JUDGMENT 1. In this case a rule was granted calling on the District Magistrate and the opposite party to show cause why the order of the Deputy Magistrate, dated 22nd September 1902, should not be set aside on the ground, that the first party having alleged they were entitled to joint possession there was no jurisdiction to make an order giving them exclusive possession. The order in question was made under sec. 145. The facts are that the landlords of the first party hold jointly with Mon Mohan Ghose the Sripultola talook. The 2nd party landlord Mon Mohan Ghose is by his tenants (who are also included in the 2nd party) in exclusive possession of Oraboonia Ganti. The subject of the dispute in this case is about 200 bighas of land : and the real controversy between the parties was whether the land appertained to Sripultola talook or whether it was in Oraboonia Ganti. There was no dispute as to the possession of the respective parties of Sripultola talook and Oraboonia Ganti. But it is said that the Magistrate was without jurisdiction under sec. 145 ; because Mon Mohan Ghose who was the landlord of the 2nd party and was in actual possession of Oraboonia Ganti was also, it was conceded, entitled to an undivided share of Sripultola talook. In support of this contention the case of Tarujan Bibee v. Asamuddi Bepari 4 C. W. N. 426 (1900) was relied on. In that case the Magistrate found that two parties were entitled to joint possession of the property in dispute and directed that one should hold actual possession until evicted in due course of law. This, it was held, the Magistrate was not entitled to do, and it was said that where two parties are in joint possession and one is trying to evict the other proceedings under sec. 145 are not applicable. 2. This case was followed by the case of Krista Alhadini Dasi v. Radha Syam Panday 7 C. W. N. 118 (1902) which lays down the proposition that sec. 145 does not apply between parties claiming to hold joint possession and neither contesting such right ; another case Surb Narain Singh v. Birj Mohan Thakur I. L. R. 28 Cal. 2. This case was followed by the case of Krista Alhadini Dasi v. Radha Syam Panday 7 C. W. N. 118 (1902) which lays down the proposition that sec. 145 does not apply between parties claiming to hold joint possession and neither contesting such right ; another case Surb Narain Singh v. Birj Mohan Thakur I. L. R. 28 Cal. 80 (1895) was also relied on which is an authority for the proposition that a dispute as to the right to realise rent of any undivided share of any tract of land is not a subject for proceeding under sec. 145. 3. With these rulings we agree : but in our opinion they are not applicable to the present case. In each of the cases referred to the dispute was between the parties as joint owners of the land or rental in dispute. In the present case there is no dispute as between the parties as joint owners. On the contrary the dispute is really concerning the boundaries of land, i.e., of the two estates Sripultola talook and Oraboonia Ganti. There is no dispute about title : the only question is whether the land lies within or without the boundary of Oraboonia Ganti. It is in no sense a dispute between joint owners as such but a dispute as to whether the land falls within the boundaries of the second party's exclusive property or whether it falls within the boundaries of the talook in which one individual of the other second party has an undivided share jointly with the landlords of the first party. 4. Sec. 145 contemplates a dispute as to the possession of a definite piece of land or the rents or profits issuing from a definite piece of land. In the cases to which we have referred the dispute was about an undivided share in land or the rent issuing from an undivided share ; in other words, the subject-matter of the dispute was uncertain, the boundaries of the land were undefined, and no order under sec. 145 could be made which would have the effect of stopping the dispute. 5. Those objections do not apply in this case for the subject of the dispute is a clearly defined plot and the controversy, is capable of precise decision. 6. In our opinion therefore the dispute was one with which the Magistrate had jurisdiction to deal. 7. 145 could be made which would have the effect of stopping the dispute. 5. Those objections do not apply in this case for the subject of the dispute is a clearly defined plot and the controversy, is capable of precise decision. 6. In our opinion therefore the dispute was one with which the Magistrate had jurisdiction to deal. 7. It is argued that the Magistrate has given the first party more than he claimed. Even if this were so, it is very doubtful whether it could be said that the order could be questioned as made without jurisdiction. But in our opinion it is not so. The possession of the first party must in the absence of an express declaration extending it mean the possession of the first party as claimed by them. For these reasons we discharge the rule.