JUDGMENT Ghose and Pratt, JJ. - This appeal arises out of a suit for rent in respect of the years 1304 to 1307 F.S. due on a mokurari tenure held by the Defendant under the Plaintiffs. The latter sought to recover the sum of Rs. 4,242-11-2 as due with damages in the amount of Rs. 1,060-10-9, in all Rs. 5,303-5-11. The Defendant pleaded that he was entitled to set-off against the Plaintiffs claim certain sums of money due to him and that far from there being anything due to the Plaintiffs, a considerable amount was payable by the Plaintiffs to him. The sums in respect of which set-off was claimed were first, Rs. 6,125 recoverable under a decree passed by the Privy Council on the 17th of June 1899 between the very same parties; secondly the sum of Rs. 170, being the costs of inquiry as to security in the appeal to the Privy Council under the orders of the High Court; thirdly, a certain amount due to the Defendant as damage on account of the Plaintiffs having taken possession of a certain property when they were not so entitled; fourthly the sum of Rs. 107-14-9 on account of certain zarpeshgi which the Defendant had paid; and lastly the sum of Rs. 15-2-7 on account of mouzah Ghatera Babubigha, which the Defendant had paid to the former lessee of the Plaintiff. 2. The Subordinate Judge has declined to entertain the plea of set-off thus raised and has decreed the Plaintiff's claim in full. With respect to the amount of costs recoverable under the decree of the Privy Council, to which we have already referred, the Subordinate Judge makes the following observations : "I think this Court having no power to enter full satisfaction on the Privy Council decree, cannot set-off the amount due on it to a claim made in this suit. This is not the object of Section 111 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This Court has no power to execute that decree." We do not quite understand what the Subordinate Judge here means. He was perhaps under the impression that the matter fell u/s 246 of the CPC and that because the decree of the Privy Council was not under execution in his Court, he could not entertain the plea of set-off raised by the Defendant. In this respect, we think he is clearly in error. He was perhaps under the impression that the matter fell u/s 246 of the CPC and that because the decree of the Privy Council was not under execution in his Court, he could not entertain the plea of set-off raised by the Defendant. In this respect, we think he is clearly in error. Section 111 of the Cole provides "If in a suit for the recovery of money the Defendant claims to set-off against the Plaintiff's demand any-ascertained sum of money legally recoverable by him from the Plaintiff and if in such claim of the Defendant against the Plaintiff both parties fill the same character as they fill in the Plaintiff's, suit, the Defendant may, at the first hearing of the suit, but not afterwards unless permitted by the Court, tender a written statement containing the particulars of the debt sought to be set-off." 3. "The Court shall thereupon inquire into the same and if it finds that the case fulfils the requirements of the former part of this section and that the amount claimed to be set-off does not exceed the pecuniary limits of its jurisdiction, the Court shall set-off the one debt against the other." And so on. 4. There can be no question here that the amount which the Defendant claims to set-off so far as the costs awarded by the Privy Council are concerned, is an ascertained sum, which is legally recoverable and there is also no question that both parties fill the same character in this suit as also in the claim which the Defendant sets up. It is obvious therefore that the question of setoff pleaded by the Defendant can be entertained u/s 111. And this is made perfectly clear by illustration (d) of the same section, which says : "A sues B on a bill of exchange for Rs. 500. B holds a judgment against A for Rs. 1,000. The two claims, being both definite pecuniary demands, may be set-off." 5. No doubt, if the decree of the Privy Council had been put into execution in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, he would be bound to deal with the claim of the Defendant u/s 216 of the Code, provided of course, that the Plaintiff had recovered judgment in this suit and applied for execution of his decree. No doubt, if the decree of the Privy Council had been put into execution in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, he would be bound to deal with the claim of the Defendant u/s 216 of the Code, provided of course, that the Plaintiff had recovered judgment in this suit and applied for execution of his decree. It does not however follow from this, that the Subordinate Judge cannot entertain the claim of the Defendant u/s 111 of the Code, when the decree of the Privy Council has not been as we understand, attempted to be enforced by execution. 6. In this view of the matter, we are of opinion that the Court below was wrong in not entertaining the claim of set-off raised by the Defendant so far as it is covered by the decree of the Privy Council. 7. As regards however the other claims set up by the Defendant, we agree with the Subordinate Judge for the reasons given by him in declining to entertain them u/s 111 of the Code. The result is that the case will be sent back to the Court below, so that the claim of the Defendant may be as already stated dealt with u/s 111 of the Code. It should however, be understood that if the Defendant has applied to the Court of the Subordinate Judge for the execution of the decree of the Privy Council, the matter should not be dealt with u/s 111. 8. There is, however, one other matter that we desire to refer to and that is as regards the decree for damage or compensation, which has been allowed by the Subordinate Judge. It appears that the decree of the High Court which was affirmed by the Privy Council on the 17th of June 1899 was passed on the 15th May 1894 corresponding to Baisak 1301. Under that decree, a considerable sum of money was due to the Defendant as costs and it further appears that during the years in suit (1304 to 1306) considerable sums of money were paid by the Defendant at different times to the Plaintiff as rent, such being the case this was not a case in which damages should have been awarded to the Plaintiff as the Court below has done. All that the Plaintiff is entitled to is the ordinary rate of interest, that it to say at the rate of 12 percent, per annum from the end of each quarter in which the instalment falls due. 9. With these observations we send the case back to the Court below so that the claim set up by the Defendant and as covered by the decree of the Privy Council might be dealt with u/s 111, CPC and a proper decree made. 10. In the circumstances of the case we think that each party should bear his own costs in all the Courts up to the present stage. Subsequent costs will abide the result.