JUDGMENT Ghose and Peatt, JJ. - This is an appeal by one Babu Chuni Lal Bose, Administrator to the estate of the late Raja Han Bahadur Singh, against an order of the Subordinate Judge of Gaya, disallowing the petition of objection preferred by the said administrator to the execution of a decree passed in favour of one Rai Narain Das against Rani Asmed Koer and Raja Ran Bahadur Singh. The facts out of which the contest between the parties arises are shortly these: Rani Asmed Koer, widow of the late Raja Modh Narain Singh, executed a mortgage bond in favour of the said Rai Narain Das. The latter brought a suit to enforce his mortgage security against Rani Asmed Koer. Raja Ran Bahadur Singh who was then the reversionary heir, was brought on the record as a Defendant and a compromise was come to between the Plaintiff and Raja Ban Bahadur Singh, upon which the decree of the 29th March 1873, was passed. Subsequently, on the 18th December 1899, proceedings for the execution of the said decree were taken out against Raja Ran Bahadur Singh and in the course of this execution, an account was prepared showing the amount due to the decree-holder. Ran Bahadur, however, objected to the said account; but while the matter was still pending before the Court, he died on the 19th March 1380 and this fact having been brought to the notice of the Court, an order was made on the 7th April 1890, upon the decree-holder, to take necessary steps against the legal heirs of the deceased judgment-debtor. It would appear that two persons, Raj Kumari Ratan Koer, who claimed under a will of Raja Ran Bahadur Singh and one Chotey Narain Singh, who was apparently regarded as the nearest agnate relation and heir ab intestato of the said Raja, were made parties to the proceedings. Notices were issued and though the said notices were served upon them, they did not enter appearance, the result being that the account prepared by the Office of the Subordinate Judge was approved and confirmed on the 7th May 1890. The decree-holder was then called upon to take further steps, but no such steps having been, taken within the proper time, the application was dismissed for default of prosecution on the 15th July 1890. The decree-holder was then called upon to take further steps, but no such steps having been, taken within the proper time, the application was dismissed for default of prosecution on the 15th July 1890. However that may he, the main question that we have been called upon to determine is whether the said order of the 7th May 1890 is conclusive between the parties. 2. With a view to determine this question, it is necessary to state that Raja Ran Bahadur Singh, by his will, bequeathed all his property to Raj Kumari Ratan Koer (she being his grand-daughter, born of a son who had predeceased him), with the exception of ten villages which were given to Musammat Rameswar Koer, alias Dulhin Sahiba, the widow of that son. Ratan Koer, applied for letters of administration with the will annexed; but this application was opposed by Chotey Narain Singh and two other persons, Karowr Patti Narain Singh and another, the former claiming (so we gather from the judgment of the District Judge dated the 16th February 1891, which came up to this Court on appeal) as the nearest agnate of Raja Ran Bahadur Singh, being, as stated, his grandfather's great great-grandson and the two latter, as his grandfather's brother's great-grandsons upon the ground that the will was untrue. The District Judge refused the application upon the ground that the will was not proved, but this judgment was reversed in appeal by the High Court on the 1st September 1891; and the order of the High Court was affirmed in appeal by the Privy Council on the 8th December 1894. Ratan Koer, however, died before taking out letters of administration and she left a will demising her estate to her daughter Raj Kumari Bhubaneswari Koer alias Bacha Saheba and appointing her mother, Rameswar Koer and her husband, Rajeswari Prosad Narain Singh, as executrix and executor, respectively. 3. In the meantime, on the 21st September 1890, the decree-holder presented his second application for execution, the previous application of the 18th December 1889 having been, as already stated, dismissed for default on the 15th July 1900. This application, as we gather, was made against Raj Kumari Ratan Koer and Chotey Narain Singh; and upon this application the mortgaged property was advertized for sale. This application, as we gather, was made against Raj Kumari Ratan Koer and Chotey Narain Singh; and upon this application the mortgaged property was advertized for sale. Ratan Koer seems to have objected to the execution on the ground that the dispute in regard to the will left by Raja Ran Bahadur Singh had not teen then finally decided and that the sale ought not to take place until such decision. The execution case, however, was struck off on the 1st August 1891. 4. A third execution was taken out on the 19th August 1893 and it was taken out against the same persons, Ratan Koer and Chotey Karam Singh, as the legal representatives of Raja Ran Bahadur Singh, the former being described to be in possession of the estate of the said Raja Ran Bahadur Singh. In the course of this execution Ratan Koer pleaded, among other matters, that the, account which had been prepared in the course of the execution in 1890 was wrong and not binding upon her, it having been approved of in her absence and at a time when the right of succession of the several claimants to the estate of the late Raja had not been adjudicated and when no letters of administration had been granted. She, however, stated, that, by reason of the will of Raja Ran Bahadur Singh, she was in possession of the estate, save and except ten villages which had been bequeathed to Rameswar Koer. The Subordinate Judge dealt with the question thus raised by Ratan Koer and by his judgment of the 9th July 1894, held that the substituted judgment debtors having been made parties to the previous execution case of 1890 and the account having been adopted by the Court on the 7th May 1890 after service of notices upon them and Raj Kumari Ratan Koer having preferred no appeal against that order, she was not competent to question the correctness of the said account. He also held that the decree was not barred by the law of limitation as was contended for by the judgment-debtor. 5. An appeal was preferred against this order by Ratan Koer to the High Court; but pending this appeal, Ratan Koer died on the 21st May 1895. He also held that the decree was not barred by the law of limitation as was contended for by the judgment-debtor. 5. An appeal was preferred against this order by Ratan Koer to the High Court; but pending this appeal, Ratan Koer died on the 21st May 1895. Thereupon, on an application being made by Rameswar Koer and Rajeswari Prosad Narain Singh, the executrix and executors appointed by the will of Ratan Koer, they were substituted in her place as Appellants, but subsequently, upon an objection being raised by the decree-holder, Respondent, it was hold by a Division Bench of this Court on the 2nd January 1896 that Rameswar Koer and Rajeswari Prosad Narain Singh did not represent the estate of Raja Ban Bahadur Singh and that therefore, they had no right to continue the appeal preferred by Ratna Koer and that the appeal must abate. Accordingly the appeal did abate. Subsequently the present application for execution was presented on the 25th April 1896 and it was against Musammat Rameswar Koer and Rajeswari Prasad Narain Singh as executors of Musammat Bhubaneswari Koer, alias Bacha Saheba, minor. This application was, however, understood to be an application against the minor Bhubaneswari Koer as well and it was opposed by those two individuals upon the ground that they were not the executors of Rajkumari Bhubaneswari Koer and that, therefore, the execution could not proceed against them when Bhubaneswari Koer had not been properly represented. On the 2nd January 1897, the Subordinate Judge disallowed the objection; and against this order an appeal was preferred to the High Court by Musammat Bhubaneswari Koer through her guardian and next friend Musammat Rameswar Koer, but no such appeal was preferred by Rameswar Koer and Rajeswari Prosad Narain Singh in their individual capacity, audit was held that Bhubaneswari being only a legatee of the executrix of the original judgment-debtor, she could not represent the estate of Raja Ran Bahadur Singh and further that she had not been properly represented in the appeal; the result being that appeal was decreed and the order of the Court below was set' aside, but only in so far as it affected the Appellant before this Court, namely, Musammat Bhubaneswari Koer. In the meantime Rajeswari Prosad Narain Singh died and it would appear that subsequently an application for execution was presented against Rameswar Koer only and this was opposed by her on tie 8th June 1898 upon the ground that she being only an executrix to the will of Raj Kumari Ratan Koer, could not represent the estate of Raja Ran Bahadur Singh and that the beneficial owner of the properties sought to be sold in execution was Raj Kumari Bhubaneswari Koer under the will of her mother, Rai Kumari Ratan Koer and that, therefore, the properties could not be sold. On the 20th June 1898 the Subordinate Judge disallowed the objection of the Rameswar Koer upon the ground that the order of his predecessor of the 2nd January 1897, disallowing the objection of Rameswar Koer, was binding upon him and conclusive between the parties. This order was appealed against to the High Court; and a Divisional Bench dismissed the appeal upon the ground as that that portion of the order of the Subordinate Judge of the 2nd January 1897, which directed execution to proceed against the executors under the will of Ratan Koer as representing the estate of Ran Bahadur Singh, had not been interfered with in appeal by the order of this Court of the 31st August 1897, the said order of the 2nd January 1897 was binding upon the Appellant. 6. The original, decree-holder, we might here mention, is dead and the decree has now passed by transfer by his heirs to on Dakshina Mohun Roy. 6. The original, decree-holder, we might here mention, is dead and the decree has now passed by transfer by his heirs to on Dakshina Mohun Roy. But before this transfer was effected, an application was made by the original decree-holder's heirs, u/s 38 of the Probate and Administration Act, for administration of the estate of Raja Ran Bahadur Singh, limited for the purpose of representing the deceased in the execution suit and an order to that effect was made on the 11th November 1899 and it would appear that, on the 16th March 1901, administration was issued to the present Appellant, Babu Chuni Lal Bose and he has been duly substituted in place of the judgment-debtor, so that whatever defects there might have existed in the matter of the execution proceedings that were taken out on different occasions by the decree-holder against the persons described as representing the estate of Raja Ran Bahadur Singh, have now been removed and we have before us a person who, for the purposes of the execution case, fully represents the estate of the said Raja Ran Bahadur Singh. It should also be mentioned that the name of the present holder of the decree, Dakshina Mohan Roy, was duly substituted in the place of the original decree-holder, but, in connection with a litigation now pending in the Original Side of the High Court, Mr. Beeby has been appointed administrator pendente lite to the estate of Dakshina Mohun Boy and he now represents the decree-holder, who is the Respondent before us Having stated the facts which bear upon this appeal, we now revert to the order of the 7th May 1890; and the main question, as already indicated, which arises in this appeal is whether that order accepting the account which was then prepared, is conclusive between the parties. The question also arises whether the order of the 9th July 1894 disallowing the objection of Ratan Koer and holding her to be bound by the said order of the 7th May 1900, is also conclusive between the parties. The Subordinate Judge has decided both these questions against the judgment-debtor. The question also arises whether the order of the 9th July 1894 disallowing the objection of Ratan Koer and holding her to be bound by the said order of the 7th May 1900, is also conclusive between the parties. The Subordinate Judge has decided both these questions against the judgment-debtor. A further question seems to have been raised in the Court below by the judgment-debtor or rather by the administrator that the execution of the decree was barred by the law of limitation, but we need not deal with that question, it not having been raised before us by the learned Counsel on behalf of the Appellant. 7. The Subordinate Judge, however, at the same time has expressed the opinion that if the question of the conclusiveness of the order of the 7th May 1890 and that of the 9th July 1894 were open to him for consideration, he would hold that there was a mistake in the account previously prepared in the sum of Rs. 21,280 and that the judgment-debtor was entitled to credit in respect of that amount. 8. The learned Counsel for the Appellant has contended that Ratan Koer was only a residuary legatee under the will executed by Raja Ran Bahadur Singh and that though she obtained an order for the grant of letters of administration, yet none was taken out by her and that therefore she could not represent the estate of Raja Ran Bahadur at the time when the order of the 7th May 1890 and 9th July 1894, respectively, were passed and that it is open to the true legal representative to Raja Ran Bahadur Singh to show notwithstanding those orders, that the account upon the footing of which execution has been taken out is wrong. 9. Section 4 of the Probate and Administration Act provides that the executor or the administrator, as the case may be, is the legal representative of a deceased person and all the property of the deceased vests in him. Section 12 ordains that probate of a will, when granted, establishes the will from the death of the testator and renders valid all intermediate acts of the executor as such. Section 12 ordains that probate of a will, when granted, establishes the will from the death of the testator and renders valid all intermediate acts of the executor as such. Section 14 says that Letters of Administration entitles the administrator to all rights belonging to the intestate as effectually as if the administrator had been granted at the moment after his death and Section 15 lays down that letters of administration do not rends valid any intermediate acts of the administrator tending to the diminution or damage of the intestate's estate. 10. These two latter sections, however, do not apply to this case for this was no case of intestacy, as regards the estate of Ram Bahadur Singh. Section 19 provides, among other matters, that when a deceased has made a will, but has not appointed an executor, an universal or residuary legatee may he admitted to prove the will and letters of administration with the will annexed, may be granted to him. And we may take it that Ratan Koer was regarded as tilling the character of a residuary legatee and administration was ordered to be granted to her, though she did not actually take out the letters. 11. It will be observed that Section 190 of the Indian Succession Act, which provides that no right to any part of the property of a person who has died intestate can be established is any Court of Justice unless letters of administration have been granted, has been omitted from the Probate and Administration Act; but Section 187 of the Act, though it has not been incorporated in the Probate and Administration Act, has been retained in the Hindu Will's Act. That section provides that no right as executor or legatee can be established in any Court of Justice unless a court of competent jurisdiction within the province shall have granted probate of the will under which the right is claimed, or shall have granted letters of administration under the one-hundred and eightieth section, so that we may take it that an executor or as administrator cannot establish his right under the will until probate or administration has been granted. But the question here is not whether the right of Ratan Koer under the will could be established without a probate or administration, But whether proceedings in execution could be taken against her as the representative of Ran Bahadur Singh. 12. But the question here is not whether the right of Ratan Koer under the will could be established without a probate or administration, But whether proceedings in execution could be taken against her as the representative of Ran Bahadur Singh. 12. u/s 82 of the Probate and Administration Act, after any grant of probate or letters of administration, no other than the person, to whom the same shall have been granted, shall Lave power to sue or prosecute any suit, or otherwise act as representative of the deceased, until such probate or letters of administration shall have been recalled or revoked. If in this case probate or letters of administration had been granted to any body, he would be the legal representative of the deceased Raja Ran Bahadur Singh and the decree-holder would have been bound, having regard to the provisions of Section 234, Code of Civil Procedure, to bring such legal representative upon the record of, the execution case of the year 1890) when Raja Ran Bahadur Singh died. But though the Raja left a will under which Ratan Koer was the residuary legatee and an application for probate or letters of administration seems to have been made almost immediately after (i.e. 7th April 1890) as we gather from the judgment of the District Judge dated the 16th February 1891 to which we have already referred, it was not until the 1st September 1891 that the High Court ordered letters of administration to be granted. Ratan Koer, however, was in the meantime in possession of the estate left by the Raja. In this circumstance, the question arises, who represented the deceased at the time when, after the death of the Raja, the decree-holder was called upon by the Court to take the necessary steps against the legal heirs of the deceased judgment-debtor. It could not be rightly said that because no probate of the will or letters of administration had been granted to any person nobody represented the deceased at the time. And here we cannot do better than refer to the observations of Markby J. in the case of Prosunno Chunder Bhuttacharjee v. Kristo Chytunno Pal ILR (1878) Cal. 342. "The executor does no represent the deceased by virtue of the will until he has obtained probate. Who then represents the deceased who has left a will from his death until probate has been obtained? 342. "The executor does no represent the deceased by virtue of the will until he has obtained probate. Who then represents the deceased who has left a will from his death until probate has been obtained? Surely some one must do so, or the law would not have provided that the statute of limitation should run between the death and the grant of probate and it undoubtedly does," and later on he observed: "Upon the whole I think that until some other claimant comes forward the party who takes possession of the estate of a deceased Hindu must in the present state of the law be treated for some purposes as his representative and that a judgment obtained against such a representative is not a mere nullity. Even if it cannot be executed against the estate in the hands of the executor when he has taken out probate, it is at any rate sufficient to enable the Plaintiff to bring a suit against the executor in order to have the decree satisfied." This view was accepted by the Madras High Court in the case of Janaki v. Dkanu Lall ILR (1891) Mad. 454, where the learned Judges observed as follows:--"If therefore the Creditor is precluded from bringing in any one as the personal representative of the deceased until some one had proved his will, Jus just claims would be liable to be defeated by the simple expedient of refusing to apply for probate until the debt had become barred. This certainly cannot have been the intention of the law. It appears to us that, though the executor can establish no right without taking probate, the existence of the will cannot be ignored for all purpose whatsoever," And it was held that the persons who toot possession of the estate of the deceased upon his death were liable to be treated by the creditor as his representative, even though they themselves were liable to be dispossessed by the executors on taking oat probate. The question in these two cases no doubt arose with reference to the suit brought by the creditor against the representative of the deceased debtor and the effect of the judgment passed in such suit and not with reference to proceedings taken in execution of a decree against a person as the legal representative of the deceased judgment-debtor; but the principle under-lying the observations which we have quoted are equally applicable here. We find however that the Madras High Court, in the case of Chathakelan v. Govinda Karumiar ILR (1893) Mad. 186, has held that the words "legal representative," as occurring in Section 234 of the Code, do not necessarily include a person in possession who does not in law represent the estate of the deceased; and that a stranger in possession of the property of the deceased person, who was not a party to the decree ought not to be preceded against in execution or otherwise, than by a regular suit. But would it be right to regard Ratan Koer as a stranger is possession? There was ft will in her favour and she asked for letters of administration with the will annexed and this will was ultimately proved to be true; and apparently, it was on the basis of the right conferred by the will that she entered into possession. He possession could not, we think, be regarded as the possession of an executor de son tort, as Mr. Hill compared her with, so that her acts would not be binding upon the true legal representative, but she was a person who was the residuary legatee and who was entitled to administer the estate upon letters of administration being received. But apart from this consideration, there was Chotey Narain Singh and he was throughout the execution proceedings regarded as the legal heir of the deceased ab intestato. If Ratan Koer could not represent the estate at the time surely Chotey. Narain Singh, or the two other persons, who opposed the application of Ratan Koer for probate of the will did. But nothing seems to have been suggested in the Court below, nor has it been suggested before us that there was any other legal heir ab intestate of the deceased Ban Bahadur Singh than Chotey Narain Singh. Narain Singh, or the two other persons, who opposed the application of Ratan Koer for probate of the will did. But nothing seems to have been suggested in the Court below, nor has it been suggested before us that there was any other legal heir ab intestate of the deceased Ban Bahadur Singh than Chotey Narain Singh. In these circumstance it seems to us that the substitution of Ratan Koer and Chotey Narain Singh as the legal representative of the deceased judgment-debtor was a good and legal proceeding and it follows that the order made by the Court on the 7th May 1890, confirming the account prepared by the office was a perfectly legal order and so it was held by the Subordinate Judge on the 9th July 1894, when it was determined that Ratan Koer and Chotey Narain Singh were made parties to the execution proceedings, that after service of notices upon them the accounts were adjusted and confirmed and that the question of the correctness of the account could no longer be questioned. This order, as we have already noticed, also became final by reason of the appeal that was preferred by Ratan Koer having abated in consequence of her death, the legal representative of Raja Ran Bahadur Singh's estate, having not been substituted in her place. 13. Upon these considerations, we think that the view adopted by the Court below is right and that the question of the correctness of the account, that was prepared and adopted in the year 1890, is no longer open for consideration. The result is that this appeal is dismissed with costs.