JUDGMENT Mitra, J. - A preliminary objection has been taken that no appeal lies against the order of the District Judge, but I think there is no foundation for it. The learned District Judge declined to interfere with the decree of the Munsif and rejected the appeal holding that no appeal lay to him. He thought that the case was one in which the Munsif's decision was final under sec. 153 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, the Munsif having been empowered by the Local Government to exercise final jurisdiction in the class of suits for rent contemplated by cl. (6). 2. The broad contention of the vakil for the Respondent is that no order made by an Appellate Court by which it declines to admit an appeal as contemplated by sec. 548, C.P.C., is a decree and is subject to an appeal under sec. 584 of the Code. Whatever the grounds for a rejection of an appeal may be, whether it be for the reasons given in sec. 543, C.P.C., or for the reason of its being barred by limitation or for the supposed incompetency of the Court to hear it, the order it is contended is final and may only be open to revision under sec. 622, C.P.C. 3. The practice of this Court has been, so far as I am aware, to admit second appeals against erroneous orders of rejection, provided second appeals are otherwise entertainable, having regard to the nature of the original suits. It seems to me that the practice is consistent with the definition of the word "decree" in sec. 2 of the Code. An order of rejection amounts to a final adjudication of the Appellants' claim so far as the Court expressing it decides the appeal. It is not capable of being re-opened by the same Court except on an application for review. It is to all intents and purposes a dismissal of the appeal. The stage of the appeal and the reasons for the order are not material. 4. In the present case the order of the learned District Judge concludes with the words "I decline to interfere with the order." His order affirms the decree of the Court below on the ground of his supposed incompetency to entertain an appeal. The matter is not one expressly covered by any section of the Code of Civil Procedure, but sec. In the present case the order of the learned District Judge concludes with the words "I decline to interfere with the order." His order affirms the decree of the Court below on the ground of his supposed incompetency to entertain an appeal. The matter is not one expressly covered by any section of the Code of Civil Procedure, but sec. 540 lays down that an appeal shall lie from decrees "unless when otherwise expressly provided by the Code itself or any other law for the time being in force." As to whether an appeal lies or not in any particular case may be decided either before or after the admission of an appeal under sec. 548. A decision adverse to the Appellant may be arrived at at the instance of the Court itself or on the application or after hearing the arguments on behalf of the Respondent, but the effect is the same:--It is a dismissal of the appeal. 5. My attention has been drawn to the case of Venkatarayadu v. Rangayya Appa Rau ILR 21 Mad. 152 (1897) as supporting the argument of the learned vakil for the Respondent. That case comes strictly within sec. 543 and is distinguishable from the present one. But at the same time, I think, the rule laid down in it is not in harmony with the practice of this Court and puts too narrow a construction of the definition of "decree." 6. I overrule the preliminary objection. 7. The suit out of which the appeal arose was stated in the plaint to be one for recovery of arrears of rent of homestead land. The Munsif's judgment indicates the same thing, There was no issue raised as to whether the land in arrear was homestead or agricultural. Prima facie therefore the suit was not one under the Bengal Tenancy Act and sec. 153 of that Act had no application to it. Ordinarily the venue of appeal is regulated by the allegations in the plaint, and I do not see any reason for departing from the ordinary rule. 8. I, therefore, decree the appeal and direct that the appeal in the Court below be duly registered under sec. 548, C.P.C., and tried out. Costs of the appeal should abide the result.