JUDGMENT Maclean, C.J. - A preliminary objection has been taken to the hearing of this appeal, namely, that the order of this Court of the 27th November 1899, which was made ex parte, giving the Appellant leave to appeal in forma pauperis, was out of time, and, consequently that order could not properly have been made. The order runs in these terms:--"Subject to the enquiry to be made by the lower Court in the pauperism of the Appellant, the Petitioner will be allowed to appeal as a pauper:" that is dated the 27th of November 1899. On the 2nd of April 1900, after the present Respondent had been present at the enquiry as to pauperism, an order was made in his presence, allowing the Petitioner to prosecute the appeal in forma pauperis. The contention of the Respondent is that that order could not properly have been made, having regard to the dates of the proceedings. The decree of the Court below was made on the 20th of July 1899, and was signed on the 22nd July, Under art. 190 of the 2nd Schedule of the Indian Limitation Act, the period for applying for leave to appeal as a pauper is thirty days from the date of the decree appealed against. The period would, therefore, run from the 22nd of July and would expire on the 21st of August: but under sec. 12 of the Limitation Act, the applicant was entitled to certain allowances of time, and the last date for the application for leave to appeal in forma pauperis became the 29th of August The application was not made until the 20th of November, and, as I have said, the ex parte order was made on the 27th of November 1899. It is clear that, when the application was made, the application was out of time. But it is said that it is open to the Court to extend the time under paragraph 2 of sec. 5 of the Limitation Act. I do not think that is so. That section only applies to an appeal or application for a review of judgment, either of which may be admitted after the period of limitation prescribed therefor, when the Appellant or applicant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not presenting the appeal or making the application within such period. I do not think that is so. That section only applies to an appeal or application for a review of judgment, either of which may be admitted after the period of limitation prescribed therefor, when the Appellant or applicant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not presenting the appeal or making the application within such period. We are asked to hold that the expression "appeal" includes an application for leave to appeal in forma pauperis. It would be straining the language of the section, if we put that construction upon it. In sec. 12 an application for leave to appeal as a pauper is expressly included, whilst it is excluded from sec. 5. This view has been held in the case of Lakshmi v. Ananta I. L. R. 2 Mad. 230 (1879) and of Parbati v. Bhola I. L. R. 12 All, 79 (1889). In these cases no special application was made to discharge the order which had been made out of time. 2. It must be borne in mind that under sec. 4 of the Limitation Act, the Court is bound, when an application is out of time, to dismiss it, even although the point may not be raised by the other side. I think, however, that there ought to have been a special application made to set aside the orders admitting the application; and we only allow the preliminary objection upon the undertaking of the Respondent to present a petition before Wednesday next, the 10th instant, asking for the discharge of these orders. 3. We do not, however, wish to exclude the Appellant from appealing if he choose to proceed in the ordinary way, and not as a pauper, though he is much out of time. We can, however, extend the time for appealing and if by Wednesday next, he puts in the Court-fee on the memorandum of appeal, we will hear the appeal on the merits. The orders of the 27th November and the 2nd of April, in this case, must be vacated : and, as the Appellant is not in a position to take advantage of our offer to carry on the appeal otherwise than as a pauper, the appeal stands dismissed with costs, hearing fee 3 gold mohurs.