JUDGMENT Sale, J. - The only question that arises now is on the preliminary issue, namely, whether the added Defendant Basanta Kumar Das, a son of Bhuban Mohan Das, was in accordance with the authority in that behalf contained in the will validly adopted as a son to the testator Kali Mohan Das. 2. When this suit was instituted there was no issue raised as to the adoption of the present infant Defendant, the adopted son not being even a party to the suit. On the application for the appointment of a Receiver it was pointed out that there was an obstacle in the way of the Plaintiff, namely, the existence of an adopted son of the testator and there upon leave was given to the Plaintiff to bring the adopted son on the record and to take steps to question the adoption if the Plaintiff so desired and leave to amend the plaint was given to the Plaintiff. As a result of the leave given, paragraph 13A was added to the plaint and so far as the question of adoption is concerned it runs as follows: That the Plaintiff is informed that in or about the month of Joisto in the Bengali year 1297 corresponding with parts of the months of May and June 1890, the said Chandramoni Debi purported to take in adoption the Defendant Basanta Kumar Das, a natural son of the Defendant Bhuban Mohan Das, but the Plaintiff is advised and believes and submits that inasmuch as the said Bhuban Mohan Das was at the date of the said alleged adoption and also at the date of the birth of the aid Defendant Basanta Kumar Das and is now, a member of the Sadharan Brahmo Somaj and inasmuch as he had, many years prior to the dates above mentioned renounced the Hindu religion the said alleged adoption of the said Basanta Kumar Das by the said Sreemutty Chandramoni Debi was absolutely invalid, under the Hindu Law and did not operate to pass any title whatever to the said Defendant Basanta Kumar Dass under the provisions of the &aid will in and to the estate of the said testator. 3. 3. The case then came on for settlement of issues and my former judgment deals fully 'with the arguments on the questions which were then, discussed; I was of opinion that on the pleadings as then framed the fact of the adoption and its recognition by the members of the family was substantially admitted and the only issue raised was one of law, namely, whether the father of the adopted son having at the date of the adoption renounced Hinduism, could validly give his son in adoption according to the rites of the Hindu religion. 4. An appeal was made to me, however, to give the Plaintiff another opportunity of questioning the fact of the adoption and I was informed that the Plaintiff was anxious to raise issues bearing on the fact of the adoption. In order that the whole question might be dealt with and disposed of finally and the question of adoption set at rest, I gave the Plaintiff leave to amend her plaint with the object that definite allegations of fact bearing on the adoption should be made and the grounds on which the adoption was challenged should be expressly stated. This was, I am quite sure, fully understood when the leave to amend the plaint on this point was given. 5. The plaint has now been re-amended and I asked to raise a variety of issues both as regards the caste of the family, whether certain ceremonies were performed which are essential to the twice-born castes to which it is said the family of the testator belonged; and whether the renunciation by the father of the adopted son of certain Hindu beliefs and doctrines, constituted him a non-Hindu and incapacitated him from giving his son in adoption to an orthodox Hindu family. 6. The question of fact as to the ceremonies which were or were not performed at the adoption and as to the caste of the family whether it belongs to the Sudra caste or to one of the twice-born castes--as the Plaintiff now for the first time asserts--are in my opinion questions which do not arise in the amended pleadings and it would I think be a pure waste of time to permit them to be raised now. In substance the plaint retains its form as originally amended. In substance the plaint retains its form as originally amended. The only change made under the leave granted on the last occasion is the interpolation of the following passage into paragraph 13 A of the amended plaint. That paragraph after stating that the widow of the testator in the year 1890 purported to take in adoption the Defendant Basanta Kumar Das proceeds: That the Defendant Basanta Kumar Das was not in fact adopted as a son to the said testator."--Beyond this bare denial of the fact of the adoption, which must he taken in conjunction with the allegation made in the same paragraph, that the widow of the testator thirteen years ago purported to take in adoption the Defendant Basanta Kumar Das,--and which adoption so far as allegations in the pleadings are concerned must be taken to Lava been recognized by the family as a valid adoption, ever since the adoption took place--there is not a single allegation of fact of any kind which discloses the ground on which the fact of the adoption is challenged. 7. Under these circumstances I decline to consider any question other than the question of law which was originally raised. I decline to enquire whether the family of the testator belongs to the Sudra caste--according to the generally accepted notion or whether it belongs to the twice-born castes--as the Plaintiff now asserts through her counsel. I also decline to enquire what were the necessary formalities to be observed at the adoption and whether such were in fact observed. Nor do I propose, as I have 'also been invited to do, to enter into an abstract discussion as to the religious tenets of the Brahmos in general, of the Sadharan Brahmo Samaj in particular--nor to attempt to assign to the professors of Brahmoism their exact position in the system of religions. All these questions I consider are outside the pleadings in this suit and are as unnecessary to discuss and as irrelevant as would be a question of the domicile of the adopted son, supposing the Plaintiff had desired to raise that question now. I come therefore to the question of the validity of the adoption, of the Defendant Basanta Kumar Das. 8. How is the validity challenged? I come therefore to the question of the validity of the adoption, of the Defendant Basanta Kumar Das. 8. How is the validity challenged? It is said that Babu Bkuban Mohan Das, the natural father of the adopted son, has ceased to be a Hindu and was not a Hindu at the date of the adpotion and that he was therefore incapacitated from his giving his son in adoption according to Hindu rites. Assuming however that Babu Bhuban Mohan Das has abandoned certain of the more important Hindu tenets and practices and that in this sense he is a non-Hindu, it ns admitted that he is by birth and descent a Hindu and that he could, if so desired at any moment, revert to Hinduism by undergoing the necessary expiatory ceremony. If the natural father could himself revert to Hinduism, it is difficult to understand, why an infant son of his should not be received into Hinduism according to the rites of that religion if his natural father, who is his legal guardian, in the exercise of his discretion consents to and approves of that step. No Court of law would, I apprehend, interfere with the exercise by a natural father and guardian of his own discretion in a case of the kind. In a recent Bombay case, Shamsing v. Santabai ILR (1901) Bom. 551, it was held that a Hindu father does not lose his capacity to give his son in adoption by reason of his conversion to Mahomedanism and it was pointed out that this right was incidental to the civil guardianship of his son, which the lapse from Hinduism did not affect. In that case, as in the present, the authority to give in adoption was delegated by the non-Hindu father to an orthodox member of the family. 9. It is said that the case is distinguishable, inasmuch as the son of the father who became Mahomedan remained a Hindu. In the present case it is asserted that the adopted son was not a Hindu at the date of the adoption and that he was not even born a Hindu. But the material fact is that the adopted son is by origin and descent a Hindu and a member of the family which was originally Hindu and which as regards certain of its branches still remains Hindu. But the material fact is that the adopted son is by origin and descent a Hindu and a member of the family which was originally Hindu and which as regards certain of its branches still remains Hindu. I have not been referred to any authority which decides that a Eon of a father who was a Hindu but had abandoned the tenets and practices of Hinduism, could under no circumstances revert to Hinduism, if he was born after the father had ceased to conform to Hinduism. If the father can revert to Hinduism, surely so can the son. It must, I apprehend, be admitted that the Defendant Basanta Kumar Das, if he had remained a Brahmo, could on attaining years of discretion revert to Hinduism which was the religion of his father and if he could take that step on attaining the proper stage, what was there to prevent his father from taking the same action on behalf of his infant son, if the father in the exercise of his discretion and believing he was acting in the best intgrests of his son thought proper so to do. Such an act cannot be adjudicated by of Court of Law as illegal or wrong without an enquiry as to the respective merits of Hinduism and Brahmoism as systems of faith and morals and any such inquiry would be outside the Court's jurisdiction. 10. Although the adoption in question has in the course of the argument been confidently challenged as illegal and invalid, it is a singular fact that until the present litigation arose the adoption was, as I must assume on the pleadings, never questioned and the adopted son has been throughout recognized and treated as a member of an orthodox Hindu family. 11. The conclusion I arrive at is that the Plaintiff has failed to impugn the validity of the adoption of the Defendant Basanta Kumar Das and I must declare that the Defendant Basanta Kumar has is the validly adopted son of the testator. 12. The Plaintiff must pay the costs of the hearing of this issue. 13. The further hearing of the case, for the determination of the remaining issues, if any, was adjourned.