Judgement Appeal from a decree of the above Court (April 26, 1900) affirming a decree of the District Judge of Secunderabad (April 12, 1899) and dismissing the suit. The question decided in this case, the facts of which are stated in the judgment of their Lordships, is whether false imprisonment continues until the warrant of arrest is set aside, including the period of liberation on bail, or whether it terminates when bail is granted. The bar of limitation depended upon its decision. The District Judge decided that, the appellant having expressly disclaimed that his suit was one for damages for malicious prosecution or for wrongful arrest, the suit could only be regarded as one for compensation for malfeasance, misfeasance, or nonfeasance independent of contract, and not specially provided for by a particular article of Sched. II., Act XV. of 1877. He therefore applied art. 36 as fixing the period of limitation, and determined that under this article the suit was barred. The Judicial Commissioner held that evidence of the plaintiffs remaining on bail until the order setting aside the proceedings was necessary, and that in its absence the suit was barred by limitation, the period being one year. Asquith, K.C., and Phillips, for the appellant, contended that until the proceedings in the criminal case were set aside as illegal the appellant had no cause of action. When that event happened, any wrong that then appeared to have been done to him in the course of the proceedings was a continuing wrong until the proceedings terminated in his favour. The suit was therefore in time, whatever article of the Limitation Act was applicable, having been brought within a year of Her Majestys order setting them aside. They referred to arts. 19, 22, 36, and 120 of the Limitation Act, and to s. 23, and to Muhammad Yusuf-ud-din v. Queen-Empress (( 1897) L. R. 24 Ind. Ap. 137.), where it was finally decided that the arrest was unlawful. There was no release from the actual condition of restraint until after it was decided that the arrest was unlawful and the consequent proceedings were brought to an end. Cohen, K.C., and De Gruyther, for the respondent, contended that the plaint did not allege malice or want of reasonable or probable cause. There was no release from the actual condition of restraint until after it was decided that the arrest was unlawful and the consequent proceedings were brought to an end. Cohen, K.C., and De Gruyther, for the respondent, contended that the plaint did not allege malice or want of reasonable or probable cause. Austin v. Dowling (( 1870) L. R. 5 C. P. 535, 540.) and Loch v. Ashton (( 1848) 12 Q. B. 871.) shew the difference between an action for malicious prosecution and an action for illegal arrest. The damage in the latter case is only for the time that illegal arrest, that is actual detention, continues, which in this case was a matter of hours. The plaintiffs cause of action arose on his liberation upon bail from actual imprisonment, and was barred see Beg. v. Hughes. (( 1879) 4 Q. B. D. 614.) Asquith, K.C., replied. May 15. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD MACNAGHTEN. The question in this case is a very short one. It really comes to this Is a prisoner who has been released on bail under imprisonment still so long as he is out on bail ? There are no facts in dispute at this stage of the proceedings. In July, 1895, one Gopal Chunder was convicted by the district magistrate at Simla of having attempted to obtain official information by bribery. On September 18, 1895, the officiating resident at Hyderabad applied to the district magistrate at Simla for a warrant to arrest the appellant on the charge of having abetted Gopal Chunder in the commission of that offence. Now the appellant was and is a subject of the Nizam of Hyderabad. He was a native of that State, and in the Nizams service. The magistrate granted the application, and issued a warrant for the appellants arrest addressed to the officiating resident at Hyderabad. In issuing the warrant the magistrate recorded a note to the effect that it could only be executed out of British India through a political agent, and that the resident at Hyderabad, as such political agent, must decide whether the accused, if in a foreign territory, could be handed over to the British Courts under the extradition law. At Hyderabad the warrant was indorsed to the superintendent of railway police there. At Hyderabad the warrant was indorsed to the superintendent of railway police there. He indorsed it over to a chief constable, who arrested the appellant at one of the stations on the Nizams State Railway on November 28, 1895. The railway itself is part of the Nizams territories. But the Government of India, by arrangement with the Nizam, exercises jurisdiction upon the railway by a British magistrate in respect of a certain class of offences, which may be termed railway offences. The appellant was taken to the Court of the district magistrate for the railway. On November 30, 1895, he was released on bail, undertaking to appear on a day named at the Court of the district magistrate at Simla. At the appellants request the case was afterwards transferred to Umballa. There were various proceedings and adjournments. Ultimately the appellant applied to the Chief Court of the Punjab to set aside the warrant. That application was unsuccessful; but on appeal to Her late Majesty the order of the Chief Court of the Punjab was reversed, the warrant of September 18, 1895, was cancelled, and the proceedings thereon were set aside by an Order in Council dated August 3, 1897. In July, 1898, the appellant filed his plaint in the present suit against the Secretary of State for India, alleging that the warrant of September, 1895, was issued without jurisdiction, and that the charge against him was unfounded. As compensation for the injury inflicted upon him, and the sufferings, expense, and loss which he had sustained in consequence, he claimed damages to the amount of Rs.3,81,500. The plaint stated that the cause of action arose on August 3, 1897, the day of the date of Her late Majestys Order in Council. Various defences were raised on behalf of the Secretary of State. The only one which calls for decision on the present occasion is the question of limitation. In the Court of first instance the cause of action was not defined with anything like precision. The pleader for the plaintiff asserted that it was neither false imprisonment nor malicious prosecution. The case as presented to the Court appears, however, to have partaken of both. In the result the Court dismissed the suit, holding it barred by limitation. In the Court of first instance the cause of action was not defined with anything like precision. The pleader for the plaintiff asserted that it was neither false imprisonment nor malicious prosecution. The case as presented to the Court appears, however, to have partaken of both. In the result the Court dismissed the suit, holding it barred by limitation. An appeal to the Judicial Commissioner met with the same fate, on the ground apparently that the appellant had not satisfied the Court that " his imprisonment or restraint on bail, with surety or without surety, extended to within one year prior to the date of institution of suit." Before this Board the learned counsel for the appellant raised a clear and simple issue. They admitted that no question of malicious prosecution was involved. All or almost all the elements required to found a case of malicious prosecution were wanting. It was false imprisonment or nothing. Again, they admitted that if the imprisonment ended on November 30, 1895, the suit was time-barred, for the period of limitation in a suit for false imprisonment is one year from the termination of the imprisonment. But their contention was that the imprisonment continued until the warrant was set aside. So long as the restraint of bail lasted—and it may be taken that it lasted until the warrant was set aside—the appellant, they said, was not a free man; he was even liable to be actually imprisoned through the action of his surety, or possibly by reason of the intervention of the Government. All this may be very true. But the learned counsel for the appellant did not cite any case in support of their contention. The whole weight of authority is the other way. Nothing short of actual detention and complete loss of freedom will support an action for false imprisonment. The leading case on the subject is the case of Bird v. Jones (7 Q. B. 742.), in which Coleridge, Williams, and Patteson JJ. The whole weight of authority is the other way. Nothing short of actual detention and complete loss of freedom will support an action for false imprisonment. The leading case on the subject is the case of Bird v. Jones (7 Q. B. 742.), in which Coleridge, Williams, and Patteson JJ. differed from Den-man C.J. " Some confusion/ said Coleridge J., " seems to me to arise from confounding imprisonment of the body with mere loss of freedom it is one part of the definition of freedom to be able to go whithersoever one pleases; but imprisonment is something more than the mere loss of this power; it includes the notion of restraint within some limits defined by a will or power exterior to our own." Williams J. speaks of imprisonment as being "entire restraint/ and Patteson J. adds, " imprisonment is, as I apprehend, a total restraint of the liberty of the person for however short a time, and not a partial obstruction of his will, whatever inconvenience it may bring on him." The old authorities cited in that case are to the same effect. In their Lordships opinion it is perfectly clear that the appellants imprisonment did not last one moment after he was liberated on bail. The very object of granting bail was to relieve him from imprisonment. Immediately after his liberation he might have brought a suit for false imprisonment, and possibly he might have succeeded in obtaining some damages. Having failed to bring his suit within one year from the date of his liberation, he is now barred by the law of limitation. Their Lordships will therefore humbly advise His Majesty that the appeal should be dismissed. The appellant will bear the costs of the appeal.