Judgement Appeal from a decree of the Chief Court (Aug. 12, 1901) reversing a decree of the District Court of Amherst (Feb. 18, 1901). The plaint alleged that certain land in Moulmein, with the saw-mill and all other erections and buildings thereon, together with two elephants, had on December 13, 1889, been conveyed by the appellant, his wife, and mother-in-law to the Chetty firm of M.E.M.A.K. for a consideration of Rs.15,000, upon the verbal understanding that if the vendors or any of them should at any time repay the said sum of Rs.15,000 the same should be reconveyed to them or such of them as should repay the same; that in or about June, 1897, when the premises were fully worth Rs.22,000, the said firm of M.E.M.A.E. inquired of the appellant whether he would be able to repurchase the same for the sum of Rs.15,000 in terms of the said verbal agreement; that the appellant, being unable to find the money himself, sought the assistance of the respondents, who agreed to find the money for the repurchase of the said mill, and also an additional sum of Rs.1000 for expenses upon the following terms, contained in a written agreement dated June 25, 1897, namely— 12 Law. Rep. 30 Ind. App. 230 ( 1902- 1903) Maung Po Hti V. Mahomed C assim 113 That the said premises should be conveyed in the names of the appellant and respondents by the firm of M.R.M.AR. That the appellant and the respondents should jointly raise a loan of Rs.12,500 from the Chetty firm of V.R.S. (the partners in which firm were made the first and second defendants in the suit) upon the mortgage of the said premises. That the second respondent should advance Rs.3500 to make up the deficiency. That the appellant and respondents should work the mill as partners for a period of three years, and for another year, if they should further agree. Then followed the two material clauses of the agreement, Nos. 11 and 12 — "11. That the second respondent should advance Rs.3500 to make up the deficiency. That the appellant and respondents should work the mill as partners for a period of three years, and for another year, if they should further agree. Then followed the two material clauses of the agreement, Nos. 11 and 12 — "11. That the said saw-mill having been mortgaged with one V. R. S. Nagappa Chetty for Rs.12,500 by the said Maung Po Hti, Mahomed Cassim, and Adjim Mahomed Nacoda, the said Mahomed Cassim and Adjim Mahomed Nacoda, their heirs, executors, and administrators, respectively agree and allow that the said Maung Po Hti, his heirs, executors, or administrators, to redeem the said premises after the expiration of three years or at any time between three and four years from the date of these presents on payment of Rs.12,500 to the said V. R. S. Nagappa Chetty, Rs.3500 to the said Adjim Mahomed Nacoda, and all other sums of money then due and payable by the said P. A. Mahomed Cassim and Company. “12. That in the event of the said Maung Po Hti or his heirs, executors, and administrators failing to pay off and redeem the said premises at the expiration of the third year and before the end of the fourth year from the date of these presents, then the said Mahomed Cassim and Adjim Mahomed Nacoda, their heirs, executors, or administrators, have and each of them right to redeem the same." On June 20, 1900, the appellant intimated to the respondents his intention to exercise the right reserved to him of redeeming the said property. The respondents denied that right, and objected that the above agreement in respect of clauses E and F was inadmissible in evidence for want of registration. The District Judge admitted it in evidence without registration as " a document clearly falling under sub-s. (h) of s. 17 of Act III. The respondents denied that right, and objected that the above agreement in respect of clauses E and F was inadmissible in evidence for want of registration. The District Judge admitted it in evidence without registration as " a document clearly falling under sub-s. (h) of s. 17 of Act III. of 1877." The Chief Court held that the District Judge erred in ruling that the document fell within clause (h) and not under clause (b) of the section for the reasons given by him, that " It did not give the plaintiff any present interest in the land, but merely gave him a conditional right upon making certain payments within specified limits of time to obtain documents of title." The Chief Court observed that, " In considering whether the partnership deed was admissible or not, it strikes me that the plaintiff is on the horns of a dilemma. The right to redeem was vested jointly in the plaintiff and third and fourth defendants, unless and until by some means such joint right became extinguished. The deed of partnership either operated to extinguish that joint right and (completed with the exercise of the option) to vest a sole right to redeem in the plaintiff, or it did not do so. If it did, then it must fall within clause (b) of s. 17 of the Act, and it was inadmissible in evidence. If it did not do so, but merely created a right to obtain another document, which would when executed extinguish the joint right and vest the sole right to redeem in the plaintiff, then the plaintiff has not obtained that document from the third and fourth defendants, and his suit to redeem from the first and second defendants was premature. In either case his suit should have failed." Cowell, for the appellant, submitted that the equity of redemption sought to be enforced had itself been created by two registered deeds of conveyance and mortgage; and that the question in this suit related to the relative rights of the parties under a partnership agreement as to the mode of dealing therewith 12 Law. Rep. 30 Ind. App. 230 ( 1902- 1903) Maung Po Hti V. Mahomed C assim 114 inter se as an item of the partnership assets. Rep. 30 Ind. App. 230 ( 1902- 1903) Maung Po Hti V. Mahomed C assim 114 inter se as an item of the partnership assets. That agreement did not purport "to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish, whether in present or in future, any right, title or interest, whether vested or contingent," in immovable property. On the contrary, clauses 11 and 12 thereof were in the nature of mutual covenants between the partners as to the mode in which they would " agree and allow" a right already created to be exercised by one or other of them according to circumstances thereafter to arise and there is no clause in the .Registration Act which requires its registration. It was further contended that the agreement in question is expressly excepted from registration under s. 17, sub-s. (h), of Act III. of 1877, as a document merely creating a right to obtain, if necessary, in the circumstances which have happened, an assignment from the respondents of their interest in the said equity of redemption. The right to obtain such assignment was a matter dependent on the option of the parties and the lapse of time, and could not be executed until it was ascertained what the nature and effect of it should be. Reference was made to Chunilal Panalal v. Bomanji Mancherji Modi. (( 1883) Ind. L. R. 7 Bomb. 310.) Lowis, for the respondents, was not heard. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD MACNAGHTEN. Their Lordships are of opinion that the judgment of the Chief Court is perfectly right. The partnership agreement of June 25, 1897, is an instrument falling within s. 17, clause (b), of the Indian Registration Act (Act No. III. of 1877). In one of the clauses of the agreement there is a complete assurance of a right of redemption for and during a future period of limited duration. The clause declares that what, but for this stipulation, would have been the right of the three partners shall, during that period, be the right of one of the three, exercisable by him for his own sole benefit. That right is a right in immovable property. The agreement, therefore, ought to have been registered. Being unregistered, it is inadmissible in evidence. That right is a right in immovable property. The agreement, therefore, ought to have been registered. Being unregistered, it is inadmissible in evidence. If the agreement had been registered, then, if the respondents had been content to abide by their bargain, no further assurance from them would have been required; if they had contested the appellants right, a declaration by the Court of his right as expressed in the agreement would have been sufficient, and it would not have been necessary for the Court to make an order directing the execution of any further instrument. Their Lordships will, therefore, humbly advise His Majesty that this appeal ought to be dismissed. The appellant must pay the costs of the appeal.