JUDGMENT Maclean, C.J. - This is a suit the object of which is to have certain wakfnamas, which are mentioned in the plaint, declared to be invalid as against the present Plaintiff and to recover possession of his share of the property comprised therein. I will first deal with the wakfnama executed by the Plaintiff's father and dated the 14th of February 1880. A minor question has been raised on cross-objection as to the validity of a wakf deed dated the 15th of February 1860, which was created by the mother of the Plaintiff's father. I will deal with that later on. 2. The wakfnama which it is now sought to set aside is, as I have stated, dated the 14th February 1880 and the grantor, the father of the present Plaintiff, died on the 30th of April 1896, leaving a widow and several sons and daughters, some of whom are the present Appellants. 3. The suit was instituted on the 30th of July 1897 and the Subordinate Judge of Murshidabad on the 19th of December 1898 held that the wakfnama of the 14th of February 1880 was invalid as against the present Plaintiff as one of the heirs of the grantor. Under the deed itself, the present Plaintiff is excluded from any benefit in the property settled and he is gravely interested in the question of the validity of the wakf, because, if the o deed be not valid as against him, he, as one of the heirs of his 1 father, would be entitled to a share of his father's property. 4. Two or three points have been suggested, rather than argued, by the Appellants against the view of the Court below, but practically there are only two which necessitate any real consideration. The first is a question of limitation and the second and the main one is whether the deed in question is a good and valid wakfnama. The minor points, which were not pressed upon us were, first, that the Plaintiff as heir could not challenge the validity, of the wakf deed and secondly, that he is estopped from raising the present question. In my opinion the Plaintiff as heir is entitled to challenge the validity of the wakfnama, nor, on the facts, do I see how any question of estoppel arises as against him. 5. In my opinion the Plaintiff as heir is entitled to challenge the validity of the wakfnama, nor, on the facts, do I see how any question of estoppel arises as against him. 5. The question of limitation is not, I think, a very difficult one. It is contended for the Appellant that the case falls within Article 91 of the Second Schedule to the Limitation Act. I will assume that it does. But on that assumption I do not see how the present suit is barred. Under that article, "to cancel or set aside an instrument not otherwise provided for," the period of limitation is three years from the time, when the facts entitling the Plaintiff to have the instrument cancelled or set aside became known to him. "The father died on the 30th April 1896 and the present suit was instituted on the 30th of July 1897 and until the death of the father, the son, as one of his heirs, had no interest in the property settled by the wakfnama, nor any right to have it cancelled or set aside. His title as heir did not accrue until the death of his father, which was roughly about a year before the institution of the suit. I therefore cannot see how Article 91 bars this suit. 6. I now pass to the consideration of the question of whether or not the wakfnama in dispute is a good and valid deed. 7. A series of decisions, not only by the Courts of this country but by the Privy Council, has settled the law relating to the question of the validity or invalidity of deeds of this description. I only propose to refer to four cases--all decisions of the Privy Council. It has been seriously and earnestly contended before us, on behalf of the Appellant, that the view adopted by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in these cases is quite at variance with the Mahomedan Law and Mahomedan sentiment in this country. Whether that be so or not is a matter which it is not competent for us to discuss. The decisions of the Judicial Committee are binding upon us and all we can do is loyally to accept and follow them if they are in point. 8. In the case of Mahomed Ahsanulla Chowdhry v. Amar Chand Kundu ILR (1889) Cal. Whether that be so or not is a matter which it is not competent for us to discuss. The decisions of the Judicial Committee are binding upon us and all we can do is loyally to accept and follow them if they are in point. 8. In the case of Mahomed Ahsanulla Chowdhry v. Amar Chand Kundu ILR (1889) Cal. 498 : L.R. 17 IndAp 28 the law is thus laid down: "Although the making provision for the grantor's family out of property dedicated to religious or charitable purposes may be consistent with the property being constituted wakf, yet in order to render it wakf the property must have been substantially and not merely colourably, dedicated to such purposes." The same view was again held in a later case of Abdul Gafur v. Nisamudin ILR (1892) Bom. 1 : L.R. 19 IndAp 170, in which it was held "that a wakfnama to be valid must be a substantial dedication of property to a religious or charitable purpose at some time or other." Again, after a long discussion and a careful review of the authorities, the same tribunal held the same view in the case of Abul Fata Mahomed Ishak v. Rasamaya Dhur Chowdhuri ILR (1894) Cal. 619 : L.R. 22 IndAp 76 and very recently the Judicial Committee in the case of Mujibunnissa v. Abdur Rahim ILR (1900) All. 233 : L.R. 28 IndAp 15 summarised the law by saying: "Their Lordships have, however, considered the question whether, even assuming it to have been registered, the deed is according to its terms a valid deed of wakf. It will be so, if the effect of the deed is to give the property in substance to charitable uses. It will not be so, if the effect is to give the property in substance to the testator's family." (I think the word "testator's" must be a slip for "grantor's.") 9. In this state of the law, we must ascertain from the document itself, whether the effect of the deed is to give the property in substance to charitable uses or in substance to the grantor's family. 10. In this state of the law, we must ascertain from the document itself, whether the effect of the deed is to give the property in substance to charitable uses or in substance to the grantor's family. 10. Before I deal with the construction of the deed, I may refer in passing to a very frank admission made in the evidence of one of the principal witnesses for the Defendants, which is to be found at pages 100 and 101 of the paper book, as to what the objects of the deed were. He says very frankly: "As regards the object of his creating the teak, I cannot say what was the innermost motive of the Chowdhury Shaheb" (that is, the Plaintiff's father) ; "but I understand that his object was that, instead of the properties being subdivided amongst the heirs, they may remain joint and that some may remain in the hands of his wife, the matwali and that the provisions of the wakfnama may be carried out. It was also his object that the properties may never be done away with on being sold at auction for the satisfaction of any one's debts." And later on at page 101, he says: "One person is being defrauded; one person of one party is being kept excluded. Such appears to be the case from the wakfnama." Pausing therefore a moment, it is reasonably clear that the person so excluded is the Plaintiff, who takes no interest under the deed, though, as one of the heirs of the grantor, he would be entitled to a share in the settled property. " But he (the grantor) said to me to this effect: Obedul Azim (that is, the Plaintiff) has got the properties of his mother. I have laboured much and expended much money on account of the said property. I have three sons and two daughters by my this wife. If those properties be divided, they shall not have any means to maintain themselves. Consequently, according to the terms of the wakfnama, his wife's sons and daughters shall get." I merely refer to this evidence as showing that, in the view of this witness, the object was certainly not charitable purposes. If those properties be divided, they shall not have any means to maintain themselves. Consequently, according to the terms of the wakfnama, his wife's sons and daughters shall get." I merely refer to this evidence as showing that, in the view of this witness, the object was certainly not charitable purposes. But I rely upon the terms of the deed itself; and looking at the deed, it is almost impossible to say that the substantial object of this deed was to devote the settled property to charitable purposes. No doubt a small annual sum of 360 rupees--30 rupees a month, out of a total annual income of about eight thousand rupees--is devoted to pious purposes and this, we are told, is about the sum which a Mahomedan gentleman in the position of the grantor would, without any wakfnama, devote to such purposes. No doubt, in the recitals of the deed there is a J statement that "for the sake of spiritual benefit," the grantor makes the deed of wakf and the provisions of the deed are to be M "for ever." If we look at the provisions of Clause 3, we find that the grantor was to remain in possession of the wakf properties as matwali during his life,' and under Clause 4, the widow is to have 150 rupees a month as matwali for dispensing a monthly charitable sum of 30 rupees only. The surplus profits are devoted to the family practically in perpetuity. Under Clause 10, on failure of the direct line of descendants, the male descendant of the grantor's nearest kinsman and relative is to be matwali and on that contingency, as under Clause 13, there is an ultimate gift for charitable purposes. But having regard to the previous limitation and gifts under the deed, the provisions for charitable purposes can scarcely be regarded as other than illusory; see the case of Abul Fata Mahomed Ishak v. Rasamaya Dhur Chowdhri ILR (1894) Cal. But having regard to the previous limitation and gifts under the deed, the provisions for charitable purposes can scarcely be regarded as other than illusory; see the case of Abul Fata Mahomed Ishak v. Rasamaya Dhur Chowdhri ILR (1894) Cal. 619 : L.R. 22 IndAp 76 Under Clause 11 "none of the matwalis shall ever be able to mortgage those wakf properties for his own debts, nor shall be able to make any gift, (sic), sale or any other kind of transfer of the same to any body and these wakf estates shall not be liable to be mortgaged or attached or sold by auction for any personal debts of the matwali." Clause 12 gives power to grant permanent settlements of the property. Looking at the deed as a whole, I think there can be no reasonable doubt, but that, to quote the language of the Judicial Committee, the effect of the deed is to give the property not in substance to charitable uses, but in substance to the grantor's family," and that upon this point the Court below was right. 11. As regards the cross-objection, I have felt some doubt as to whether it is open to the Plaintiff, as one of the heirs of his father, who did not dispute the wakfnama created by his mother, to maintain the present suit, but it is unnecessary to decide this, for, looking at this deed of wakfnama (see p. 114 of the Paper Book) as a whole, I am not disposed to say that on the whole the view taken by the Court below as to the nature of the deed is erroneous. The amount involved is very small and this cross-objection has not been very seriously urged before us. 12. The result is that the appeal and the cross-objection are both dismissed with proportionate costs. Geidt J. 13. I concur.