JUDGMENT 1. This is an appeal under sec. 411 of the Code of Criminal Procedure from the judgment of the Chief Presidency Magistrate of Calcutta, convicting the Appellant of the offence of wrongfully confining the complainant, and sentencing him under sec. 342 of the Indian Penal Code to a fine of Rs. 300, or in default to one month's rigorous imprisonment; and the grounds urged before us by the learned counsel for the Appellant are, first, that the prosecution is barred by lapse of time, it having been instituted more than three months after the act complained of had been committed, that is, beyond the limit of time prescribed by cl. 1 of sec. 99 of the Calcutta Police Act, No. 4, of 1866, Bengal Council; and, second, that upon the evidence and upon the facts found, the conviction of the Appellant is wrong on the merits. In support of the first point it is argued for the Appellant that cl. 1 of sec. 99 of the Calcutta. Police Act provides a period of limitation not only for civil actions, but also for criminal prosecutions, and that the word prosecutions used in that section must mean criminal prosecutions, as otherwise the words "and prosecutions" occurring in the section would be wholly superfluous. On the other hand, the learned Standing Counsel, who appears for the Crown, seeks to answer the contention of the Appellant, not so much by arguing that the word "prosecutions" does not mean criminal prosecutions (though he does not concede the point in favour of the Appellant) as by contending that cl. 1 of sec. 99 of the Calcutta Police Act does not cover a case like the present, which is brought for an act of the accused that is neither done or intended to be done under the provisions of the Calcutta Police Act, there being no provision in that Act for the detention of an accused person in police custody for the purpose of holding a police inquiry. Various authorities have been cited on both sides, some of which we shall notice as we proceed. 2. Various authorities have been cited on both sides, some of which we shall notice as we proceed. 2. The clause upon the construction of which the determination of the point raised, depends, runs thus:-- "All actions and prosecutions against any person, which may be lawfully brought for anything done, or intended to be done, under the provisions of this Act, shall be commenced within three months after the act complained of shall have been committed, and not otherwise: and notice in writing of such action, and of the causes thereof shall be given to the Defendant one month at least before the commencement of the action and in every such action, it shall be expressly alleged in the plaint that the act complained of was done maliciously and without reasonable or probable cause; and if at the trial of any such action, upon the general issue being pleaded as hereinafter provided, the Plaintiff shall fail to prove such allegation, he shall be non-suited, and a verdict shall be given for the Defendant." It is clear that the whole of what follows in the clause after the words "and not otherwise" applies only to civil actions. 3. The marginal note to the clause which is in these words "limitation of action" also relates only to civil actions, and the question is whether, notwithstanding all this, the provision relating to limitation of time in the clause applies to criminal prosecutions as well as to civil actions, by reason of the occurrence of the words "and prosecutions" in it. The marginal note need not, and indeed it should not, influence our decision, as it has been held that the marginal note to a section is no part of the Act [see Dukhimullah v. Halway ILR 23 Cal. 55 (1895), see also Sutton v. Sutton ILR 23 Cal. 55 (1895) and Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, 3rd Ed., pp. 58, 59]. The construction of the clause, we must say, is not altogether free from doubt and difficulty. 55 (1895), see also Sutton v. Sutton ILR 23 Cal. 55 (1895) and Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, 3rd Ed., pp. 58, 59]. The construction of the clause, we must say, is not altogether free from doubt and difficulty. The context of the section would rather go to show that the words "and prosecutions," if they are to be understood in the sense of criminal prosecutions, are somewhat out of place in that context, but at the same time to hold that the word "prosecutions" does not mean criminal prosecutions, would be to treat it altogether as a matter of surplus age, to say nothing of the meaning which attaches to that word in legal phraseology. It is true, in ordinary dictionaries the word "prosecution" has been defined to include a civil suit as well as a criminal prosecution; but if we are to understand the word in that sense, it was wholly unnecessary, as the word "action" means and includes suits of a civil nature. Moreover, in law dictionaries, the word "prosecution" is defined as meaning criminal prosecutions only. Thus in Wharton's Law Lexicon "prosecution" is defined to be a proceeding either by way of indictment or information in the Criminal Courts in order to put an offender upon his trial; and the same is the meaning assigned to the word in the Eucyclopaedia of the Laws of India. 4. In construing a statute we must give to every word used in a clause its proper meaning, and we should not treat any word as superfluous, unless there is something in the subject or context which would make it absurd or unreasonable to follow that course. In the present instance, if we are to give to the word "prosecution" its ordinary meaning and are not to treat as superfluous, we must hold that it is meant to include criminal prosecution. Now is there anything in the subject or context which would make our giving the word that meaning, and our not treating the word as superfluous, absurd or unreasonable ? We think the question must be answered in the negative. Now is there anything in the subject or context which would make our giving the word that meaning, and our not treating the word as superfluous, absurd or unreasonable ? We think the question must be answered in the negative. It is true the rest of the clause, that is, the portion relating to the giving of notice and so forth, is intended to apply only to civil actions, but that is no reason why we should hold that the provision in the first part of the clause fixing a limit of time was not intended by the Legislature to apply to the institution of criminal prosecutions, by reason of its being a thing unreasonable in itself. It is quite true that a civil action is one in which only private individuals are concerned, whereas a criminal prosecution concerns the public as represented by the Crown; still it does not follow that a rule of limitation as to time in regard to criminal prosecutions against police-officers is an unreasonable one. On the contrary, we think it is quite a reasonable provision of the law that criminal prosecutions against police-officers for acts done by them in the discharge of their duty should have a limitation of time; for whilst, on the one hand, the public require to be protected against the abuse of authority by the Police, on the other hand the Police require some protection against being prosecuted for acts done by them in the discharge of their duty at any distance of time after the alleged acts have been committed. The very nature of their duties exposes police-officers to the risk of frequent prosecutions and it would be a great hardship if they continued liable to be prosecuted for acts done by them in the discharge of their public duties at any distance of time. The clause, therefore, in our opinion, applies, so far as the rule of limitation goes, to criminal prosecutions as well as to civil actions. 5. But then there remains the question whether the clause applies to a case like the present. The clause, therefore, in our opinion, applies, so far as the rule of limitation goes, to criminal prosecutions as well as to civil actions. 5. But then there remains the question whether the clause applies to a case like the present. The learned Standing Counsel argued that as the detention of the complainant by the Police in this case was an act not provided for by the Police Act, it could not be held to be a thing done or intended to be done under the provisions of the Act so as to come within the scope of cl. 1 of sec. 99, and if it does not come within the scope of that section the rule of limitation will not apply to the present case? The provisions of the Act to which the learned counsel for the Appellant referred us are provisions 76 and 77, but they do not provide for the detention of any person in police custody for the purpose of a police inquiry for which the complainant in this case was detained. The only authority for such detention is, as we learn from the judgment of the Chief Presidency Magistrate, a certain circular order issued by the Commissioner of Police, a copy of which has been laid before us. Evidently the Appellant in detaining the complainant has been acting under the authority of that circular, and the question is, therefore reduced to this, namely, whether the act of the accused under these circumstances can beheld to be a thing done, or intended to be done, under the provisions of the Calcutta Police Act. It is somewhat unfortunate that the objection now taken, that the prosecution is time-barred was not raised before the Court below. If it had been raised there, possibly some more light would have been thrown by the evidence upon the question of the authority under which the Appellant had been acting, and whether his act came properly within the scope of cl. 1 of sec. 99 of the Act. As, however, the question is one of law, we will not shut out the Appellant from raising it even though it was raised for the first time in the appellate stage of the case. 1 of sec. 99 of the Act. As, however, the question is one of law, we will not shut out the Appellant from raising it even though it was raised for the first time in the appellate stage of the case. Moreover, the judgment of the Court below does throw some light upon the point, as the learned Chief Presidency Magistrate says towards the conclusion of his judgment, when dealing with the question of sentence, "in fact the Calcutta Police are directed to make investigations under orders which have been in force for many years." But the question remains, as we have just said, whether the acts done under those orders could be treated as acts done or intended to be done under the provisions of the Calcutta Police Act. Sec. 9 of the Act authorises the Commissioner to issue orders from time to time for various purposes, amongst which one is "to render the police-force efficient in the discharge of all its duties," and a circular order authorising the Calcutta Police to inquire into matters may (without much straining of language) come within the scope of such a purpose. In saying this however, we must guard ourselves against being understood to hold that the Commissioner of Police is authorised by this section to make any general orders which affect not merely the police-force under him, but the public at large in any material way. 6. There is another provision of the Calcutta Police Act which may be referred to on this point. That is sec. 12, which enacts that "for any breach of the orders and regulations framed as aforesaid, every member of the Police, besides being suspended or dismissed from his employment at the discretion of the Commissioner, shall be liable, on conviction before a Magistrate, to a fine not exceeding Rs. 100 or to imprisonment, with or without hard labour, for any term not exceeding three months." The accused, therefore, ran the risk of incurring the penalty provided by this section if he did not obey the circular order in question. That being so, it could not very well be said that the act done by the Appellant, was one, which was neither done or intended to be done under the provisions of the Calcutta Police Act so as to exclude it from the scope of cl. 1 of sec. 99. That being so, it could not very well be said that the act done by the Appellant, was one, which was neither done or intended to be done under the provisions of the Calcutta Police Act so as to exclude it from the scope of cl. 1 of sec. 99. Whether it was justifiable or not, whether in doing that act the Appellant made himself justly liable to any criminal prosecution or not, is quite another question. All we decide is that the act was one which must be held to have been done or at least intended to be done under the provisions of the Calcutta Police Act. The cases which those qualifying words exclude are cases of police-officers doing acts in abuse of their authority and only under colour of that authority for the purpose of harassing or injuring other people. In the judgment the learned Chief Presidency Magistrate says nothing to suggest that the acts of the Police in this case were of that nature, nor did the learned Standing Counsel argue that they were of such a nature. 7. In this view of the matter we must hold that the prosecution was barred by cl. 1 of sec. 99 of the Calcutta Police Act, as it was admittedly instituted after the expiry of three months from the date when the acts complained of had been committed. 8. As the prosecution must fail and the conviction and sentence must be set aside on this ground, it becomes unnecessary for us to go into the merits of the case. 9. The result then, is that the conviction and sentence must be set aside and the fine, if realised, will be refunded. As the circular orders issued by the Commissioner of Police may affect the public, we think it right to add that it is desirable that they should be published, so that the public may be aware of what they are.