarchand Girdhari Lall. About the time of the partition Ladhuram sent his wife and infant son, the appellant Balabux, to reside in a place referred to as Bhorteda, and a few months afterwards he seems to have joined them there, and they then went together on a pilgrimage to Prayag (Allahabad), where he died in the year 1873. Thereupon Girdhari Lall brought the appellants mother, Birjubai, and the appellant, then a lad thirteen or fourteen years of age, to his residence in Ellichpur, and they lived with him there until his death in 1882. He left one daughter, but no male issue. Thereupon Girdhari Lall brought the appellants mother, Birjubai, and the appellant, then a lad thirteen or fourteen years of age, to his residence in Ellichpur, and they lived with him there until his death in 1882. He left one daughter, but no male issue. After Girdhari Lalls death the two families continued to live together, and the two widows managed the shop. Differences arose between the ladies, and in 1889, on the advice of friends, the business was divided into two shops, one of which was carried on by the respondent for her own profit, the other being in like manner carried on by Birjubai for herself and the appellant. A complete and apparently exact division was then made of the stock-in-trade, book debts, and other assets of the business, and, according to the respondent, of the houses, the jewels in the house, and the utensils also; but this does not seem to be proved. The parties, however, continued to live in the family house, though whether they messed together is not clear, until 1894, when the final rupture took place and the respondent went to reside elsewhere. The appellant became of age on March 25, 1887, but he seems to have been more studious of religious observances than of the care of the business, and he did not in fact give much atten tion to the business at any time, though there are entries in his handwriting in the books before the division in 1889, and even in the respondents books after the division. It should be mentioned that expenses connected with Ladhurams funeral ceremonies were paid out of the moneys of the business, and by agreement a sum of Rs.4000 was allowed at the time of the division in 1889 for the marriage expenses of Girdhari Lalls daughter. In the present suit the appellant claims, as the survivor of a joint family, consisting of his uncle Girdhari Lall and himself, to be sole owner of the family shop and business, and treats the division in 1889 as an arrangement for management only to avoid quarrels and as a matter of convenience, and he suggests that it was made by his mother and his aunt before he was perfectly able to understand things. The respondents story was that there was a complete separation between the brothers in 1869, and that Ladhuram took out his one-third share and set up a shop of his own at Bhorteda, and the family shop in Ellichpur thereupon became the separate property of Girdhari Lall. She further said that after Ladhurams death Girdhari Lall, out of charity and family affection, brought the appellant and his mother to his own house and maintained them, and before his death verbally directed her to give the appellant one-half of the property, which she had done by the division in 1889. There is, however, no evidence that Ladhuram drew out his third share or set up a shop of his own in Bhorteda or elsewhere, and the one fact which is clear in this cloud of uncertainty is that Girdhari Lall in his lifetime never treated himself as the sole owner of the business. The question for consideration therefore is, What was the nature and legal effect of the transactions which took place in 1869 or 1870 and 1889 ? The Civil Judge of Ellichpur was of opinion that, reading the whole mass of evidence together, it appeared that there was a partition between Girdhari Lall and his two brothers in 1869, but that there was union between the present appellant and his mother and Girdhari Lall some years before the latter died; so the effect of this reunion must be taken as cancelling the first division between them. The learned judge also held that the division in 1889 was made as a family arrangement only, and without the consent of the appellant, who was, therefore, at liberty to impeach it. He therefore made a decree in the appellants favour. Their Lordships are of opinion that the learned judges view as to the reunion after the death of Ladhuram cannot be supported, and, indeed, it was not maintained by the appellants counsel. A reunion in estate properly so called can only take place between persons who were parties to the original partition. This appears to be the meaning placed on the well-known text of Vrihaspati (Mitakshara, ch. A reunion in estate properly so called can only take place between persons who were parties to the original partition. This appears to be the meaning placed on the well-known text of Vrihaspati (Mitakshara, ch. 2, s. 9) " He who being once separated dwells again through affection with his father, brother, or paternal uncle is termed reunited." It is difficult, also, to see how an agreement for that purpose could have been made by or on behalf of the appellant during his minority. The Judicial Commissioner also held that Girdhari Lall and Ladhuram separated in 1869 or 1870, but he held that they then became partners in the firm of Amarchand Girdhari Lall, the appellant taking the place of his father on Ladhurams death, and the respondent taking Girdhari Lalls place on the latters death. He further held that the firm of Amarchand Girdhari Lall was dissolved in January, 1889, each partner taking half of the assets and liabilities as nearly as could be ascertained, and from that date the respondent became sole owner of the firm of Amarchand Girdhari Lall, and the appellant became sole owner of the firm of Amarchand Ladhuram. By his decree, dated April 4, 1899 (which is the decree under appeal), the Judicial Commissioner accordingly dismissed the appellants claim with costs in both Courts. There is therefore a concurrent finding that there was a partition between all three brothers in 1869 or 1870. The Judicial Commissioners opinion on this point, however, seems to be based more on the legal inference to be drawn in the absence of any direct evidence of the actual agreement between Girdhari Lall and Ladhuram than on a consideration of evidence. Their Lordships, therefore, think it will be more satisfactory for them to state their own reasons for agreeing with the Judicial Commissioner. There is no doubt some evidence both of a continued union between Girdhari Lall and Ladhuram and against it. On the one hand, the absence of any proof of an actual division of property between Girdhari Lall and Lad huram and the fact of the former having taken the appellant and his mother back to the ancestral home are evidence of the two brothers having agreed to remain united. On the one hand, the absence of any proof of an actual division of property between Girdhari Lall and Lad huram and the fact of the former having taken the appellant and his mother back to the ancestral home are evidence of the two brothers having agreed to remain united. On the other hand, the fact of Ladhuram having sent his wife and child to reside at Bhorteda and himself leaving the ancestral home (though it k said for a pilgrimage only), and the evident and expressed desire of Girdhari Lall, concurred in by the appellant and his mother until 1894, that the appellant should be treated as entitled to one-half the business and property, is evidence in the contrary direction. But the evidence either way is too slight to form a satisfactory basis for decision. What, then, is the result? It appears to their Lordships that there is no presumption, when one coparcener separates from the others, that the latter remain united. In many cases it may be necessary, in order to ascertain the share of the outgoing member, to fix the shares which the other coparceners are or would be entitled to, and in this sense the separation of one is said to be a virtual separation of all. And their Lordships think that an agreement amongst the remaining members of a joint family to remain united or to reunite must be proved like any other fact. They agree, therefore, with the Judicial Commissioner on this part of the case, and they think that his inference of a partnership between Girdhari Lall and Ladhuram and afterwards the appellant, either by express agreement or by operation of law, is the hypothesis which best reconciles all the proved facts in the case. The Judicial Commissioner has very carefully considered and stated the effect of the evidence as to the division in 1889. With the assistance of counsel their Lordships have examined the evidence, both oral and documentary, upon which the learned Commissioners finding is based, and they agree with him as to the result of it. They need not, therefore, repeat what he has said. They find that the plaintiff was of age, and was present and took an active part in the arrangement then made, and that a careful and exact division was made of the assets and liabilities of the former firm between the two new firms. They need not, therefore, repeat what he has said. They find that the plaintiff was of age, and was present and took an active part in the arrangement then made, and that a careful and exact division was made of the assets and liabilities of the former firm between the two new firms. There is evidence also that the house in which the appellant and respondent resided was divided, the respondent taking the northern portion and the appellant and his mother the southern portion ; but it is not quite clear to what period the division should be referred. Their Lordships also think that the Judicial Commissioner was right in not attaching any importance to the fact of the Wahipuja having been performed by the appellant in the respondents shop, or his having visited her shop and even made entries in her books. It appears from other evidence that the appellant and respondent remained on friendly terms until the commencement of the present suit. Their Lordships, therefore, are of opinion that the transaction of 1889 was a dissolution of the partnership theretofore subsisting between the appellant and the respondent, as heir and representative of Girdhari Lall, and even if they took a different view of what took place in 1869 or 1870, they would hold that the arrangement made in 1889 was not, as alleged by him, of a merely temporary character, but was intended to be a permanent family settlement, and in the circumstances cannot be impeached by, and is binding upon, him. They will, therefore, humbly advise His Majesty that the appeal be dismissed, and the appellant will pay the costs of it.