JUDGMENT 1. This is an appeal under sec. 411 of the Code of Criminal Procedure from a sentence passed by a Presidency Magistrate, namely, the Municipal Magistrate of Calcutta, the sentence being one of daily fine under sec. 580 of the Calcutta Municipal Act III of 1899; and the points urged on behalf of the Appellant are, first, that the prosecution was barred by limitation under sec. 631 of Act III of 1899; second, that no offence had been committed by the Appellant when the house was built in accordance with the sanction of the Corporation of Calcutta; third, that no offence had been committed by the Appellant as he did not coutravene Rule No. 24 of Sch. XVII of Bengal Act III of 1899, inasmuch as he was not bound to leave any open space by reason of the building abutting on an open square or the like dedicated to public use, namely, a gully or Municipal lane; and, fourth, that the imposition of a daily fine was bad as there was no fresh order under sec. 449 made in this case, and as the summons did not specify the number of days for which the Appellant had incurred the penalty under sec. 580 of Bengal Act III of 1899. We shall consider these points in the order in which they have been stated above. Upon the first point it is argued that as sec. 631 of the Calcutta Municipal Act lays down that no "person shall be liable to punishment for any offence against this Act or any rule, bye-law or regulation made hereunder unless complaint of such offence is made before a Magistrate within three months" (we quote so much only of the section as bears upon this case), and that as the offence complained of was committed on the 8th of December 1902 and the present complaint was not made until the 10th of March 1903, the prosecution was barred by limitation. We are of opinion that this contention is not correct. The offence, of which the Appellant has been convicted, and for which he has been fined, is that referred to in the latter part of sec. 580 of the Calcutta Municipal Act which makes each day's default in obeying the order under sec. 449 an offence, and prescribes the punishment for such offence. The offence, of which the Appellant has been convicted, and for which he has been fined, is that referred to in the latter part of sec. 580 of the Calcutta Municipal Act which makes each day's default in obeying the order under sec. 449 an offence, and prescribes the punishment for such offence. Now the conviction for the primary offence, if we may use the expression, was on the 10th of February 1903, that offence being the failure to obey an order made under sec. 449 for demolishing a part of a certain building. The order directing the demolition of the building was made on the 8th of September 1902, and it gave the Appellant three months time within which to comply with the order. The primary offence, therefore, of non-compliance with the order, was complete on the 8th of December following, and the prosecution for that offence was started not later than the 10th of February 1903, that is, well within three months. After that, every day's default in carrying out the order became a distinct offence under sec. 580. The summons in this case was issued on the 6th May upon a complaint made on the 10th March 1903, so that it cannot be said that the prosecution was in any way barred by limitation under sec. 631. 2. The argument on behalf of the Appellant proceeded upon the assumption that the only offence that was committed was the primary offence committed on the 8th December 1902, when the first default in carrying out the order under sec. 449 occurred; and it was argued that sec. 580 was only a section providing for the punishment for the offence, the offence being defined and created by sec. 449. We do not consider this argument sound. Sec. 580 creates the offence and also prescribes the penalty, and it is a section which creates both the primary offence and the subsidiary or the continuing offence, and the latter consists of a series of offences committed on each day by reason of the default in carrying out the order under sec. 449. The first contention of the Appellant must therefore fail. 3. 449. The first contention of the Appellant must therefore fail. 3. Upon the second point it is argued that as the Corporation of Calcutta accorded its sanction to the erection of the building in question, no offence has been committed by the accused in not demolishing any part of it, and that it was not open to the Corporation of Calcutta to take exception to the building as having been erected in contravention of any provision of the Calcutta Municipal Act. Ordinarily no doubt that would be so; but in the present case it has been found that the sanction of the Corporation was accorded under a misapprehension, the misapprehension having been due to the Appellant's application and the plan submitted with that application not drawing the attention of the Municipality to the existence of the gully or Municipal lane on the side on which open space is now required to be left. If that is so, it is not open to the Appellant to contend that no offence has been committed by him, because the building was erected with the sanction of the Municipality; and that the Corporation is precluded from taking proceedings against him. In saying this, however, we must guard ourselves from being understood to imply, that because primarily the responsibility rested with the Appellant to draw the attention of the Municipality to all necessary facts connected with the position and surroundings of the proposed house, no responsibility attached to the Corporation to ascertain those facts and circumstances before granting the permission applied for. If the corporation granted its sanction inadvertently, though that fact may not have the effect of exonerating the Appellant entirely from all liability, it is a matter for the Corporation of Calcutta as a public body to take into consideration in determining its action in the matter of actual enforcement of the penalty prescribed by law. But, as we have already said above, this circumstance cannot be a ground for our holding that no offence has been committed by the Appellant. 4. But, as we have already said above, this circumstance cannot be a ground for our holding that no offence has been committed by the Appellant. 4. We come now to the third point raised in the case, and it is this, that no offence has been committed by the Appellant at all in building the house without leaving any open space on the side in question when on that side there is the Municipal gully or lane, and when the house must therefore be held to abut on an open square or the like which is dedicated to public use within the meaning of Rule 24, paragraph (1) of Sch. XVII of the Calcutta Municipal Act. It is argued for the Appellant that whereas, Rule No. 22, which provides for leaving an open space in the rear of a building, requires abutment on an open square or the like of not less than 20ft. in breadth as a condition for exonerating a person from liability to leave an open space, Rule 24, which provides for leaving open space at the sides of a building, does not require abutment on an open square or the like of any definite width as a condition for exempting the owner of the house from liability to leave an open space on the sides; and that the inference must be that if the house on any side abuts on an open square or the like of any width however small, the owner is exempted from liability to leave any open space on that side. 5. We are unable to accept this contention as sound. It is true there is a difference in this respect between the language of Rule No. 22 and that of Rule No. 24, but does it follow from that that Rule No. 24 dispenses with the necessity of leaving an open space on any side of a building which is not attached to the adjacent building merely because it abuts on an open space dedicated to public use of any width however small ? To hold that it does, would be to defeat the object of the rule and to go against its plain intention of the Legislature as indicated by paragraph (2) of the rule itself. To hold that it does, would be to defeat the object of the rule and to go against its plain intention of the Legislature as indicated by paragraph (2) of the rule itself. The object of this rule as well as of Rule No. 22 is to leave an open space between two buildings where any space is left at all, of width sufficient to allow free access to light and air, so as to prevent the open space from proving a source of inconvenience from sanitary and other points of view; and with this object the minimum width of the space to be left open, as provided by paragraph (2) of Rule 24, is six feet if there is a building next to the boundary line or wall and four feet--if there is an open apace at least of four feet on the other side of such boundary line or wall. The open space dedicated to public use on which the building in question abuts in this case, is only two feet wide; and the question is whether that is sufficient to dispense with the necessity of the Appellant's leaving an open space on that side of his building; and whether such a lane can be said to answer the description of "an open square or the like which is dedicated to public use" within the meaning of paragraph (1) of Rule 24. 6. We are of opinion that this question must be answered in the negative. If the open space had been private property, of width not less than 4ft. then under cl. (b) of paragraph 2 of Rule 24 another 4ft. of open space would have been necessary to be left, and because the open space here 2ft. in width is dedicated to public use, is that any reason why no space should be left on that side of the building ? We are unable to see any reason for answering this last question in the affirmative. It is argued that not to answer this question in the affirmative would be to interpolate words into paragraph (1) of Rule 24. We do not see that that follows at all. We are unable to see any reason for answering this last question in the affirmative. It is argued that not to answer this question in the affirmative would be to interpolate words into paragraph (1) of Rule 24. We do not see that that follows at all. We have to construe Rule 24 taken as a whole; and we are not precluded from holding, in the first place, that the words 'an open square or the like which is dedicated to public use' embody a description which is not answered by a narrow lane only 2ft. in width; and in the second place, taking the rule as a whole, from holding that 'an open square or the like' must at least be 4ft. wide; and that if the open space is not less than 4ft. in width on the other side, the owner of the house is to leave at least 4ft. of open space more, as may be, gathered from cl. (b) of paragraph 2 of the Rule. In taking this view we are only following the rule laid down for the interpretation of statutes, namely, that "where the language of a statute, in its ordinary meaning and grammatical construction, leads to a manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment, or to some inconvenience or absurdity, hardship, or injustice, presumably not intended, a construction may be put upon it which modifies the meaning of the words." See Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, p. 319, of the third edition; see also Salmon v. Duncombe 11 Ap. Cas. 627 (1886), in which Lord Hobhouse in delivering the judgment of the Privy Council observed:-- "it is, however, a very serious matter to hold that when the main object of a statute is clear, it shall be reduced to a nullity by the draftsman's unskilfulness or ignorance of law," and later on,-- "it is very unsatisfactory to be compelled to construe a statute in this way, but it is much more unsatisfactory to deprive it altogether of meaning. Their Lordships chose the lesser of two difficulties." The third contention of the Appellant must therefore also fail. 7. It remains now to notice the fourth and the last contention which is this, that the imposition of a daily fine was bad in law, as there was no fresh order under sec. Their Lordships chose the lesser of two difficulties." The third contention of the Appellant must therefore also fail. 7. It remains now to notice the fourth and the last contention which is this, that the imposition of a daily fine was bad in law, as there was no fresh order under sec. 449, and as the summons did not specify the days for which a daily fine was intended to be inflicted. 8. The first branch of this contention we have already answered above. No fresh order was necessary under sec. 449 to authorise the imposition of a daily fine. Sec. 580 makes default upon every subsequent day an offence for which a fine can be imposed. 9. As for the cases cited, namely, Ram Krishna Biswas v. Mohendra Nath Majumdar ILR 27 Cal. 565 (1900), Kristo Dhone Dutt v. Chairman of the Municipal Commissioners of the Suburbs of Calcutta 25 W.R. Cr. R. 6 (1876), In the, matter of W.N. Love 18 W.R. Cr. 44 (1872). In the matter of Sagore Dutt 18 W.R. 44 foot-note (1868) and In re Limbaji Tulsiram ILR 22 Bom. 766 (1896) they are all distinguishable from the present. The rule that they lay down is that there cannot be any imposition of a daily fine prospectively for an offence which has not yet been committed. That was not the case here. 10. As for the second branch of the contention, it will be enough to say that it is cured by sec. 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, there being nothing to show that the omission in the summons to specify the days has in any way prejudiced the Appellant. The result is that this appeal must be dismissed; but as we have observed above it will be for the Corporation, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, to consider how far the penalty to which the Appellant has rendered himself liable ought really to be enforced.