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1903 DIGILAW 113 (CAL)

Promotha Nath Majumdar v. Robert Watson and Co. Ld.

1903-05-04

body1903
JUDGMENT 1. The Plaintiff's are the owners of a 10 annas 8 gundas share in an estate, No. 3 of the Towji. As such they claim a corresponding share in the malikana reserved on estate "No 1821--share 8," a temporarily settled estate managed by the Collector from the year 1847. The Collector found that this estate had accreted to the present estate No. 3. It was temporarily settled with a reservation of the malikana. The Plaintiffs were registered in the Collector's books as entitled to a 7 annas share of the malikana rights in this estate, but in January 1877 the Defendants got their names registered as proprietors of the malikana right to which the Plaintiffs lay claim. The Plaintiffs accordingly sue to establish their rights in the malikana and for pertain arrears. The Defendants, according to the District Judge, have succeeded in proving that they are entitled to the shares of the malikana in respect of which their names are registered "by a series of purchases of the malikana right (apart from No. 3) going back to the original grantees of the malikana." He states that before him the main question discussed was "whether malikana rights can be sold apart from the estate to the proprietors of which they were awarded originally." He came to the conclusion that they could not be sold, and affirmed the decision of the Munsif decreeing the suit. 2. The Defendant now appeals and on his behalf it has been argued that the Judge's judgment is worng. 3. In support of his argument the learned pleader for the Appellant has referred us to the sec. 4 of Reg. XI of 1825, sec. 1 of Act XXXI of 1858, and to the case of Khub Lal v. Ghina Hazari 2 B.L.R. 339 (1869). The Regulation and Act above-mentioned do not throw much light upon the matter. Sec. 4, Regulation XI of 1825 merely lays down that the person in possession of an estate to which land has accreted shall not be entitled to any right in the accretion in excess of that possessed by him in the estate to which it has accreted, and sec. Sec. 4, Regulation XI of 1825 merely lays down that the person in possession of an estate to which land has accreted shall not be entitled to any right in the accretion in excess of that possessed by him in the estate to which it has accreted, and sec. 1 of Act of XXXI of 1858 merely provides that the revenue assessed upon the accretion may be added to the revenue of the parent estate, and a settlement made for the total revenue so arrived at, or a separate settlement may be made in respect of the newly-accreted estate. But the case of Khub Lal v. Ghina Hazari 2 B.L.R. 339 (1869) seems to be in point. In this case, according to the head-note "certain lands accreted to an estate No. 667, and were temporarily settled as a separate estate No. 3148. During the currency of this settlement the owner sold his rights and interests in 667 to the Plaintiff and in No. 3148 to the Defendants. On the expiry of the temporary settlement, the Plaintiff as owner of the parent estate sued to establish his right to the permanent settlement of 3148. It was held that the suit would not lie, and that the Plaintiff had no claim to have a settle ment of 3148." 4. In his judgment Norman, J., observed : "We are of opinion that the decision of the lower Court is perfectly correct. It seems to us that, when No. 3148 had completely formed and more particularly after it had been assessed and settled as a separate estate with a separate juma as provided for by sec. 1, Act XXXI of 1858, it became for all purposes a distinct estate, and was capable of being sold, or otherwise dealt with as such by the owner of the estate to which it had originally accreted; that when Ram Lal sold the original estate without any words, showing that he meant to convey the new estate or any right in it to the purchaser, the purchaser of the original estate acquired no more interest in the new estate than be did in any fruit or profit which had been produced by that estate before the date of his purchase. So much for the Plaintiff's supposed title. So much for the Plaintiff's supposed title. As to the title of the Defendant, we think it is clear that by the conveyance of all the rights and interests of Ram Lal in the new estate 3148, he, as purchaser, acquired, not, only the rights and interests of Ram Lal under the temporary settlement, but his right to ask for and obtain the permanent settlement after the expiration of the temporary settlement." We consider that on the precedent of this judgment, from which we see no reason to dissent, we must hold that the Plaintiffs have no malikana rights in "No. 1821, share 8," as they claim to have. It is clear that they purchased only a share in estate No. 3, while as found by the District Judge the Defendants have purchased the malikana rights in No. 1821, share 8. The Judge sums up the arguments adduced before him as follows: "The Appellant's contention comes to this, that there is no law to the contrary and the Respondents' answer that from its very nature, there can be no (out-and-out) sale of a right to malikana apart from the parent estate. The Appellant's pleader has not cited any case where such a sale, as he maintains, has been held good." He goes on to give his conclusion in the following words:-- "It appears to me that as long as there is no permanent settlement, lauds bearing malikana under the older regulations are pro tanto under these regulations. There has been no permanent settlement of 1821, share 8.' Should one be proposed the proprietors of No. 3 would have the first refusal of the settlement, so they are still entitled to the malikana." We must however hold on the authority of the case of Khub Lal v. Ghina Hazari 2 B.L.R. 339 (1869) that there may be an out-and-out sale of the malikana rights in a newly-accreted estate apart from the parent estate. There is no law to the contrary and no equitable principle which precludes such a sale from taking effect. Hence, as the Defendants in this case have proved that there has been such a sale to them, we must find that the judgment of the Judge in the Court below is wrong and must decree this appeal, which we accordingly do. This order carries costs.