JUDGMENT 1. This is a rule calling upon the Magistrate of the district to show cause why the order of acquittal in this case should not be set aside and the case reheard from the point at which Mr. Reid, the Assistant Magistrate, left it, and also why the case should not be transferred to some other Magistrate for such rehearing. The case which is the subject-matter of the rule is one in which charges were framed against the accused under secs. 147, 380 and 448 of the Indian Penal Code. Those charges were originally tried by the Assistant Magistrate, Mr. Reid. At a certain stage of the case Mr. Reid was transferred, and it became necessary that the case should be heard by the District Magistrate. On the District Magistrate taking up the case, an application purporting to be under sec. 526, Criminal Procedure Code, was made on behalf of the prosecution for, the adjournment of the case, in order that the prosecution might move this Court for a transfer of the case. The learned District Magistrate declined to accede to that application; and he proceeded with the hearing of the case and finally acquitted all the accused. 2. Now, the first question that arises is as to the effect of cl. 8 of sec. 526, having regard to the fact that the learned Magistrate declined to accede to the application for postponement of the case. It is contended that sec. 526 has no application to the present case, inasmuch as, under cl. 8 any application which is to be made should be made at the commencement of the hearing, and that as the application in the present case could not be said to have been made at the commencement of the hearing of the case, the section does not apply. It seems to us, however, that this reading of the section is not one which was intended by the Legislature. In our opinion the section itself was intended to apply to a case of this kind, and to apply to a case in which an application for transfer is made at the very earliest time. The objection was not to Mr. Reid trying the case, but to the District Magistrate who took up the case at the point at which Mr. Reid left it. The objection was not to Mr. Reid trying the case, but to the District Magistrate who took up the case at the point at which Mr. Reid left it. It is obvious, therefore, that the prosecution made the application in question at the earliest possible time, and having done so, we think that they came within the language of the section. In our view the words "commencement of the hearing" must mean the commencement of the hearing in the Court objected to, or, in other words in the Court to which the notification subsequently referred to in the section applies or is made. Now, as regards the question as to the effect of the application for postponement, and its refusal, by the Magistrate, we think we should follow the ruling of this Court which is Surat Lal Chowdhuri v. Emperor ILR 29 Cal. 211 (1902). It seems to be there laid down that the effect of a refusal of an application of this kind, falling within sec. 526, Code of Criminal Procedure, is to invalidate all subsequent proceedings and if, as in our opinion, this case is one which falls within sec. 526, it seems to us that the ruling must be held to be applicable, and therefore the duty of the Magistrate under the section being to grant a postponement, and he having no power to proceed with the hearing of the case until a reasonable postponement had been granted, the result is that the subsequent proceedings are unwarranted by law and must be set aside. The next question is as to the rehearing of this case. Now, the case itself is one in which it is alleged that the Bettiah Raj has an interest. This case and a number of other cases which from time to time have come before this Court are concerned with the possession of a particular math, and the allegation of the prosecution was that an attempt had been made by the accused to dispossess the complainant and his master, Kishori Gir, the Mohunt, of the said math. This case and a number of other cases which from time to time have come before this Court are concerned with the possession of a particular math, and the allegation of the prosecution was that an attempt had been made by the accused to dispossess the complainant and his master, Kishori Gir, the Mohunt, of the said math. Now the allegation that the Bettiah Raj is in some way concerned with the math is, we think, one which ought to be taken into consideration in deciding the question as to whether it is desirable that this case should be tried by a Magistrate who is ex-officio one of the chief executive authorities connected with the Court of Wards which has control over this Raj. We do not doubt that the Magistrate, if he tried this case, would deal with it in an impartial way, but, at the same time, it is impossible under the circumstances, to prevent persons from having an apprehension that there might be some bias in the mind of the Magistrate inclining him to look with favour upon the interests of the Bettiah Raj, as represented by the accused persons in this case, Under these circumstances we are of opinion that, to avoid any possible misapprehension on this point, the case should be tried by some Magistrate other than the District Magistrate of Chumparun. We understand that some other oases arising out of or connected with the possession of this math have been transferred to Sarun for trial, and we accordingly direct that this case be tried by the District Magistrate of Sarun, or by some other Magistrate in that District whom he may see fit to send it. If the accused prefer that the case should be taken up from the point at which it was left by Mr. Reid, the Assistant Magistrate, they will have the right to ask that this should be done.