JUDGMENT Banerjee, J. - There two appeals arise out of a suit brought by the Plaintiff-Appellant in appeal from Appellate Decree No. 1150 of 1900, and Respondent in Appeal No. 1305, for recovery of the amount of compensation adjudged under the Land Acquisition Act I of 1894, the suit being brought under the terms of the last proviso to sub-sec. 2 of sec. 31 of the Act, the claim of the Plaintiff being based upon a mokurari lease granted by the Defendant who was the proprietor of the estate within which the land for which compensation was awarded, is situate. 2. The defence was that a suit like this is not maintainable as the Plaintiff had appeared before the Collector, and that the Plaintiff was not entitled to the whole of the compensation as she has a very limited interest under her mokurari patta, she not being entitled to alienate her mokurari right and only certain classes of her heirs being entitled to it after her. 3. The Courts below overruled most of the objections raised in the defence, and the first Court gave the Plaintiff a decree in full, which the lower Appellate Court reduced to a decree for one-half of the amount claimed. Against this decree of the lower Appellate Court, the Plaintiff has preferred Appeal No. 1150, and the Defendants, Appeal No 1305. 4. It would be convenient to consider the Defendants' appeal first as it raises a question which goes to the root of the whole case. The contentions urged in, that appeal are, first, that this suit is not maintainable as the Plaintiff appeared before the Collector when he made his award, and yet did not apply for a reference to the Civil Court, and, second, that the Plaintiff has only a limited interest under her mokurari patta and the landlord's interest in reversion is much larger in value than that of the Plaintiff, the tenant, who owns only an estate for life. 5. In support of the first contention it is urged, that, where a statute allows a person a certain remedy, if that remedy is not availed of, the general remedy by a civil suit is not available under any circumstances. 5. In support of the first contention it is urged, that, where a statute allows a person a certain remedy, if that remedy is not availed of, the general remedy by a civil suit is not available under any circumstances. It is moreover pointed out that a party not accepting the award of the Collector on the question of apportionment of the compensation can compel the Collector to make a reference only by an application to that officer made in writing and within six weeks from the date of the Collector's award. If then it be held that such a person can bring a civil suit after having entered appearance before the Collector, he may get over the limitation of the six weeks time provided in clause (6) of sub-sec. 2 of sec. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. On the other hand it is contended that where, as in this case, there has been no reference to the Civil Court upon the question of the apportionment and therefore no adjudication of the rights of parties upon that question, it is open to a party entitled to the whole or a part of the compensation to maintain a civil suit under the last proviso of sub-sec 2 of sec. 31 of the Act which says:--"That nothing herein contained shall affect the liability of any person, who may receive the whole or any part of any compensation awarded under this Act, to pay the same to the person lawfully entitled thereto." 6. The question is one of some nicety and not altogether free from doubt and difficulty. But after giving our best attention to the arguments on both sides, the conclusion we arrive at is that the Plaintiff is not precluded from maintaining this suit merely by reason of her having appeared before the Collector and asked the reference to the Civil Court on the question of apportionment; and our reasons are shortly these : The award of the Collector who under sec. 11 is no doubt authorised to deal with the question of apportionment, is declared by sec. 12 of the Act to be final except as thereinafter provided, only as between the Collector on the one hand and the body of claimants on the other, and not as between the claimants inter se. 11 is no doubt authorised to deal with the question of apportionment, is declared by sec. 12 of the Act to be final except as thereinafter provided, only as between the Collector on the one hand and the body of claimants on the other, and not as between the claimants inter se. If there is any question raised as between the claimants, that can be determined only by the Civil Court. And when there has been no reference made, there has been no adjudication of the rights of the claimants inter se. To hold nevertheless that a claimant is precluded from advancing his or her, claim by a suit in the Civil Court as provided by the last proviso of sub-sec. 2 of sec. 31 of the Act, merely because such person appeared before the Collector would be to extend the doctrine of constructive res judicata a great deal too far. The view we take is in accordance with that taken by the Privy Council in the case of Raja Nilmoni Singh v. Ram Bandhu Rai I. L. R. 7 Cal. 388 (1881) in which their Lordships say "their Lordships are of opinion that the Courts in India, who both concur on this point, have rightly held that this proviso applies only to persons whose rights have not been adjudicated upon in pursuance of the sections (38 and 39)." Their Lordships decided the case under the old Act X of 1870 and the proviso that their Lordships had to construe is word for word the same as the last proviso to sub-sec. 2 of sec. 31 of the present Act; and their Lordships referring to an adjudication in pursuance of secs. 38 and 39 go clearly to show that it is an adjudication of the Civil Court upon a reference by the Collector that their Lordships had in view. 7. Then as to the contention that the limitation of six weeks provided in proviso (a), sub-sec. 2 of sec. 18, being rendered nugatory, we will only observe that there is no absolute limitation as to time, seeing that sec. 33 of the present Land Acquisition Act authorises the Collector of his own motion to make a reference to the Civil Court upon any question of disputed apportionment. The first contention of the Defendants-Appellants in Appeal No. 1305 must, therefore, in our opinion, fail. 8. 33 of the present Land Acquisition Act authorises the Collector of his own motion to make a reference to the Civil Court upon any question of disputed apportionment. The first contention of the Defendants-Appellants in Appeal No. 1305 must, therefore, in our opinion, fail. 8. The second contention, however, is entitled to succeed in part. The mokurari lease in question is very similar in terms to the lease which their Lordships of the Privy Council had to construe in the case of Pudmanund Singh v. Hayes 5 C. W. N. 806 : s. c. I. L. R. 28 Cal. 720 (1901), so far as one-half of the property covered by the lease in that case is concerned ; and following that case and also the decision of the Privy Council in Jotendra Mohan Tagore v. Gyanendra Mohun Tagore 18 W. R. 359 (1872) we must hold that the grantee Srimati Punnabati Dai had only a life-estate under that document. 9. It has been argued by the learned vakil for the Plaintiff-Respondent in this appeal that the case cited is distinguishable from the present, as it is not shown that the grantee had no issue of her body living at the date of the grant, entitled to take under the grant. Whether that is so or not, we cannot say, and no materials have been placed before the Court by the Plaintiff whose duty it was to make a full statement of her rights in her plaint, she being the Plaintiff in the case and to make the person entitled to take after her a party to the suit. That being so, the question of the rights of the descendants of the Plaintiff to take after her death and their rights, if any, to any part of the compensation, must be left out altogether untouched in this suit. The only question that can be determined in this suit is how should the compensation be awarded by apportionment between the two parties, one of whom, namely, the Plaintiff, holds an estate for life in the laud acquired, and the other, the Defendant, is the landlord entitled to the reversion. The only question that can be determined in this suit is how should the compensation be awarded by apportionment between the two parties, one of whom, namely, the Plaintiff, holds an estate for life in the laud acquired, and the other, the Defendant, is the landlord entitled to the reversion. For the decision of that question there are no materials before the Court, and the case must be remanded to the Court of Appeal below to determine that question, both parties being at liberty to adduce such evidence as they may be advised ; and the lower Appellate Court may either take the evidence itself or send back the case to the first Court to take such evidence. 10. It remains now to say a few words with reference to the Plaintiff's appeal which has practically been disposed of by our determination of the second point raised in the other appeal. All we need say in that appeal is that there must be a remand, which we have already directed. We may add here that as no abatement of rent has been allowed, the Defendant landlord is not entitled to any separate portion of the compensation on that account. 11. Costs of these two appeals will abide the result. Pargiter, J. I agree. I would wish to add that there can be no proper apportionment of compensation in this suit, for it appears all the persons interested are not parties, and the only question to be decided is this: What part of the compensation is due to the Plaintiff herself for her own limited interests in the land acquired ?