JUDGMENT 1. This is a suit brought by the purchaser of an under-tenure to avoid an encumbrance. The sale took place before the Bengal Tenancy Act became law, and, therefore, for the purposes of this suit, Act VIII (B.C.) of 1869, sec. 66, must be held to apply. The Court of first instance found that the property sold was a tenure within sec. 66; that the Plaintiff, being one of the tenure-holders for whose default in the payment of rent the tenure was sold, cannot by his purchase of that tenure benefit by reason of the last portion of sec. 66 and the Subordinate Judge accordingly dismissed the suit. 2. In appeal, the District Judge held that the property sold was only an ordinary jote and not a tenure within the terms of sec. 66 but he agreed with the Court of first instance that the suit was barred by the last portion of that section inasmuch as the Plaintiff was one of the defaulting tenants. The District Judge lastly held that inasmuch as the holding of the Defendants was not proved to be an encumbrance created by the talukdar without the permission of the superior landlord, it could not be avoided. In the view that we take of the second point mentioned, it is scarcely necessary for us to express any opinion in regard to the nature of the jote purchased--whether it was a tenure within the terms of sec. 66 or an ordinary holding. We may, however, observe that the fact that it has been described as a jote does not necessarily show that it was not a tenure and that it was simply an ordinary cultivating jote or holding and we may further observe that, inasmuch as the area of this jote exceeds 100 bighas, the presumption in the Bengal Tenancy Act should be applied under which, until the contrary is shown, the holding must be regarded as a tenure. As authority for this, we have been referred to Gokul Mandar v. Pudmanund Singh ILR 29 Cal. 707 (1902). The Plaintiff's case really fails on the second point on which both Courts have been concurrent and, in our opinion, correct in interpreting the law. As authority for this, we have been referred to Gokul Mandar v. Pudmanund Singh ILR 29 Cal. 707 (1902). The Plaintiff's case really fails on the second point on which both Courts have been concurrent and, in our opinion, correct in interpreting the law. No doubt, as pointed out to us by the learned pleader for the Appellant the Plaintiff was only one of the defaulting tenants but he was the purchaser at the sale held to realise the rent which was in default in consequence of non-payment by him and his co-sharers. We do not understand the last part of sec. 66 to make any exception in favour of a shareholder defaulter in the position of the Plaintiff. It seems to us that we are bound, in such a case, to apply the ordinary principle that no man should benefit by a wrongful act done or caused by himself. The Plaintiff was, in some degree at least, responsible for the nonpayment of rent in consequence of which the sale took place and, unless the sale on account of non-payment of the rent had taken place, he could not, as auction-purchaser, claim to be placed in the advantageous position which has been set out in sec. 66 of Act VIII (B.C.) of 1869. But the default was to some extent due to his neglect and the sale was, therefore, brought about by him. He cannot, therefore, claim the same position as a stranger or to be a bond fide purchaser or he would benefit by his own default. On this ground, we dismiss the appeal with costs.