Judgement Appeal from a decree of the above Court (July 27, 1899) affirming a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Pertabgarh (Feb. 27, 1897). The respondent bank sued upon a mortgage dated November 14, 1881, and executed by Janki Koer, deceased. It prayed amongst other things for a sale of Pawansi, part of the mortgaged property, the history of which taluq is given in their Lordships judgment. The appellant and the second respond ent were made defendants as Janki Koers heirs. The appellants case was that Pawansi came unincumbered to the possession of Janki Koer as a Hindu daughter on the death of her mother Kablas Koer in 1872, and that her estate therein was that known as a widows estate. The bank replied that "after her mothers demise Janki Koer succeeded to the estate under the provisions of Act I. of 1869, and enjoyed all the privileges of a taluqdar, with full power to transfer the property. Besides this, the said estate was Kablas Koers stridhan, which, on her death in 1872, devolved on her daughter, Janki Koer, with rights of transfer." The Subordinate Judge held "that Rani Janki Koer, who inherited Pawansi estate from her mother, under s. 22, sub-s. 11, of Act I. of 1869, inherited it under the special provisions of that Act, and that, therefore, she unmistakably falls within the definition of heirs given in s. 2. Rani Janki Koer thus having been proved to have been an heiress of a taluqdar, within the meaning of Act I. of 1869, there remains no doubt in my mind as to her being fully competent to transfer the said estate of Pawansi under s. 11 of Act I. of 1869." The sections which are relied upon as giving to Janki Koer an absolute power of alienation, regardless of any limitation to her interest in the estate imposed by the general law under which she inherited, are as follows— Sect. 2 " Heir means a person who inherits property otherwise than as a widow under the special provisions of this Act." Sect. 2 " Heir means a person who inherits property otherwise than as a widow under the special provisions of this Act." Sect. 11 " Subject to the provisions of this Act and to all the conditions under which the estate was conferred by the British Government, every taluqdar and grantee, and every heir and legatee of a taluqdar and grantee, of sound mind and not a minor, shall be competent to transfer the whole or any portion of his estate, or of his right and interest therein, during his lifetime by sale, exchange, mortgage, lease, or gift, and to bequeath by his will to any person the whole or any portion of such estate, right, and interest." The Subordinate Judge also held that Janki Koer was fully competent to mortgage Pawansi under the Hindu law of the Benares school, as well as under Act I. of 1869. The respondents contention on this point was that the estate had been the stridhan of Kablas Koer, and that after its devolution on Janki Koer it became her stridhan. The Subordinate Judge said, in reference to this contention, that not a single ruling had been pointed out in which the point had been decided according to the Benares school of Hindu law. He referred to the well-known contention based in several cases on the Mitakshara, s. 11, c. 2, v. 1, that property inherited by a woman ranks as stridhan; and held that although the Courts ignored that rule in cases of property inherited from a male, a distinction might yet be drawn in favour of property inherited from a female. The Judicial Commissioners, after an exhaustive review of the authorities, decided that under the Hindu law of the Mitakshara school, a woman who succeeds as heir to her mothers stridhan takes an absolute and not a qualified interest, and added that, having come to this conclusion, it was not necessary for them to express an opinion on the construction of Act I. of 1869. Mayne and Cowell, for the appellant, contended, in reference to Jankis alleged power of absolute alienation under Act I. of 1869, that this rested upon a misconstruction of the Act. Whether or not Janki Koer was an heir within the meaning of ss. Mayne and Cowell, for the appellant, contended, in reference to Jankis alleged power of absolute alienation under Act I. of 1869, that this rested upon a misconstruction of the Act. Whether or not Janki Koer was an heir within the meaning of ss. 2 and 11 of the Act, there was nothing in s. 11 which extended her power of alienation over the estate in question beyond her right and interest therein. She succeeded to the estate by the ordinary law, and if the ordinary law, according to the appellants contention, gave her only a widows estate with reverter to the heirs of her mother, there was nothing in s. 11 which enlarged her powers of alienation and enabled her to alienate the interests of her mothers heirs without their consent and to their detriment. Reference was made to s. 8 of Bengal Regulation I. of 1793 and s. 8 of Madras Regulation XXV. of 1802 as being the source of the provisions of Act I. of 1869 see Brij Indar Bahadur Singh v, Janki Koer (( 1877) L. R. 5 Ind. Ap. 1.), Jagdish Bahadur v. Sheo Par tab Singh (( 1901) L. R. 28 Ind. Ap. 100.), Narindar Bahadur Singh v. Achal Ram (( 1893) L. R. 20 Ind. Ap. 77.), and Dewan Ran Bijai Bahadur Singh v. Jagatpal Singh. (( 1890) L. R. 17 Ind. Ap. 173.) The main contention for the appellant was that Janki Koer, having succeeded by inheritance to her mothers stridhan, took it for a limited and qualified estate with reverter to her mothers heirs, and that accordingly the banks interest therein under her mortgage ceased at her death. The con tention to the contrary was based upon the text of the Mitakshara, c. ii. s. 11, v. 2. The cases of Thakor Deyhee v. Bai Baluk Ram (( 1866) 11 Moores Ind. Ap. Ca. 139), Bhugwandeen Doobey v. Myna Baee (( 1867) 11 Moores Ind. Ap. Ca. 487.), and Chotaylall v. Chunnoo hall (( 1876) L. R. 6 Ind. Ap. 15.) decide that property inherited by a woman from a male is not stridhan. The distinction drawn by the Courts below in favour of property inherited by a female being stridhan, notwithstanding those decisions, admittedly rested on no authority (unless Jagannatha be so considered), and, it was contended, was unreasonable. Ap. 15.) decide that property inherited by a woman from a male is not stridhan. The distinction drawn by the Courts below in favour of property inherited by a female being stridhan, notwithstanding those decisions, admittedly rested on no authority (unless Jagannatha be so considered), and, it was contended, was unreasonable. It was contended that property inherited by a woman from a female was, under the Mitakshara law equally with the Bengal, not her stridhan, that she took a womans estate in it, inalienable except to the extent of her interest and in the absence of special circumstances, with reverter to the heirs of her immediate predecessor. The argument in the former case of Sheo Shankar Lal v. Debi Sahai (See ante, p. 202.) was recapitulated, and reference was made to Prankishen Singh v. Bhagwutee ((1793) 1 Sel. 3.), Srinath Gangopadhya v. Sarbamangala Debi (( 1868) 2 B. L. R. A. C. 144, 151.), Sengalamathammal v. Valaynda Mudali (( 1867) 3 Madr. H. C. 312.), Bhoobun Mohun Banerji v. Muddun Mohun Singh (( 1877) 1 Shome. 3.), Prankissen Laha v. Noyahmoney Dassee (( 1879) Ind. L. R. 5 Calc. 222.), Huri Doyal Singh v. Grishchunder Mukerjee (( 1890) Ind. L. R. 17 Calc 911.), Chotaylall v. Chunnoo Lall (( 1874) 14 Beng. L. R. 235.), Venkatarama Krishna Rau v. Bhujanga Rau (( 1895) Ind. L. R. 19 Madr. 107.), and Virasangappa Shetti v. Rudsappa Shetti. (( 1895) Ind. L. R. 19 Madr. 110.) De Gruyther, for the respondent, contended, with reference to the Oudh Estates Act, that Janki Koer, as heir of a taluqdar and not his widow within the meaning of s. 2, took an estate which she had full power to alienate under s. 11. She inherited under the special provisions of the Act see ss. 3 and 15, and Brij Indar Bahadur Singh v. Janki Koer (L. R. 5 Ind. Ap. 1.), Rani Bijai Bahadur Singh v. Jagatpal Singh (L. R, 17 Ind. Ap. 173.), and Rai Jagatpal Singh v. Jageshar Baksh Singh. (Ante, p. 27.) Under the provisions of the Act, moreover, Janki Koer became a fresh stock of descent, and there was no reverter to the heirs of her mother. With regard to Hindu law, this estate was Janki Koers stridhan under the literal interpretation of Mitakshara, c. ii. s. 11, v. 2, being property which she had inherited from her mother. With regard to Hindu law, this estate was Janki Koers stridhan under the literal interpretation of Mitakshara, c. ii. s. 11, v. 2, being property which she had inherited from her mother. No decision had yet Laid it down that property inherited by a woman from a woman is not stridhan. The earlier Hindu authorities did not deal with the case of a womans right of inheritance at all, and still less as to the quantum of interest which she would take by that eans. Women hold and acquire property much more readily now than in ancient times. They can acquire property by gift, purchase, and even by adverse possession, and hold and transmit it absolutely without regard to the usual restraints imposed upon them by the general law. As to the sources of Hindu law applicable in Oudh or to this case, see Collector of Madura v. Ramalinga Sethupatty. ((1807) 12 Moores Ind. Ap. Ca. 397, 435.) See also Mitakshara, c. ii. s. 11, vv. 9, 25, 30, 31, 32, 33. Those treatises which differ from the Mitakshara as to what constitutes stridhan do not possess any validity in Oudh and are not applicable to this case see Sham Koer v. Bah Koer (( 1902) L. R. 29 Ind. Ap. 132.); Bhugwandeen Doobey v. Myna Baec. (11 Moores Ind. Ap. Ca. 487, 512) Besides, there is no instance in Hindu law of reverter to the heirs of the original owner on the death of a female proprietor except in the case of the original owner being a male; and that is strong reason for saying that when a woman inherits from a woman she takes an absolute interest in such inherited pro perty as her stridhan. Reference was made to the following authorities Dayabhaga, c. iv. s. 2, v. 3; Srimatti Gangopadhya v. Sarbamangala Debi (2 B. L. R. A. C. 144.); Dayabhaga, c. iv. s. 1, vv. 1, 8, 19, and 23; Dayakrama Sangraha, c. 2, s. 2, v. 28; Judoonath Sircar v. Bussunt Coomar Roy Chowdhry (11 Beng. L. R. 286.); Vyavahara Mayukha, c. iv. s. 10, vv. 7, 24-26; Macnaghtens Hindu Law, 38; Bachiraju v. Venkata Appadu (( 1865) 2 Madr. H. C. 402.); Sangamalat-hammal v. Velaynda Mudali (3 Madr, H. C. 312.) ; the two cases in 19 Madr. L. R. 286.); Vyavahara Mayukha, c. iv. s. 10, vv. 7, 24-26; Macnaghtens Hindu Law, 38; Bachiraju v. Venkata Appadu (( 1865) 2 Madr. H. C. 402.); Sangamalat-hammal v. Velaynda Mudali (3 Madr, H. C. 312.) ; the two cases in 19 Madr. cited by the appellant; Vyavastha Chandrika (translated by Shamachurn Sircar), 505; Prankissen Laha v. Noyamoney Dossee (Ind. L. R. 5 Calc. 222.); Huri Doyal Singh v. Grishchimder Mukerji (Ind. L. R. 17 Calc. 911.); Maynes Hindu Law, 6th ed. p. 33; the cases in 11 Moore, cited on the other side; Jollys Tagore Lectures, p. 248; Manilal Rewadat v. Bai Rewa (Ind. L. R. 17 Bomb. 758.); Chiddhu v. Naubat. ((1001) Ind. L. R, 21 Allah. 67.) Mayne replied. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by SIR ARTHUR WILSON. On November 14, 1881, Janki Koer, a Hindu lady governed by the Hindu law of the Benares school, executed a mortgage deed in favour of the present respondents, the Allahabad Bank, by which she purported to charge, first, her zemindary Pawansi, and, secondly, in case Pawansi should be insufficient, another property, to secure the repayment by instalments of a sum advanced by the bank, with interest. Janki Koer having died in the meantime, the bank, on February 19, 1894, filed a suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Pertabgarh to enforce the mortgage deed. A number of persons were made defendants to the suit, but of these it is only necessary now to mention the first defendant, the present appellant, Sheo Pertab Bahadur Singh, who had succeeded to the zemindary of Pawansi on the death of Janki Koer, and who is now in possession of it. The plaint alleged that he was the heir of Janki Koer. The present appellant in his written statement said that Janki Koer held Pawansi as a Hindu daughter without power of alienation, that he himself was not Jankis representative, and that no transfer by her could affect him. Issues were settled, of which it is sufficient to mention the sixth "Was Rani Janki Koer competent to mortgage taluqa Pawansi in such a way as to make it binding beyond her lifetime?" The history of Pawansi, so far as it is necessary to notice it, is this. At the time of the annexation of Oudh, in which it lies, Kablas Koer, the mother of Janki, was in possession of it. At the time of the annexation of Oudh, in which it lies, Kablas Koer, the mother of Janki, was in possession of it. The summary settlement was made with her, a sanad was granted to her, and she was entered in lists 1 and 2 under s. 8 of the Oudh Estates Act, 1869 (Act I. of 1869). After her death in August, 1872, disputes arose as to the succession to her property, and litigation ensued, which ended in a judgment of this Committee, by which it was decided that Kablas Koer had taken a permanent heritable and transferable right in Pawansi, and that on her death it had passed to her daughter and only child, Janki Brij Indar Bahadur Singh v. Ranee Janki Koer. (L. R. 5 Ind. Ap. 1.) After the death of Janki Koer, controversy again arose as to the succession, and again the litigation was carried to this Committee Jagdish Bahadur v. Sheo Partab Singh. (L. R. 28 Ind. Ap. 100.) In that litigation no one claimed to be entitled as stridhan heir of Janki. The suit was framed upon the assumption that upon the death of Janki the property did not pass to any heir of hers, but reverted to the heirs of an earlier generation. In the judgment it is said (L. R. 28 Ind. Ap. at p. 106.) " It is not disputed that the succession must be to the heirs of her (Jankis) father,” presumably as the stridhan heirs of her mother in the absence of lineal heirs of the latter. The question then which their Lordships have to decide is whether Janki Koer had power to mortgage Pawansi absolutely, or whether her power to do so was limited to her own lifetime. The case for the plaintiff bank was put upon two grounds. First, that under the Oudh Estates Act of 1869 Janki Koer, as heir of a taluqdar or grantee, had express statutory power to alienate the whole estate, whatever the extent of her own interest might be; secondly, that apart from the Act, under the Hindu law of the Benares school, she having inherited what had been her mothers stridhan, held it as her own stridhan with full power of alienation. The Subordinate Judge decided in favour of the plaintiff bank, the now respondent, upon both grounds, and made a decree in its favour. The Subordinate Judge decided in favour of the plaintiff bank, the now respondent, upon both grounds, and made a decree in its favour. The Judicial Commissioners on appeal expressed no opinion upon the first question, but on the second question agreed with the First Court and affirmed its decree. Against this decision the present appellant alone has appealed, and the appeal therefore relates only to Pawansi. With regard to the first question, there can be no doubt that Kablas Koer, the mother of Janki, was a taluqdar or grantee under Act I. of 1869, and the portions of the Act material to the present question are— "Sect. 2. Estate means the taluqa or immovable property acquired or held by a taluqdar or grantee. . . . "Heir means a person who inherits property otherwise than as a widow under the special provisions of this Act. "Sect.11. Subject to the provisions of this Act and to all the conditions under which the estate was conferred by the British Government, every taluqdar and grantee, and every heir and legatee of a taluqdar and grantee, of sound mind and not a minor, shall be competent to transfer the whole or any portion of his estate, or of his right and interest therein, during his lifetime, by sale, exchange, mortgage, lease, or gift, and to bequeath by his will to any person the whole or any portion of such estate, right, and interest." The contention was that every heir, whether absolute or qualified, of a taluqdar or grantee (and it would seem to follow, every legatee, however limited his interest) has an absolute power to alienate the whole estate. If sect. 11 had stood alone the question would hardly have been arguable. A power to an heir to alienate "his estate or his right and interest.--therein" would certainly have meant his estate, if he owned the estate, or his right and interest therein, if he owned less than the estate. But the argument was based upon the words otherwise than as a widow " in the definition of an heir. It was argued that the insertion of these words indicated an intention to give to all heirs other than widows some power which widows do not possess. But the argument was based upon the words otherwise than as a widow " in the definition of an heir. It was argued that the insertion of these words indicated an intention to give to all heirs other than widows some power which widows do not possess. It is useless to speculate why the words referred to were inserted in the definition ; but their Lordships think that much clearer language would have to be shewn to justify them in saying that the Legislature has departed so far from the ordinary principles of law as to empower people to alienate what may not belong to them. And the decisions of this Committee in former cases seem to lend support to this rather than to the contrary view. In a series of cases it has been held that, notwithstanding the strong language of the Act, and in particular the enactment in s. 10 that the Courts are to accept the lists framed under the Act as conclusive that the persons included in them are taluqdars or grantees, and those of s. 11, the Courts may nevertheless go behind the Act to the extent at least of recognising trusts, and may give effect to beneficial titles distinct from the statutory title under the Act. It may be sufficient to refer to Hurpurshad v. Sheo Dyal (( 1876) L. R. 3 Ind. Ap. 259.) and Seth Jaidial v. Seth Sita Bam. (( 1881) L. R. 8 Ind. Ap. 215.) From what was said in the last-mentioned case (L. R. 8 Ind. Ap. at p. 228.) it would appear that, if the facts had been such as to require it, their Lordships would have granted an injunction restraining a taluqdar recorded as such under the Act from attempting to alienate the estate to the detriment of those beneficially interested. The question which remains is whether, apart from the provisions of the Act, Janki, being governed by the Hindu law of the Benares school, had power to alienate absolutely the taluqa of Pawansi which she had inherited from her mother. The question thus arising is not the same question as that with which their Lordships had to deal in the case of Sheo Shankar Lal v. Debi Sahai (Ante, p. 202.), in which judgment has just been delivered, but it is very closely connected with it. The question thus arising is not the same question as that with which their Lordships had to deal in the case of Sheo Shankar Lal v. Debi Sahai (Ante, p. 202.), in which judgment has just been delivered, but it is very closely connected with it. Each case has to do with the estate of a woman under Benares law in property inherited from a woman. The former case referred to the descent of such property; the present raises the question whether it is the absolute property of the last holder in such a sense that, apart from any grounds of necessity, she could alienate it beyond her lifetime. In the present case their Lordships have had the advantage of hearing a full argument upon both sides. The argument for the appellant was to the effect that the alleged power of the lady to alienate in the present case could be based only upon the literal interpretation of the Mitakshara, which seems to make all property inherited by a woman her stridhan in the strict sense of the term with all the incidents of such property, including the free power of alienation ; that that view of the Benares law had already been negatived by this Committee in the case of property inherited from a male; that inheritance from males and that from females could not be differently treated; and that the authorities in most parts of India were to the effect that what a woman has inherited from a woman she does not hold as her absolute and alienable estate, but for a qualified estate, with reverter after her death to the heirs of her predecessor in title. The argument on the other side was based strictly upon the text of the Mitakshara; but it was contended that a distinction should properly be drawn between property inherited from males and that inherited from females; and an endeavour was made to shew that the decisions in various provinces in India applying the doctrine of reverter to such cases were wrong. On the present point, as on that arising in the previous case, it is too late to contend for the literal meaning of the Mitakshara to the full extent. On the present point, as on that arising in the previous case, it is too late to contend for the literal meaning of the Mitakshara to the full extent. The previous decisions of this Committee have established that, under the Benares law, what a woman takes by inheritance from a male she takes not absolutely, but for a qualified estate alienable only under the conditions applicable to such an estate. The reasons given by their Lordships in the judgment just delivered for declining to draw a distinction between property inherited from a male and that inherited from a female seem to them to apply to the present case. As to the argument directed against the application of the doctrine of reverter in such cases as the present, their Lordships are of opinion that that doctrine is too well established in India generally to be now overthrown. The question may be different in those parts of Bombay which are governed by the Mayukha. An exact examination of the terms of that treatise seems to have led to some diversities of view in the Bombay High Court, which need not now be considered. Their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that the decree of the Subordinate Judge and that of the Judicial Commissioners ought to set aside so far as they affect the property of the present appellant, and that instead thereof the suit ought to that extent to be dismissed with costs in both Courts. The respondent bank will pay the costs of this appeal.