JUDGMENT 1. The Plaintiffs in this case obtained a preliminary decree in a mortgage suit against the Defendants on the 24th of June 1892, and, in January 1899, they applied under sec. 89 of the Transfer of Property Act to have an order absolute for the sale of the property. The case for the Defendants was that between the 24th of June 1892 and the time when the application was made in January 1899, they had paid up the whole of the mortgage-debt to the decree-holder and that the mortgage-decree was satisfied. 2. Evidence was gone into on this point by the Munsif; and, he found that all but thirty rupees of the mortgage-debt had been paid. He, therefore, directed that an order absolute should be given to the Plaintiffs for the recovery by sale of so much of the mortgaged property as was necessary for the recovery of this sum of 30 rupees. The Plaintiffs appealed to the District Judge; and, the District Judge has reversed the judgment and decree of the Munsif and has directed that an order absolute for the sale of mortgaged property should be made for the realization of the whole decretal amount. He held that the Defendants were not entitled to any benefit from the payments which they had made out of Court, by reason of the fact that those payments had not been duly certified under sec. 258, C.P.C.; and, he further held that under the provisions of Art. 173A of Schedule II of the Limitation Act, the Defendants were debarred from setting up this plea of payment. The Defendants have appealed to this Court. 3. The first point taken in support of the appeal is that sec. 258, C.P.C., does not apply to an application made under sec. 89 of the Transfer of Property Act, that section not having been made applicable by any rule issued by this Court under sec. 104 of the Transfer of Property Act. This contention is supported by the decision of this Court reported in Kedar Nath Raut v. Kali Churn Ram ILR 25 Cal. 703 (1898); and, the learned pleader who appears on behalf of the Respondents admits that he is not able to dispute it. 4. The next point taken is that as the application must be taken to have been made under sec. 703 (1898); and, the learned pleader who appears on behalf of the Respondents admits that he is not able to dispute it. 4. The next point taken is that as the application must be taken to have been made under sec. 89 of the Transfer of Property Act, and the provisions of sec. 258, C.P.C., do not apply, the limitation prescribed by Art. 173A, Sch. II of the Limitation Act cannot govern the case and that the District Judge was wrong in holding that the Defendants were debarred from setting up the plea of payment. 5. This contention is also supported by the decisions of this Court in Tiluck Singh v. Parsotein Proshad ILR 22 Cal. 924 (1895), and the learned pleader who appears for the Respondents is unable to oppose it. 6. It is lastly contended that even if sec. 258 of the CPC could have been taken to apply to such an application, then as the Court to which that application was made could not be regarded as being a Court executing the decree, it would not have been necessary under the provisions of that section to certify any payment or adjustment to that Court. The rulings reported in Akikunnissa Bibee v. Roop Lal Das ILR 25 Cal. 133 (1897) which follows an earlier ruling reported in Ajudhia Pershad v. Baldeo Singh ILR 21 Cal. 818 (1894) are sufficient authority for the view that any question that arises as to an order absolute for sale is not a question relating to the execution of the decree, and that until a decree absolute is made under sec. 89 of the Transfer of Property Act, there is, in fact, no decree capable of execution. We think, therefore, this contention is well-founded. 7. On behalf of the Respondents it has been suggested that the order passed by the District Judge directing an order absolute for the sale of the mortgaged properties for the realization of the whole decretal amount is the only order that he could pass, because the full mortgage-debt had not been paid at the time of the application, and, it was suggested that the question of the amount due under the mortgage can only be gone into during the proceedings in execution. We are unable to agree with this view, and, we hold that the Court to which the application is made under sec. We are unable to agree with this view, and, we hold that the Court to which the application is made under sec. 89 of the Transfer of Property Act has full power to ascertain what balance of the mortgage-debt is really outstanding at the time of the application and to make the order absolute for the realization of that amount only. 8. For the above reasons, we think that the judgment and decree of the District Judge cannot be supported. We, therefore, set them aside and restore the judgment and decree of the Court of first instance. The appeal is decreed with costs.