JUDGMENT Sale, J. - The object of this suit is two-fold : the Plaintiff as administratrix of the estate of her grandmother, Rani Karunamoyee Dassee, deceased, seeks to recover from the Administrator-General as executor of Kumar Inder Chunder Sing, deceased, Government securities of the value of Rs. 15,000 or the equivalent of those securities in money deposited by Karunamoyee in her lifetime with Kumar Inder Chunder Sing. The Plaintiff also seeks to recover from the Defendant as representing Inder Chunder Sing's estate, the property and effects of Karunamoyee Dassee, which came into the hands of Inder Chunder Sing upon the death of Karunamoyee. The main defence which has been relied upon is one of limitation. There is also a contest between the parties as to the properties which the Plaintiff alleges came into the hands of Inder Chunder Sing upon the death of Karunamoyee Dassee. 2. Evidence has been given showing that Inder Chunder did take possession of the estate of Karunamoyee upon her death. But the question as regards what that estate consisted of is a matter which would be inconvenient to be tried at the present stage of the suit and assuming that the defence of limitation fails. 3. I should be disposed to take the usual course of directing an enquiry as to what that estate consisted of upon the death of Karunamoyee and what were the property and effects which came into the hands of Inder Chunder Sing upon Karunamoyee's death. 4. The parties are not at issue either as regards the circumstances under which the Government securities of Rs. 15,000 came to be deposited by Karunamoyee with Inder Chunder Sing, and it has been taken as admitted in course of argument that the facts under which the deposit came to be made are correctly stated in the 3rd para, of the Plaintiff's plaint. And as regards the defence of limitation, the argument has proceeded not so much as affecting the claim of the Plaintiff so far as regards the general estate of Karunamoyee, but it has been confined to the question whether or not the claim as regards the Government securities for Rs. 15,000 is barred by the law of limitation. I propose, therefore, to dispose of the plea of limitation so far as it affects the claim for recovery of the Government securities. 5. 15,000 is barred by the law of limitation. I propose, therefore, to dispose of the plea of limitation so far as it affects the claim for recovery of the Government securities. 5. The facts, which I have already said, are admitted, I may shortly summarize as follows :--It appears that shortly before the death of Karunamoyee, Kumar Inder Chunder Sing who was her grandson and the brother of the Plaintiff was anxious to buy a residence for his sister and proposed to purchase a certain house called Camperdown House for that purpose. He had entered into a contract for its purchase and being pressed to complete it he requested his sister and grandmother to let him have Company's securities of a sufficient amount in order that by pledging or selling them he might be able to proceed to carry out the purchase. 6. In the result Karunamoyee provided Government securities to the extent of Rs. 15,000, and the Plaintiff furnished Government securities to the extent of Rs. 14,500. The Plaintiff has already obtained a decree for recovery of the Government securities furnished by her. She obtained that decree in the year 1897. There was a dispute at one time as to whether the Government securities were deposited by these ladies as a contribution for the purchase or whether, as they allege, they were deposited with Inder Chunder at his request and for his accommodation it being agreed between the ladies and Inder Chunder that if Inder Chunder found a necessity for either pledging or selling the Government securities that he would upon the demand of the Plaintiff or of Karunamoyee either redeem them or replace them. 7. It does not appear that Inder Chunder in his lifetime ever paid any interest either to Karunamoyee or the Plaintiff in respect of the Government securities. What happened was this :--Shortly after these Government securities which are the subject-matter of this suit and also the Government securities which were the subject-matter of the previous suit were deposited with Inder Chunder, they were pledged by him with the Bank of Bengal and a loan was raised to carry out the purchase of Camperdown House, and it appears that after Karunamoyee's death which took place on the 16th July 1886, Inder Chunder sold the whole of the Government securities and realized the proceeds. It appears, however, that he continued to describe the Government securities in his books of account as still in deposit with him, and these entries in the books continued up to 1889-90 and up to the time of his death which took place on the 14th May 1894 he had neither returned the Government securities to the Plaintiff nor paid the value of same, nor any portion of the interest accruing upon the Government securities. 8. Karunamoyee upon her death left a Will of which Inder Chunder Singh was appointed the executor by implication. The Will is addressed to him and he is requested to pay the legacies and make over the estate to the Plaintiff as her grand-daughter and as I have stated that upon her death he proceeded to take possession of her estate. He never, however, took out probate of the Will, nor does he appear to have paid any legacies with perhaps one unimportant exception. 9. It is stated also that under the Hindu Law he was the next heir to Karunamoyee. Now, these being the circumstances so far as the deposit of the Government securities is concerned it appears that after Inder Chunder Sing's death the Plaintiff applied to be appointed administratrix of the estate of Karunamoyee and asked for administration of that estate with the Will of Karunamoyee annexed. The application was opposed by Mrinalini, widow of Inder Chunder Sing, and a very long and protracted litigation resulted, and in the end the Will of Karunamoyee was established and the litigation terminated in 1901. The Plaintiff's application is dated 18th December 1894. On 28th January 1895 the order was made for issue of the grant and in consequence of the opposition of Mrinalini, on 6th March 1895 the Plaintiff was called upon to prove the Will in solemn form. On the 2nd September 1896 probate of the Will was granted. There was an appeal against that order which was disposed of by this Court on the 4th March 1901, the appeal being dismissed. 10. Now the first question is, how the law of limitation affects the claim as regards these Government securities. On the 2nd September 1896 probate of the Will was granted. There was an appeal against that order which was disposed of by this Court on the 4th March 1901, the appeal being dismissed. 10. Now the first question is, how the law of limitation affects the claim as regards these Government securities. It is contended that having regard to the evidence of the Plaintiff who says that Karunamoyee before her death made certain demands for the return of the Government securities which she had deposited with Inder Chunder Sing, that the right to sue for these Government securities accrued during the lifetime of Karunamoyee and that limitation has continued to run from that time. The Defendant also contends that the transaction was in reality and in effect a loan and that therefore the ordinary limitation applicable to the claim would be 3 years or at the most 6 years under Art. 120 of the Limitation Act, the time running from the date of Karunamoyee's demand. The important question is whether the claim as regards the Government securities can be regarded as a claim in respect of moveable property deposited with Inder Chunder Sing ; if so, the article applicable under the Limitation Act would be Art. 145. Reliance has been placed upon the observations of Mr. Justice Jenkins in the judgment which be delivered in the previous case. The learned Judge expressed the opinion that the transaction though regarded by the parties and so described by them as a deposit was in effect a loan of the securities. It does not appear, however, that the learned Judge was considering Art. 145 with reference to the transaction, and moreover in the opinion of the learned Judge the question of the article applicable was immaterial having regard to the circumstances of the case inasmuch as the view taken was that the suit was not barred. It is clear that the loan was not a loan of money nor does Art. 59 or Art. 60 apply. They all refer to deposit of money and in my view it seems to me immaterial whether it be regarded that the transaction was one of deposit or whether it can be described as a loan of the Government securities ; in either case it seems to me that the article applicable would be Art. 145. They all refer to deposit of money and in my view it seems to me immaterial whether it be regarded that the transaction was one of deposit or whether it can be described as a loan of the Government securities ; in either case it seems to me that the article applicable would be Art. 145. The transaction in its origin was clearly a deposit and it was intended that Inder Chunder should hold those securities on account of the Plaintiff and of Karunamoyee subject to the right of dealing with them by sale or pledge should the necessity arise. But even if this were not so, it seems to me it would be very difficult to give effect to the argument as regards the applicability of the law of limitation. 11. Assuming that the transaction of deposit was in effect a loan, even an ordinary money loan, the position was that upon Karunamoyee's death her debtor Inder Chunder became the executor to her estate and whether as executor or as heir, took possession of her estate. Under these circumstances, it would appear that in equity the debtor executor is to be considered as having paid the debt due by himself to herself as executor and upon that supposition it is an established rule that the executor shall be accountable for the amount of his debt as assets. I am reading from p. 1179 of the 2nd volume of Williams on Executors, 9th edition. 12. It is not easy to see in what way or how any right to sue to render Inder Chunder accountable for this particular debt could accrue during his own lifetime, unless at the instance of one of the legatees. But even in the somewhat difficult position of a legatee being compelled to sue such suit would not be barred until the lapse of 12 years from the death of Karunamoyee. Now the present suit was instituted within that period of 12 years. 13. But even in the somewhat difficult position of a legatee being compelled to sue such suit would not be barred until the lapse of 12 years from the death of Karunamoyee. Now the present suit was instituted within that period of 12 years. 13. But it seems to me that on the death of Inder Chunder when a new administrator to the estate of Karunamoyee was appointed, a new cause of action arose to render the estate of Inder Chunder accountable both as regards the debt and as regards the general estate of Karunamoyee which remained in his hands at the time of his death, and so far as I can see Art. 120 would apply to a suit of that character. The present suit is precisely of that channel and would not be barred until 6 years from the death of Inder Chunder Sing. 14. For these reasons it appears to me that no portion of the Plaintiff's claim is barred by the law of limitation, and that being so I must make a decree in terms similar to the terms of the decree in the previous suit as regards the Government securities, that is to any, a decree to the effect that the Plaintiff is entitled to recover the present value of the Government securities originally deposited together with such interest as is allowed by the law of limitation, and as regards the remainder of the claim there must be a decree for the administration of the estate of Karunamoyee and I direct the usual enquiries including an enquiry as to what the estate was at Karunamoyee's death and what portion of that estate came into the hands of Inder Chunder Sing upon Karunamoyee's death. As regards costs I think it would he better to adopt the usual rule and reserve the costs for the present. Mr. B.C. Mitter 15. With regard to interest on the Government securities there was no question raised in the other suit. The Court 16. I only allow such interest as is recoverable under the law of limitation. You can raise the question hereafter as to the amount. Mr. Chaudhuri 17. Being an administration decree, who is to render the account ? Mr. Mitter 18. Both parties will say what they have to say. The Court 19. Both parties will file their state of facts and accounts in the usual way. Mr. You can raise the question hereafter as to the amount. Mr. Chaudhuri 17. Being an administration decree, who is to render the account ? Mr. Mitter 18. Both parties will say what they have to say. The Court 19. Both parties will file their state of facts and accounts in the usual way. Mr. Chaudhuri The matter will be referred to the Official Referee. The Court Yes.