JUDGMENT 1. Hara Nath Roy Chowdhury was a part owner of the village Serajkandi in Pargana Kajmari. By some arrangement with his co-sharers he got into possession of two entire Clinks Nos. 3 and 5 of the Thak map of the Mouzah and of shares of Clinks Nos. 1 and 4. Hara Nath died in the year 1884 having appointed Brojo Mohini Chowdhurani executrix to his last Will and Testament, Brojo Mohini Chowdhurani took out probate of the Will early in the year 1885. We have not the Will before us, but it is conceded that her sons Janaki Nath Roy Chowdhury, Mathura Nath Roy Chowdhury and Jamini Nath Roy Chowdhury are beneficially interested in the estate left by the deceased Hara Nath Roy Chowdhury. Brojo Mohini Chowdhurani, however, remained in possession of the estate until March 1899, and it is not denied that she was in such possession on account of her sons who took over possession and got their names registered under Act VII (B.C.) of 1876 during the pendency of the suit out of which this appeal has arisen. 2. The suit was instituted on the 14th September 1898 by Brojo Mohini as executrix under Hara Nath's Will. On the 19th September 1900, her sons applied to be substituted in her place as Plaintiffs in the suit, and on the 23rd November 1900 the Court granted them leave to prosecute the suit and their names were placed on the record as Plaintiffs. They are now the Respondents before us. 3. The Defendant Dino Moyi Chowdhurani pleaded inter alia, that the lands claimed in the suit were comprised in her village Dobhoya in which the deceased Hara Nath had no interest and that the suit was barred by limitation. 4. During the course of the trial a Commissioner was appointed to find out from a comparison of the survey and Thak maps filed by the parties what lands in suit, if any, were included in the village Serajkandi and in Chuks 1, 3, 4 and 5 of the Thak map and the Commissioner after a careful local investigation came to a conclusion substantially in favour of the proprietors of Serajkandi. The finding of the Commissioner, which has been accepted by the Subordinate Judge, has not been challenged before us. 5. The finding of the Commissioner, which has been accepted by the Subordinate Judge, has not been challenged before us. 5. The only question argued before us is that of limitation, we may divide it under two heads (1st) whether the suit was instituted by Brojo Mohini within twelve years of the cause of action, i.e., the accrual of the right to take possession on the re-appearance of the lands of the Chuks after their admitted submergence for some years, and (2nd) whether the sons of Brojo Mohini, the Respondents before us, are entitled to the benefit of the institution of the suit by Brojo Mohini herself in calculating the period of limitation. 6. The Subordinate Judge has found that Hara Nath was in possession of the lands for which he has given the Plaintiffs a decree, and that the lands re-appeared and were fit for use after the rainy season of the year 1294 B.S., i.e., August or September 1887. These findings are fully supported by the evidence. The Thak and the Survey maps filed in the case are evidence of Hara Nath's possession in and about the year 1853. The lands gradually disappeared since 1853 by the action of the Jumna and by the year 1864 they were, it has been proved by unrebutted evidence, entirely submerged. It has also been proved by the Plaintiffs' witnesses Haris Mandal and Kainchi that Hara Nath and his co-sharers were in possession during the period from 1853 to 1864. It is also conceded that the lands continued to be under water till, the year 1879. The only matter in controversy is the state of the land from 1873 to 1887. The case of the Plaintiffs is that after re-appearance in 1873, the lands were again submerged and there was no re-appearance before 1888. The case of the Defendant is that since 1873 the lands were always above water and that the Defendant was in actual occupation by settling and receiving rents from tenants. The Subordinate Judge has disbelieved the Defendant's case. The case of the Defendant is that since 1873 the lands were always above water and that the Defendant was in actual occupation by settling and receiving rents from tenants. The Subordinate Judge has disbelieved the Defendant's case. He has shown by a careful analysis of the evidence that the case made by the Plaintiffs, and proved by their witnesses Alanee Sheikh, Faratulla Sheikh, Nasamuddi, Fakoo, Azoo and Mamuddi Talukdar has been in substantial parts corroborated by the statements made by the witnesses of the Defendant and accepting the statements made by the witnesses of the Plaintiffs in so far as they have got full support from the witnesses of the other side, he has come to the conclusion that Brojo Mohini lodged her suit within twelve years of the re-appearance of the lands. The evidence adduced on behalf of the Defendant shows that in 1877 only 7 khadas in 1888, 10 khadas in 1290, 20 khadas in 1291, 20 khadas in 1292, and 70 khadas were settled with tenants. The Commissioner deputed to make the local investigation could not identify the lands covered by the kabuliyats filed by the Defendant and it is not possible for us to say that the lands said to have been held by the tenants of the Defendant were identical with the lands decreed. The quantity of land decreed as lying within the survey limits of Serajkandi is considerably less than the lands pointed out as disputed. The Defendant's witness Sree Nath Bhowmik says that before the year 1888 there were 175 or 200 khadas of waste land, and it would seem from the shiftings of the course of the Jumna as deposed to by the Defendant's witnesses that the lauds decreed were either under water or were quite unfit for use before the dry season following the rainy season of the year 1294 B.S. 7. The Defendant next relies on the provisions of sec. 22 of the Limitation Act (XV of 1877) as barring the suit. The contention is that the present Plaintiffs-Respondents having been placed on the record on the 23rd November 1900, that is, more than twelve years after the re-appearance of the lands they must be supposed to have instituted the suit on that day and were therefore barred. 22 of the Limitation Act (XV of 1877) as barring the suit. The contention is that the present Plaintiffs-Respondents having been placed on the record on the 23rd November 1900, that is, more than twelve years after the re-appearance of the lands they must be supposed to have instituted the suit on that day and were therefore barred. Sec. 22 of the Limitation Act however speaks of the substitution or addition of new Plaintiffs and in such a case only the suit is to be deemed to have been instituted when they were made parties. In the present case Brojo Mohini instituted the suit as representing the present Plaintiffs who alone were beneficially interested. Under sec. 437, C.P.C., a trustee, executor or administrator represents the persons beneficially interested and it is not ordinarily necessary to make them parties to the suit. But the Court may, if it thinks fit, order them to be made parties. The Will of Hara Nath has not, as we have said, been placed before us and we are not in a position to say anything as to the status of Brojo Mohini with respect to Hara Nath's estate except that she was allowed to represent the estate and did so until March 1900. The Plaintiffs thereafter come in not as new Plaintiffs but as persons who had already instituted the suit by their representative. They also obtained the necessary leave of the Court. 8. The learned vakil for the Appellant has relied on Harak Chand v. Deo Nath Sahay ILR 25 Cal. 409 (1897) and Fatma Bai v. Pirbhai Virji ILR 21 Bom. 580 (1897), but these cases are clearly distinguishable from the present one. In Harak Chand v. Deo Nath Sahay ILR 25 Cal. 409 (1897) the substituted Plaintiff was an assignee pendente lite. In Fatma Bai v. Pirbhai Virji ILR 21 Bom. 580 (1897) the substituted Plaintiff claimed adversely to the original Plaintiff, he having been vested with the power of administering the estate of the deceased husband of the original Plaintiff who was thus superseded by him. 9. In Suput Singh v. Imrit Tewari ILR 5 Cal. 720 (1880) the right of suit was assigned after its institution to the substituted Plaintiffs and the suit was continued by them with the leave of the Court granted at their instance. Garth, C.J., and Mitter, J., held that sec. 9. In Suput Singh v. Imrit Tewari ILR 5 Cal. 720 (1880) the right of suit was assigned after its institution to the substituted Plaintiffs and the suit was continued by them with the leave of the Court granted at their instance. Garth, C.J., and Mitter, J., held that sec. 22 of the Limitation Act did not apply to the case. This case was distinguished by Trevelyan, J., in his judgment in Harak Chand v. Deo Nath Sahay ILR 25 Cal. 409 (1897). It appears that in the latter case no leave such as was granted in the former case was obtained. We find that the Plaintiffs in this case did obtain the necessary sanction of the Court. We are however not disposed to place much reliance on the fact of their obtaining such leave. 10. We think the case is governed by the principle in Ram Lal v. Harrison ILR 2 All. 832 (1880), Gunpat Pandurang v. Adarji Dadahai ILR 8 Bom. 312 (1877), Kastur Chand v. Sagarmal ILR 17 Bom. 413 (1892), Mohamed Yusuf v. The Himalaya Bank Limited ILR 18 All. 198 (1896), Saminatha v. Muthayya ILR 15 Mad. 417 (1892). An act of limitation must be strictly construed and where the language is ambiguous in favour of the right to proceed. It is true that the date of the addition or substitution of a party is so far as such party is concerned to be deemed by sec. 22 to be the date of the institution of the suit: but in the circumstances of the present case the substitution of the names of the Plaintiffs did not make a new suit. It virtually remained the same and the substitution was merely nominal : We are of opinion that no new Plaintiffs were substituted within the meaning of sec. 22 of the Limitation Act. The grounds urged before us by the Appellant are not sustainable and we therefore dismiss the appeal with costs.