JUDGMENT 1. This appeal arises out of a suit brought by the Plaintiffs-Respondents for a declaration of their right to irrigate their land with the water of a certain tank, and for an injunction restraining the Defendants from obstructing them in the exercise of that right. The Courts below have given the Plaintiffs a decree. Some of the Defendants have preferred this second appeal against the decree of the lower Appellate Court. And it is contended on their behalf, first, that the finding as to the user which is to the effect that the water of the tank was lifted by baling baskets in three of the last 20 years was insufficient to warrant a decree declaring the Plaintiffs' right to take the water by that method; secondly, that the Court below is wrong in giving the Plaintiffs a decree when no right to easement could be acquired overflowing water; thirdly, that the Plaintiffs have no right to sue when the land to be irrigated is in the possession of tenants; fourthly, that the Court of Appeal below was wrong in using the decree in a former suit as evidence in this when that decree reserved the title of the predecessor in interest of the Defendants or of some of them; and, fifthly, that the decree is bad for indefiniteness. 2. In support of the first contention the case of Hollins v. Verney L.R. 13. Q.B. 304 (1884) is relied upon. That was a very peculiar case. There the easement claimed was a right of way, and the evidence showed that it had been exercised only once in 15 years and once again after another long interval of about 15 years; and it was held that the user proved was not sufficient to establish an easement. But even in that case it was said that no sharp line could be drawn between long and short periods of enjoyment. Here the user found is this,--that the Plaintiffs and their tenants have irrigated the land in question through nullahs or channels from Rengo tank for some 20 years, and when occasion required, by baling out water from it. The continued exercise of the right to irrigate land in dispute is found. It is only as to the mode of drawing the water from the tank that there was a difference. The continued exercise of the right to irrigate land in dispute is found. It is only as to the mode of drawing the water from the tank that there was a difference. When the level of the water in the tank has been high enough to pass through the channels made for the purpose, the channels have served to carry the water; when the level has been lower, the water has been carried by the process of baling or lifting; and because this process had to be resorted to only three times in the course of 20 years, that does not show that the right claimed is not established, or that the Plaintiffs have not the right to carry the water from the land in dispute by the baling process when that is required by reason of the water being at a low level. 3. The intervals moreover were here very different from those in the case cited. That being so, we do not think that the Courts below were wrong in law in finding in favour of the easement claimed. 4. As to the second point, we do not think that it arises at all. The water, though it is made to flow through channels made for the purpose, cannot be said to be a flowing water in the sense in which the expression flowing water is ordinarily understood. 5. In support of the third contention, the learned vakil for the Appellants relies upon a passage in Gale on Easement, 7th Ed., p. 552. We do not think that the passage cited supports the contention. At page 551 of the same work, the learned author says: "An action by a landlord for an injury to land in the possession of his tenant may be traced from a very early time. There are several cases in the year books where such actions have been maintained not only for a damage or destruction of the land but also for transient acts commencing and ending during the tenancy but which occasioned loss to the landlord. It cannot be said that the acts of the Defendants are not calculated to do injury to the reversioner. The landlord goes but the tenant continues." 6. As to the fourth point, it is enough to say that the judgment in the former suit is evidence under sec. It cannot be said that the acts of the Defendants are not calculated to do injury to the reversioner. The landlord goes but the tenant continues." 6. As to the fourth point, it is enough to say that the judgment in the former suit is evidence under sec. 13 of the Evidence Act as showing that the predecessors of the Defendants did not object to the Plaintiffs' exercise for the easement in question. 7. As to the last point, it will be enough to say that it was not raised in the lower Appellate Court and we do not think it necessary to determine the question. All we need say now is that the apprehension entertained by the Appellants that the tank stands in danger of being emptied of all its water, is a needless one. At any rate when the occasion arises it will be time to determine the question. The contentions urged before us therefore all fail, and this appeal must be dismissed with costs.