JUDGMENT : STANLEY, J. 1. The suit out of which this appeal has arisen was brought by the plaintiff, who claims to be the Mahant of a Math situate in the village of Kanchanpur, in the district of Gorakhpur, for recovery of certain villages and shares in villages and other property belonging to the Math. The first defendant, Rajbans Bharthi, is a rival claimant to the Mahantship, and the other defendants are, one a lessee, and the other a lessee and mortgagee of portions of the property of the Math, who derive their title under Rajbans Bharthi. The Math belongs to the Sanyasi Nihangs (cele-bates) and the properties which the plaintiff seeks to recover admittedly belong to the Math. The earliest Mahant of whom mention has been made is Puttan Bharthi. He was succeeded by his chela, Hardayal Bharthi, who in turn was succeeded by Padarath Bharthi. Padarath Bharthi was murdered by his chela, one Ajudhia Bharthi, who is now undergoing a sentence of transportation for life for his crime. On the death of Padarath Bharthi, Khushal Bharthi succeeded to the Mahantship. He had two disciples, namely, the defendant, Rajbans Bharthi, and one Bachchu Bharthi. Owing to alleged misconduct on the part of Rajbans Bharthi, he was not installed as Mahant on the death of Khushal Bharthi, but the junior disciple, Bachchu Bharthi, was selected in his place. The plaintiff's case is, that he was a chela of Bachchu Bharthi, and after his death was nominated and duly installed as Mahant. The defendant, on the other hand, denies that the plaintiff was a chela of Bachchu Bharthi or that he was ever, duly elected or installed as Mahant, and says that he himself was 14 days after the death of Bachchu Bharthi duly elected and installed upon the gaddi as Mahant. 2. Of the issues framed in the court below our attention Hat been particularly drawn in this appeal to two only. These issues are—(1) whether the plaintiff was a chela of Bachchu?, and (2) whether the plaintiff was made Mahant in accordance with the established custom and practice, or whether the defendant was installed as Mahant in accordance with such custom and has been in possession of the property of the Math as Mahant since the death of Bachchu Bharthi? On both these issues the learned Subordinate Judge found in favour of the plaintiff. On both these issues the learned Subordinate Judge found in favour of the plaintiff. There are some facts which preceded the death of Bachchu Bharthi to which it may be well here to refer. Khushal Bharthi executed a will on the 9th of August, 1882, appointing his successor to the Mahantship. In that will is a recital that the testator had become very old and blind and unable to walk, and that he could not look after the business of the llaka and household affairs. It recites that his disciple, the defendant, Rajbans Bharthi, was an able and qualified man and that he (the testator) had no other disciple than him. He then by the will directed that Rajbans Bharthi should, after his death, get mutation of names effected in his favour in respect of all his moveable and immoveable property and should be the owner of the gaddi and become the Mahant. After the execution of this document, Rajbans Bharthi appears to have become displeased, or to have had some difference with Khushal Bharthi, it may be that he was guilty of some misconduct unbecoming a disciple—for we find that a year after the execution of this will Khushal Bharthi executed another will which is dated the 8th of August 1883. It appears that the testator was totally blind at the date of the execution of this will and therefore largely dependant on others. Considering the language of this will we are disposed to think that it was not altogether the work of Khushal Bharthi himself. It recites that during the testator's illness Rajbans Bharthi had had a document drawn up, “the contents of which were bad” and having told the testator that it was a will, had had it registered on the testator's admission. Then it recites that Rajbans Bharthi was “a very bad character,” that he does not serve devotees and perform service and cannot be allowed to remain in the place. After these recitals and a recital that Bachchu Bharthi is a good man and always engaged in devotion the???stator, directed that after his death Bachchu Bharthi should be the absolute owner of the whole of his property and perform the worship and service of the gadun. After these recitals and a recital that Bachchu Bharthi is a good man and always engaged in devotion the???stator, directed that after his death Bachchu Bharthi should be the absolute owner of the whole of his property and perform the worship and service of the gadun. Then followed a declaration that the testator should, during his life, be the proprietor of everything, and after his death Bachchu Bharthi and his disciple, if any, should be the absolute owners of the whole of his property. The testator thereby also cancelled the will of the 9th of August, 1882. A month after the execution of this second will Khushal Bharthi executed a deed of gift in favour of Rajbans Bharthi, in which a different reason is assigned for his change of mind in respect of the succession to the math from that which appears in the second will. In this document the will of the 9th of August, 1882, is recited, the reason assigned for its execution being not any misconduct on the part of Rajbans Bharthi but a disagreement between Khushal Bharthi and him. The recital in the document runs as follows :—“Owing to some disagreement I cancelled and quashed the said will by the will executed in favour of Goshain Bachchu Bharthi, my disciple and heir.” In this deed of gift after a recital that some arrangement should be made for the maintenance of Rajbans Bharthi, Khushal Bharthi gives to him 32 bighas and 12 dhurs of land as his absolute propetry. On the death of Khushal Bharthi, Bachchu Bharthi succeeded to the Mahantship under the will of the 8th of August, 1883, and continued to be Mahant up to the time of his death on the 14th of April, 1894. According to the plaintiffs case, Bachchu Bharthi adopted him as a disciple when he was of the age of 8 or 9 years, and upon Bachchu Bharthi's death he was elected and installed as Mahant at the thirteenth day ceremony when he was of the age of 12 or 13 years. The case of Rajbans Bharthi is, that the plaintiff was neither a disciple of Bachchu Bharthi, nor was he ever installed in accordance with the custom prevailing in regard to the election of Mahants of the Sanyasi sect. The case of Rajbans Bharthi is, that the plaintiff was neither a disciple of Bachchu Bharthi, nor was he ever installed in accordance with the custom prevailing in regard to the election of Mahants of the Sanyasi sect. On the contrary he alleges that he himself was duly elected and installed as Mahant at a meeting convened and held on the 14th day after the death of Bachchu Bharthi. 3. It appears that no sooner had Bachchu Bharthi died than disputes arose between the plaintiff and the defendant, Rajbans Bharthi. There was a disturbance over the disposal of the corpse of the Mahant, each party claiming the right to dispose of it. To prevent disturbances the local police officer summarily made over the body to the plaintiff to be disposed of in the usual way by throwing it into the river, It may be well here to state what occurred as regards mutation proceedings on the death of Bachchu Bharthi. On the 2nd of June, 1894, the plaintiff, under the guardianship of one Ghurupuri, who was his natural father, presented an application in the Revenue Court for removal of the name of Bachchu Bharthi and substitution of his own name as owner of the village Kanchanpur and other property belonging to the Math of Kanchanpur. In that application the death of Bachchu Bharthi is stated, and it is alleged in it that Bachchu left the applicant as his disciple and heir, and that since Bachchu Bharthi's death the applicant had been in possession of the property and had performed the funeral ceremonies of the deceased. It is to be observed that in this application no mention whatever is made of the alleged installation of the applicant as Mahant of the gaddi. This is a remarkable omission if the plaintiffs case be true, that he was installed as Mahant on the 13th day (April 27th) after the death of Bachchu. The defendant, Rajbans Bharthi, filed an objection to this application on the 23rd of June, 1894, in which after several recitals the following statements appear. This is a remarkable omission if the plaintiffs case be true, that he was installed as Mahant on the 13th day (April 27th) after the death of Bachchu. The defendant, Rajbans Bharthi, filed an objection to this application on the 23rd of June, 1894, in which after several recitals the following statements appear. “Upon the death of his fellow disciple, Bachchu Bharthi, this objector performed funeral ceremonies and gave a Bhandara, and all the Mahants of the Ilaka of district Gorakhpur having assembled together, gave the sheet of a Mahant to this objector by reason of his being a competent disciple and a fellow disciple of the deceased, and by reason of his being in possession of the property and a lawful heir. This objector has been in possession of all the Milaks of the deceased and so forth. The objector then submits that he is entitled to have his name recorded in the Khewat Pattidari statement as owner in the place of Bachchu Bharthi, deceased.” We find from this document that the defendant, Rajbans Bharthi, set up his election and installation as Mahant within a very short period after the death of Bachchu Bharthi. The proceedings in the Revenue Court (where the possession of the appellant was found to be clear and undisputed) terminated in favour of the appellant under a compromise which had been made between Rajbans Bharthi and the plaintiff, through his father and guardian, Ghurupuri. This was apparently arrived at with the concurrence of some at least of the Mahants of the neighbourhood. The compromise refers to a deed of the 2nd of May, 1894, which it describes as a deed of inheritance and declares to be binding on both parties. This document is incorrectly described as an agreement, it is in reality a sort of solemn declaration of good intentions on the part of Rajbans Bharthi. In it he states that “with the advice of Mahants, punches, tenants and servants of Bachchu Bharthi, he had been invested with the sheet of a Mahant to-day,” that he had made the plaintiff Karia Bharthi his disciple, and that after his own death, Karia Bharthi should be the owner of the gaddt. In it he states that “with the advice of Mahants, punches, tenants and servants of Bachchu Bharthi, he had been invested with the sheet of a Mahant to-day,” that he had made the plaintiff Karia Bharthi his disciple, and that after his own death, Karia Bharthi should be the owner of the gaddt. He gives assurances of his future good behaviour and a promise to act in certain matter's on the advice of two Mahants, named respectively Sheosaran Bharthi, Mahant of the gaddi of Kotwa and Sarabdawan Bharthi, Mahant of Bhardiha, a resident of Badhiamal and a Muafidar. The document also contains the statement that Rajbans Bharthi had given the 32 bighas and 12 dhurs of land which he acquired under the deed of gift from Khushal Bharthi to Jageshar and Rameshar, his sons and Sheodin Bharthi who was a chela of Rajbans Bharthi for maintenance. Of this so-called agreement the plaintiff says in paragraph 8 of the plaint that the defendant, Rajbans Bharthi, “dishonestly executed an agreement on the 2nd of May, 1894, according to his own wish and desire, and thereby declared the plaintiff his disciple. On the strength of the said agreement, the defendant, first party, took an objection on the 23rd June, 1894, to the entry of the name of the plaintiff for which an application was made by Ghurupuri, on the 2nd June, 1894. Subsequently the defendant, first party, dishonestly and in collusion with Ghurupuri, aforesaid, filed a petition of compromise on the 27th June, 1894, and caused his name to be entered in the revenue papers. All these proceedings were taken fraudulently during the time the plaintiff was a minor.” The plaintiff here charges not merely the defendant but his own father, Ghurupuri also, with fraud and collusion. We fail to find any evidence on the record to support these charges. It is difficult to understand what motive Ghurupuri could have had for supporting the claims of the defendant Rajbans to the detriment of his own son's interests. In his evidence the plaintiff admits that there was no disagreement between him and his father. He says that he first heard of the compromise when mutation of names was effected, but admits that he made no inquiry as to why his father had executed the compromise. In his evidence the plaintiff admits that there was no disagreement between him and his father. He says that he first heard of the compromise when mutation of names was effected, but admits that he made no inquiry as to why his father had executed the compromise. “There was never,” he says, “any disagreement between Ghurupuri and me, but when my father made the compromise he was my ill-wisher. My father has done no other act which might show that he is an ill-wisher.” The arrangement so entered into, whether it was binding or not upon the plaintiff, was acted upon; the name of the defendant was recorded as owner and he has continued to collect the rents and manage the properties of the math up to the present time. The plaintiff endeavours to explain the fact that Rajbans had the control and management of property by the assertion that 4 or 5 days after the tirahwin ceremony he appointed Rajbans as his agent. He says, “I appointed Rajbans 4 or 5 days after the tirahwin ceremony. My servants and not I sent for Rajbans. Ghamandi Lal and Chandiman asked me to send for Rajbans saying that he would do work. Then he was sent for and kept. Ghamandi Lal and others said that Rajbans was a clever man and that he would make a good manager. I inquired nothing about Rajbans. But my servants said that he was a bad character.” This seems to us a somewhat strange story, and particularly so when it is borne in mind that the plaintiff and Rajbans had but a few days before had a dispute over the disposal of the body of Bachchu Bharthi and were not on good terms. Is it not an after thought invented to account for the undeniable fact of appellant's possession of the math property for so many years? We shall refer to this matter later on. Is it not an after thought invented to account for the undeniable fact of appellant's possession of the math property for so many years? We shall refer to this matter later on. Now it is clear from the evidence that on the death of Bachchu Bharthi two candidates were put forward for the mahantship—one the plaintiff, a lad of 12 or 13 years, who is a nephew and is alleged to have been a disciple of Bachchu Bharthi, and who was supported by a small coterie of Mahants, the other the defendant, Rajbans Bharthi, who had been a former disciple of Khushal Bharthi and who from the evidence had the support of a considerable number of influential Mahants. We think that it is just possible that some of the plaintiff's supporters may have taken time by the forelock and gone through the form of installing the plaintiff on the gaddi on the occasion of the thirteenth day ceremony and forestalled the supporters of Rajbans who only assembled and installed him on the succeeding day. The initiation of a child of the tender age of seven or eight years as a disciple and the installation as Mahant of the same child when he was of the age of but 12 or 13 years and could not possibly understand the duties and responsibilities of an ascetic and a Mahant probably struck some of the wiser heads among the electoral body as being absurd if not farcical. Seeing this they, in all probability, we think, arranged the compromise, the terms of which appear in the document of the 2nd of May, 1864. This, we believe to be the real genesis of the so-called agreement of the 2nd of May. The neighbouring Mahants conscious that the plaintiff-respondent, Karya, had some claim to the gaddi, and at the same time unwilling to put a mere boy into such a responsible position, and finding ready to their hands in the person of the appellant one who also had some claims as chela of a former Mahant, but before doing so made terms with him both as to his successor and as to the manner in which he should conduct himself in the office. On his accepting those terms they installed him. On his accepting those terms they installed him. And we may remark those terms were in every way most proper, and such as would naturally be imposed by Mahants anxious for the well-being of the Kanchanpur shrine. As to the date (May 2nd) that clearly was the date on which the “agreement” was engrossed on stamp paper. It had evidently been drawn up on April 28th, as appears from the recital that appellant had “to-day” been invested with the sheet of a Mahant. Under the circumstances the agreement which the defendant sets up was not unnatural, namely, that Rajbans should succeed to the Mahantship, make the plaintiff his chela and nominate the plaintiff as his successor. We may here observe that it is most unfortunate that the learned Subordinate Judge did not exercise his powers and enforce the attendance at the trial as witnesses of Ghurupuri, the father of the plaintiff, and Sheosaran Bharthi and Sarabdawan Bharthi who are alleged to have bjen mainly instrumental in carrying out the compromise. The evidence of the two Mahants was of especial importance as they were the persons by whose advice the appellant, according to the “agreement” was to be guided and whom he therein empowers to punish him for disobedience. It appears that at the instance of the defendant, warrants had been issued for these parties, but they failed to attend. An application was made to the court for the issue of a proclamation under section 168 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to secure their attendance, on the ground that their evidence was material and they were intentionally avoiding giving evidence. This application was resisted by the pleader for the plaintiff on the ground that the postponement of the trial for the purpose of obtaining the attendance of these witnesses “was sought simply with a view to harass and put the plaintiff to expense.” The learned Subordinate Judge yielded to the argument of the plaintiff's pleader and passed the following order on the application, “as with reference to the statements of the pleaders for the parties no reasonable ground appears for issuing a proclamation, it is ordered that this petition be disallowed.” He does not find that the application was made for the purpose of harassing the plaintiff and of putting him to expense. In fact, he gives no intelligible reason for his refusal. In fact, he gives no intelligible reason for his refusal. Undoubtedly these three persons were material and necessary witnesses and ought to have been examined. Ghurupuri, the father of the plaintiff, as his guardian, entered into the compromise. He could have informed the court of all the circumstances connected with it. He is, we are now told, dead, so that his evidence cannot be procured. The oppositions offered by the plaintiff to the application for the issue of proclamation leads us to suppose that the plaintiff did not believe that the evidence of these witnesses would be favourable to him. We have considered whether even now we should not direct the examination of the other persons abovenamed; but having regard to all the circumstances, we are disposed to think that it would not now be desirable to adjourn the hearing of this appeal for the purpose of obtaining the evidence of these witnesses assuming that they are now to be found. Before we proceed to consider the evidence which has been adduced on behalf of the respective parties, let us first see what is alleged to be the rule for the election of Mahants of the Math in question. In the second paragraph of the plaint the plaintiff states the rule thus:— “The rule for nominating a Mahant is that one who is nominated by the Mahant for the time being from among his disciples becomes the Mahant after him. If the Mahant for the time being dies without nominating any one as his representative then after his death the Mahants and faqirs of the sect and the raises of the neighbourhood and disciples of the deceased Mahant appoint as his successor one of his disciples who may be qualified, and if there are no qualified disciples, then another person of the family who may be qualified.” 4. The case for the plaintiff is that of the ten groups which make up the sect of the Sanyasis, the Bharthi group alone in this case was capable of electing a Mahant, and that the principal Mahants of that group did elect and install the plaintiff as Mahant. It was also contended on behalf of the plaintiff that if there be a disciple uf the deceased Mahant, such disciple must ordinarily be elected Mahant. It was not contended that such disciple must, under any circumstances, be so elected. It was also contended on behalf of the plaintiff that if there be a disciple uf the deceased Mahant, such disciple must ordinarily be elected Mahant. It was not contended that such disciple must, under any circumstances, be so elected. As evidence of the rule, the plaintiff relies, on the evidence of one Partab Bharthi who is the Mahant of Rampur Matia, and is said to be acquainted with the Math at Kanchanpur and its rules. In the course of his evidence he says, “Karia Bharthi was installed as Mahant on the thirteenth day after the death of Bachchu Bharthi. A bhandara (feast) was given on account of the tirahwin ceremony of Bachchu Bharthi. A bhandara can be given at any time after the tirahwin at pleasure. The bhandara on account of the tirahwin is given in pursuance of a religious custom. All the ten classes (that is, the ten classes of Sanyasis) attend the other bhandara, but the tirahwin is attended only by one's own class.” 5. The learned pleader for the respondent relied upon several authorities, and amongst others the decision in Atma Nund v. Atma Ram, [1864] Sud. Diw. Decs, N.W.P. Vol. I, 309 as supporting this view. In this case it was held that a right of inheritance to the estate of a deceased Guru much less of a division of property left by him whether hereditary or self-acquired, amongst his chelas, does not exist but the right of succession depends upon the nomination made by the deceased Guru which is generally confirmed by the Mahants or principal persons of the sect in the neighbourhood at the time of their assembling for the performance of the funeral obsequies of the deceased. The learned Judges in that case so held relying upon a bawasta obtained from the Hindu law officer of the court, and upon several precedents of the Sadar Dewani Adalat; they say in the course of their judgment:— “The right of succession depends upon the nomination made by the deceased Guru which is generally confirmed by the Mahants or principal persons of the sect in the neighbourhood at the time of their assembling together for the purpose of performing the funeral obsequies of the deceased, on which occasion they proceed to install the chela nominated by the deceased with the usual ceremonies unless they saw reason for setting aside the nomination, or no successor should have been appointed by the deceased, in either of which cases they make an election of their own, selecting from among the pupils of the deceased the one who may appear the best qualified to be his successor.” 6. The same rule was laid down in reference to the very Math which is the subject matter of the present appeal in the subsequent case of Nirunjun Barthee v. Padaruth Barthet and, Khooshal Barthee, [1864] S.D.A., N.-W.P.R. 512. In their judgment in that case Batten and Spankie, JJ., say:— “With the circumstances of this case and with the precedents before us, there can be no doubt that amongst Sanyasis it is usual to appoint Mahants and that there must be nomination during the life-time of the Mahant or when there has not been such nomination, there must be election and confirmation by the neighbouring Mahants and members of the sect.” 7. In the case of Genda Puri v. Chatar Puri, [1886] I.L.R., 9 All., 1 their Lordships of the Privy Council held that a claimant to a Mahantship in order to succeed must prove the custom of the Math, entitling him to recover the office and the property appertaining to it, and that a claimant who failed to prove his installation or confirmation was not entitled to a decree for the office and property against a person alleging himself to have been a chela who, whether with or without title, was in possession. “In determining” they say, “who is entitled to succeed as a Mahant in such a case as the present, the only law to be observed is to be found in custom and practice which must be proved by testimony, and the claimant must show that he is entitled according to the custom to recover the office and the land and property belonging to it. The infirmity of the title of the defendant who is in possession will not help the plaintiff as the Subordinate Judge seems to have thought.” 8. In a Khewat of the village of Kanchanpur for the year 1293 Fasli (1885-1886) (No. 42 C. in the record) the custom as regards the appointment of lambardar is thus stated:— “The disciple who will be installed to the gaddi by his guru dies without installing any one to the gaddi in his life-time, all the atits (ascetics) and ra???ses of the surrounding places shall assemble at the time of the bhandara (feast) and shall install to the gaddi the disciple whom they consider fit. The disciple so appointed shall also be appointed a lambardar. The rest of the disciples so long as they live together and bear a good character, shall get maintenance, but in case of separation they shall get nothing.” 9. According to this the election is not confined to the Mahants of any particular group, but extends to all the atits and raises of the surrounding places. As appears by a judgment of the 3rd of December, 1892, of the Subordinate Judge of Gorakhpur, in a suit which was brought by Nirunjun Barthee v. Padaruth Bharti and Khuskal Barthee, for the establishment of the right of the plaintiff to inherit the proprety of the Math in question in the defence set up by the defendant Padarath, the custom as to the appointment of Mahants was thus stated:— “The custom is that the disciple or the disciple of a disciple who is declared by the Mahant himself in his life-time to be his successor or who, after the death of his spiritual guide is declared Mahant by the Mahants, becomes the Mahant and owner of the property.” 10. We may here say that no clear and reliable evidence to establish the custom has been given. We may here say that no clear and reliable evidence to establish the custom has been given. There is nothing to show the local area which is to furnish the persons entitled to take part in the election and installation. There is nothing to satisfy us as to the number of electors requisite to form a quorum, nor does it appear how the election and installation is to be carried out, when the Mahants who form the electoral body are divided in opinion in the choice of a candidate. In the present case whatever was the local area which provided the electorate, it is clear that the electors were not unanimous in their choice of a Mahant. 11. [After discussing the evidence his Lordship proceeded —] We are disposed to think upon the entire of the evidence that what we may term a sort of a hole and corner installation was hurriedly gone through, but we are far from being satisfied that the plaintiff was duly installed in accordance with the custom of the sect. It must be borne in mind that this suit for what we may call the “temporalites” of this Math can succeed only if the respondent proves that he has been duly installed according to custom. The suit does not ask for a declaration that he ought to have been installed. There is, moreover, no satisfactory evidence before us as to the usage prevailing in regard to the appointment of Mahants. In his plaint the plaintiff, as we have pointed out, alleges that the Mahants and faqirs of the sect (i.e., the Sanyasis) the raises of the neighbourhood and disciples of the deceased Mahant appoint a successor and, as a matter of fact, according to the plaintiff's evidence, and that of Prag Bharthi, Gya Gir, who does not belong to the Bharthi group, took part in his election. This is not consistent with the contention put forward by his learned Advocate that the Mahants of the Bharthi group alone form the electoral body. Whether, however, the electorate is confined to Mahants of the Bharthi group or includes Mahants of the entire sect, it appears to us from the evidence that a valid installation of the plaintiff has not been proved. Whether, however, the electorate is confined to Mahants of the Bharthi group or includes Mahants of the entire sect, it appears to us from the evidence that a valid installation of the plaintiff has not been proved. Having regard to the fact that the plaintiff was at the time of the alleged installation a youth of the tender age of 12 or 13 years, it would be a surprise to find that any persons to whom belonged the duty of electing the head of a religious institution of the kind would support such an election. As was said by the learned Judges who adjudicated in the case of Mahanth Ramji Dass v. Lachhu Dass, [1902] 7 C.W.N., 145 in which the election to a Mahantship of a youth under 16 years of age was attempted to be supported, “A boy Mahant a superior of a religious institution of ascetics who has not attained even his 16th year the age of majority, according to the Hindu Law, is a sight of an unusual occurrence.” 12. The learned Subordinate Judge upon the main issue in the case devoted a large portion of his judgment to an endeavour as we have said, to show that the defendant was of such immoral and bad character as to be ill-suited and unfit for the position of Mahant, and that no Mahant having any voice in the election to the Mahantship could possibly have supported his election. There seems to be no doubt upon the evidence that a number of years ago the defendant incurred the displeasure of Khushal Bharthi, this may have been due to the fact that he was unduly attentive to a woman who was not his wife. It is alleged by one of the witnesses that he kept a mistress. Assuming that he did, a number of years ago, thus offend against the rules of morality and was in the eyes of a virtuous sect such, as the Sanyasis, an unworthy disciple, it may well be that he recognized this error, and in the years which intervened between the time of his lapse and the death of Bachchu Bharthi become a reformed character and that his offence was condoned. The only evidence to which we have been referred in which the character of the defendant is impeached goes to show that he was a married man and also kept a mistress. The only evidence to which we have been referred in which the character of the defendant is impeached goes to show that he was a married man and also kept a mistress. Of course, as a married man, he would not be eligible for election to the gaddi of a math of celebates unless he abandoned his wife and family. On giving up, however, his wife and family and ceasing to be a ‘householder’, there would upon the evidence be no obstacle to his election. If the Mahants of the neighbourhood considered him a fit and proper person for the office, it is not for this or any other Court of law to turn itself into a court of morals and review the decision of the electoral body. That the defendant had been a disciple of Khushal Bharthi is admitted, and that he was installed on the gaddi on the 14th day after the death of Bachchu Bharthi, the evidence leaves no doubt upon our minds. Whether or not that installation was valid is another question. A number of Mahants were examined, all of whom say that they were present and took part in his installation. Of these, Mahant Harihar Dayal Gir, the Mahant of a math at Lachhmanpur, which is distant 2 kos from Kanchanpur, says in his evidence that the defendant, Rajbans Bharthi, was made a Mahant, after consultation in regard to the contents of the agreement which was subsequently drawn up (that is, the so-called “agreement” of the 2nd of May, 1894), and on this occasion he says the plaintiff was made a disciple of the defendant. He says that it was at the instance of the Mahants who were present, that the defendant made the plaintiff a disciple in order that a former disciple of the defendant, Sheodin Bharthi, who had proved unworthy, might not subsequently claim the property. The following other Mahants also depose to the installation, namely, Mahant Sidh Gopal, Mahant of Takia Dehrara; Mahant Raj Ballabh Gir, Mahant of Ratanpura, Chandrabhan Gir, Mahant of Narkatia, Molan Gir, Mahant of Barwa, Narsing Gir, Mahant of Gopalpur. These all say that they were present and took part in the installation of the defendant, and that on that occasion the plaintiff was made a chela by the defendant. In addition to these Ajmerepuri Mahant of Balwa gives corroborative evidence. According to his evidence he pays Rs. These all say that they were present and took part in the installation of the defendant, and that on that occasion the plaintiff was made a chela by the defendant. In addition to these Ajmerepuri Mahant of Balwa gives corroborative evidence. According to his evidence he pays Rs. 24,000 a year as Government revenue. The property, therefore, which belongs to his math, must be of considerable value. The evidence of these witnesses was supported by two Brahmans, namely, Gajadhar Pande, the hereditary priest of the Kanchanpur math and Gokul Dube. Gajadhar Pande, who is a Pandit living in a village adjoining Kanchanpur says, that on the day of the bhandara ceremony of Bachchu Bharthi, the defendant was appointed Mahant, that he (the witness) went there on that day and conducted the worship, he being the hereditary purohit (priest) of the Kanchanpur math. We have not the slightest reason to doubt the truth of the evidence given by these witnesses. They could have no motive so far as we can discover, and none has been suggested for conspiring together to make a false case for the defendant. Whether they were entitled to elect and install the defendant, it is not necessary for us now to determine. The importance of their evidence lies in the fact that a large number of Mahants of the Sanyasi sect in the neighbourhood of Kanchanpur did not take part in any installation of the plaintiff, but on the contrary took part in the installation of the defendant who is and has been since the death of Bachchu Bharthi the recorded owner of the property and in receipt of the rents and profits of it. The learned Subordinate Judge has fallen into an error in the following passage of his judgment. He says, “As the Mahant is the absolute owner of the property as long as he is in the office and as he has an absolute power to declare a successor in his life-time as is admitted in the pleadings, the plaintiff, if he be the chela of Bachchu Bharthi, is entitled to succeed him to the office of Mahant under the terms of the will mentioned above (i.e., the will of Khushal Bharthi, dated the 8th of August, 1883).” This is not correct as Khushal Bharthi had clearly no right to nominate a successor to Bachchu Bharthi. The mere fact that the plaintiff was the chela of Bachchu Bharthi if he was a chela, does not of itself entitle him to succeed in this suit. He must also prove that the Mahants of the sect duly installed him as Mahant according to custom. Upon the whole of the evidence we are disposed to think that the plaintiff was made a disciple of Bachchu Bharthi, but that in consequence of his youth and incapacity a number of the Mahants who were qualified to elect and install a Mahant for the math at Kanchanpur, considered him unfit for the office, that a few partisans supported his election and possibly carried out a hurried installation, that on the following day the defendant was installed as Mahant by his supporters, he having in the meantime accepted the terms stated in the document of the 2nd of May, 1894, to which we have referred. That the defendant was appointed agent and manager by the plaintiff, as alleged by the plaintiff, we have no hesitation in characterising as anything short of a falsehood. The defendant undoubtedly had his name recorded in the record of rights by virtue of the compromise entered into between him and plaintiffs father and in virtue of it and also of his installation as Mahant, took and held possession of the property of the gaddi in his own right as Mahant and received the rents for his own use. We do not say that the compromise was binding upon the plaintiff, he being then a minor, but the onus lay heavily upon him of proving by satisfactory evidence what the custom and practice is in regard to the election of a Mahant and of showing, that he was validly elected and installed. It may possibly be that the defendant's title is weak and infirm, but this will not avail the plaintiff if he fails to establish his own title. He has, in our opinion, wholly failed to do so, and the appeal must therefore be allowed. We set aside the decree of the learned Subordinate Judge and dismiss the plaintiff's suit with costs, both in this Court and in the court below.