JUDGMENT Rampnini and Pargiter, JJ. - The suit out of which this second appeal arises was brought by the two Plaintiffs along with ten similar suits instituted by other persons to establish a right of easement over the Defendants' lands, namely, that they are entitled, by constructing an embankment across the liver Soori and diverting the water of the river over the lands of mouza Duria, to convey the water over the first Defendant's land on to their own laud in order to irrigate it. A railway, runs through the mouza and crosses the bed of the river by a long bridge built upon arches. The first Defendant holds the railway cuttings on each side of the line and (as we understand the facts) the river water when diverted flows over a portion of his land and under some of the arches so as to irrigate the lands on both sides of the line. The water, as it flowed over the Defendant's land (which is said to be lower than the adjacent lands) and under the arches was ordinarily prevented from flowing back into the river bed by some small bunds, but the Defendants out these bun]s in the year 1302 and the water escaped back without irrigating the Plaintiffs' land and thus the Plaintiffs' crops were damaged. 2. The Plaintiffs' and their fellow-villagers therefore brought these suits separately to recover damages. 3. Two questions arose,--first, whether the Plaintiffs had the easement alleged, and; secondly, what amount of damages they were entitled to get. 4. Both the Lower Courts have found the question of the easement in favour of the Plaintiffs and the Lower Appellate Court has affirmed the amount of damages which the Munsif awarded them. 5. The Defendants, appeal. On their behalf Mr. 4. Both the Lower Courts have found the question of the easement in favour of the Plaintiffs and the Lower Appellate Court has affirmed the amount of damages which the Munsif awarded them. 5. The Defendants, appeal. On their behalf Mr. Hill has contended (i) that the right claimed is not an easement, but is a customary right and it is one of the essential conditions of such a right that it must be reasonable; (ii) that even as an easement the right claimed must be reasonable ; (iii) that the easement claimed infringes the first Defendant's right to use his own land as he pleases and would indeed entirely destroy his rights in his property; (iv) that if the easement alleged be founded upon prescription it cannot be maintained, for the Plaintiffs do not claim a right to erect bunds on the first Defendant's lands, but to erect bunds on their own lands and this can give them no prescriptive right to submerge the first Defendant's lands; (v) that the Plaintiffs when diverting the river water to irrigate their lands are bound to prevent it from flowing on to the Defendant's land or to take it away if it does overflow there; and if they fail to do so, the overflow comes a nuisance and the Defendants may abate the nuisance; (vi) that the right is claimed only for seasons of drought and therefore there has been no continuity in its exercise and so no easement can have been established; (vii) that the period of Sukchand's lease for the lands now held by the first Defendant must be excluded in computing the period necessary for the acquisition of the easements; and (viii)that the onus of proving the damages has beenmisplaced. 6. With reference to the first and second of these pleas it is sufficient to say that the easement claimed in this suit is not a customary right and need not be reasonable and that there is nothing unreasonable in the easement as found by the lower courts to have been established by the Plaintiffs. 7. The easement claimed by the Plaintiffs will not destroy the Defendant's enjoyment of his property. He has hitherto used the cuttings as fisheries. 7. The easement claimed by the Plaintiffs will not destroy the Defendant's enjoyment of his property. He has hitherto used the cuttings as fisheries. The easement claimed by the Plaintiffs will not prevent the Defendants using them as such or growing paddy on them in years when there is no drought or turning them into agricultural land, as they gradually silt up and rise to the level of the Plaintiffs' land, when the water of the Soori will no longer flow over them. The case of Cooper v. Barber (1810) 3 Taunt. 99, cited by Mr. Hill does not appear to be in point, as in that case the Plaintiff had established no right of easement and could not have an easement for subsoil percolation; for where an easement cannot be prevented it cannot be acquired. 8. It is immaterial that the Plaintiffs do not claim any right to erect bunds on the Defendant's land. They claim he right by means of bunds erected on their own land to cause the water of the river to flow across the Defendant's cuttings on to their land on the east. An easement of this nature may exist and may be established. 9. The Plaintiffs when they have been found to have established an easement are not bound to prevent the water of the river flowing on to the Defendant's land, nor are the Defendants entitled to interfere with the flow of the water on to their lands caused in the exercise of the Plaintiffs' rights. The cases of Whalley v. Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Company (1884) L.R. 13 Q.B.D. 131 and Rylands v. Fletcher (1866) 3 H.L. 330, relied on by the learned Counsel for the Appellant, do not appeal to help the Appellant, for no question of, easement as involved in them. 10. It is immaterial whether the exercise of the right is continuous, provided it has been exercised over a period of 20 years, during the periods of drought, when it could be taken advantage of. The case of Rollins v. Verney (1834) L.R. 13 Q.B.D. 304, cited by the learned Counsel in support of his argument, seems to be of doubtful authority. In any case it was decided under the English Prescription Acts and has no direct application to the present case. 11. The case of Rollins v. Verney (1834) L.R. 13 Q.B.D. 304, cited by the learned Counsel in support of his argument, seems to be of doubtful authority. In any case it was decided under the English Prescription Acts and has no direct application to the present case. 11. We see no reason why the period of Sukchand's lease should not be taken into consideration in computing the period necessary for the acquisition of the easement. His right in the land is not shown to have been of a leasehold nature or in any way different friar that of his successors, the Defendants. 12. The onus of proving the damages has not been misplaced, though the Judge does not consider it to have been altogether satisfactorily discharged. He has, however, affirmed the findings of the Court of first instance on the question of damages. We accordingly dismiss the appeal and the analogous appeals with costs.