JUDGMENT 1. The point raised in this case is a technical one, namely, whether the Plaintiff is entitled to interest for the date on which a bond was executed as well as for the date of payment. The facts of the case are these. The Plaintiff has sued to recover principal and interest on a mortgage-bond executed by the Defendant No. 1 on the 5th June 1893. The Defendant No. 2 is the second mortgagee, who on two occasions deposited sums in satisfaction of the amount due. The second occasion was the 11th June 1895; and the total sum deposited was equal to the principal plus interest for two years and six days. The Plaintiff maintained that this sum was short by one day's interest. He claimed interest both for the day of the execution of the deed and for the day of payment, and refused to accept the amount put in to his credit; and, after waiting for five years, he has brought this suit just as the period of limitation is about to expire. 2. The Subordinate Judge and the District Judge have both held that the Plaintiff is not entitled to interest for both days; and we have been invited by the learned pleader for the Plaintiff to say that this view is wrong. We are, however, unable to hold that the lower Courts are wrong, in the absence of any evidence as to what is the custom of Bankers in Cuttack, when the cause of action arose. In the Court of first instance the Subordinate Judge relied upon a work on Arithmetic published by a native author, in which it is said that where "interest has to be calculated from one given day to another, it is customary to include only one of the days named in counting the period of time, that is either the day of the loan is to be included and the day of payment excluded, or vice versa" The learned Subordinate Judge also relied upon a rule of practice of the English Courts, namely, Rule 12 embodied in The Annual Practical of 1900, page 874. No doubt this rule is not exactly in point; but it affords some evidence as to the equity interpretation to be put upon the words " from " and " up to" in cases in which interest is to be calculated. 3. No doubt this rule is not exactly in point; but it affords some evidence as to the equity interpretation to be put upon the words " from " and " up to" in cases in which interest is to be calculated. 3. We have been invited by the learned pleader for the Appellant to examine the bond itself; and we have done so. It contains these words, "the interest on the principal will be calculated from this day until payment of the whole of the amount at the above rate." This does not appear to be very explicit, we think that if the parties had really wished to include the date of the execution of the bond as one of the dates on which interest was to count, they would not have used the words ajha abadhi but the express ion "addya dhariya" which would have been perfectly clear, as showing that that interest was to be allowed from that date. But in our opinion the matter is one which depends on custom, or mercantile usage. The Plaintiff should have given evidence as to the practice of Bankers in Cuttack; and, as he has not done so, and as we do not see that the judgment of the lower Appellate Court is wrong, we are unable to interfere with the decree which has been given in this case. 4. Another contention of the learned pleader for the Appellant is this, that sec. 84 of the Transfer of Property Act does not contemplate a deposit of interest being made on two dates. The Defendant No. 2 in this case first deposited a sum which was clearly insufficient, and as soon as he discovered his mistake he deposited a further amount which included interest up to the date of the second deposit. The Plaintiff was well aware of the second deposit; and we think that in this case the provisions of secs. 83 and 84 of the Transfer of Property Act have been complied with; there is nothing in these sections which expressly prohibits the deposit being made on two dates. For these reasons we do not see our way to interfere with the decision of the lower Appellate Court; and we dismiss this appeal with costs.