JUDGMENT 1. This was a rule issued by us calling upon the Magistrate of the District to show cause why the order complained of by the applicant should not be set aside, and cause has now been shown. The case is one in which the learned District Magistrate of Howrah made an order under sec. 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It appears that certain acts of the applicant before us were complained of as a nuisance committed in a public place. The applicant appears to have raised the question of title before the Magistrate, claiming that the place was not a public place, but that he had a right of property in respect of it. There seems to have been an enquiry and the parties were heard by the Magistrate, the result being that the Magistrate on the materials before him was inclined to think that the claim of title had not been made out. At the same time he said that the claim was a bond fide claim of title in the sense that it was not raised for the purpose of merely ousting the jurisdiction of the Court. In these circumstances the Magistrate professed to make an order in conformity with the ruling of this Court in Luckhee Narain Banerjee v. Ram Kumar Mukherjee ILR 15 Cal. 564 (1888), and with special reference to the observations contained in p. 572 and the effect of the order is that the proceedings before him are stayed and an opportunity is given to the applicant before us to establish his claim of title in a Civil Court. 2. Objection is taken to this order, on the ground that, having found that the claim of title was bond fide, it is not open to the Magistrate to take the course of staying his hand pending the determination of the question in the Civil Court, inasmuch as, it is said, the effect of that course is to compel the applicant before us to take proceedings in a Civil Court. 3. Now, we have carefully considered the ruling of this Court, already referred to; and it seems to us that it is quite impossible to distinguish the present case from the case in which the ruling in question occurs. 3. Now, we have carefully considered the ruling of this Court, already referred to; and it seems to us that it is quite impossible to distinguish the present case from the case in which the ruling in question occurs. The learned Magistrate appears to have taken special care to make his order in strict conformity with the principles laid down in that CASE. In order to show this it is only necessary for us to quote the particular paragraphs of the ruling in which the matter is dealt with. At p. 573 the following passage occurs:-- "If the Magistrate does not think this claim well-founded so far as he can judge, but considers that it is made bond fide, he should allow the Defendant an opportunity of asserting it by civil proceedings." The "existence of an intention or desire to do this is one test of bond fides [Reg. v. Sandford 30 L.T. 601 N.S. (1874)]. If the Defendant does not within a reasonable time assert his right, the Magistrate may proceed." And then, in the next paragraph these words occur:-- "Our observations in this judgment are, of course, directed to that part of sec. 133 which relates to the case now before us and deals with obstructions to public ways. We may observe that in cases in which danger to public health or safety is involved we by no means suggest that the Magistrate is fettered in the exercise of the powers given to him under these sections by the considerations to which we have adverted." 4. Now, the case before us seems to have more analogy to a case where public health or safety is involved, inasmuch as it is not a mere case of obstruction to a public road or way. What is complained of amounts to a nuisance; and that being so, it seems to us that this is a case which prima facie the Magistrate would have jurisdiction to deal with. What is complained of amounts to a nuisance; and that being so, it seems to us that this is a case which prima facie the Magistrate would have jurisdiction to deal with. The only limitation upon his authority, as explained by the ruling of this Court, is that in cases of the nature of obstruction to a public right of way if he should find that there is a claim of title which is bond fide, he should give an opportunity to the person raising that claim to establish it in a Civil Court, Failing his doing so, the Magistrate is bound to proceed with the case, and it is pointed out that this limitation or restriction of authority does not apply when the case is one affecting the public health or safety. That being so, it is quite impossible to distinguish the case before us from the case referred to above. It appears to us that the proceedings taken by the Magistrate in the present case are in strict accordance with the principles laid down in that case; and under these circumstances we must discharge the rule. We may add that if the applicant really wishes to go to a Civil Court the Magistrate might with advantage allow him an extension of time for the purpose of doing so.