JUDGMENT Sale, J. - The Plaintiff-company seek by this interlocutory application to restrain the Defendants from using the words "camel hair" in connection with certain belting sold by them, alleging that in so using the words there is a false representation to the effect that the belting sold by the Defendants are goods of the Plaintiffs' manufacture. The question raised in this case has been the subject of litigation in the English Courts and the cases which have been referred to, viz., the case of Reddaway v. Banham 1896, App. Cas. 199 (1896), and the case of Reddaway v. Stephenson Unreported which is an unreported case, clearly show that the Plaintiffs' right to an injunction depends upon their proving two things:-- (1) That the words complained of signify that the belting is exclusively of the Plaintiffs' manufacture, and (2) that the use of the description is such as is calculated to deceive purchasers into the belief that they are purchasing goods of the Plaintiffs' manufacture. 2. It is clear that both these propositions which have to be established are propositions of fact, and the decisions in the English cases to which I have referred, are based upon the findings arrived at on these two questions of fact. 3. Now it is obvious that in order to entitle the Plaintiffs to the relief which they seek, these questions of fact must be heard and determined in the ordinary course at the hearing of this case, and the difficulty which I feel in dealing with these questions of fact on this interlocutory application, is the danger of prejudging on imperfect and incomplete materials, questions which must be finally determined hereafter at the hearing of the case, This is a difficulty which is always present in those cases in which the intervention of the Court is sought on interlocutory applications, where the questions to be determined are questions of fact. There are exceptional cases where the Court will intervene upon an interlocutory application, but these are cases where the Plaintiff has succeeded in establishing a very strong, if not an overwhelming prima facie case, and where irreparable injury may be done if the Court does not intervene in the manner sought. 4. I do not think that the Plaintiffs have succeeded in bringing the present case within the class of exceptions to which I have referred. 5. 4. I do not think that the Plaintiffs have succeeded in bringing the present case within the class of exceptions to which I have referred. 5. I may say this much, I think without in any way prejudicing the trial of the cause, that the Plaintiffs have not adduced, in support of their present application, any evidence to show that the words "camel hair belting" exclusively relate to belting manufactured by the Plaintiffs; nor is there any evidence to show that any purchaser has been deceived into the belief that he has purchased goods of the Plaintiffs' manufacture on obtaining from the Defendants goods under the description complained of. 6. The Plaintiffs, however, seek to rely on the letter written by the Defendants' Attorneys, dated the 14th of March last, from which letter I am asked to infer that the Defendants, in effect, admit that the words "camel hair belting" must be taken to mean camel hair belting of the Plaintiffs' manufacture, inasmuch as, the Defendants state that they are perfectly willing to distinguish the camel hair belting sold by them, by the addition of words showing that they are the Defendants' camel hair belting or by using the words "camel wool belting" instead of camel hair belting. 7. The inference to be drawn from this letter is also a question of fact and the weight to be attached to it as a piece of evidence, will be more readily estimated at the hearing of the case when taken in conjunction with the other facts which may be proved. 8. All I need say about the letter at present is that it seems to me that it is not possible to give it the effect of an admission on the point to which I have just referred. 9. I think as I have had occasion before this to observe that the proper course, in a case of the present character, where speedy relief, by means of an injunction, is sought, is to ask to have the cause expedited and not to seek to have the questions, which can only be effectually determined at the hearing, prejudged in an unsatisfactory manner on an application supported by affidavits. For these reasons it seems to me I must refuse the present application and the Defendants must have their costs of it.