JUDGMENT 1. The Plaintiff, the Appellant before us, is the ijaradar under the Emambara of Hughly of an estate, which includes the plot of land now in question in Kidderpur. THE Plaintiff has instituted this suit to eject the Defendant, on the ground that the Defendant is a tenant-at-will, meaning presumably a tenant from year to year. The Defendant claims that she has a permanent heritable, transferable right. The Court of first instance found against the Defendant; but on appeal she succeeded in the lower Appellate Court. The lower Appellate Court found that the holding in question was agricultural in its inception and had been recognised as such by the Plaintiff in the Road-cess returns submitted by him as recently as in the year 1897, and that the tenancy right was, in fact, permanent, heritable and transferable. The judgment of the lower Appellate Court was largely based on a kabuliyat executed by one of the Defendant's predecessors in title on the 19th Magh 1239, that is, in the year 1833, on a previous dowl patta of the 2lst Magh 1208, that is, of the year 1802. 2. The main contentions before us are, first, that the finding of the learned Judge, that the holding was agricultural in its inception and continued to maintain that character, was erroneous secondly, that the Court below was wrong in holding that the lease of 1833 was a confirmatory document; thirdly, that the Court below was wrong in holding that the landlord was in any way bound by the recitals in the sale deeds executed by the tenants to which he was not a party and of which he might not have known; and, fourthly, that assuming that the lease of 1833 was not the origin of the tenancy but that the dowl patta was its origin, the latter document was executed, not by the landlord, but by a gomasta who was not shown to have had authority to execute it and in any case it did not establish the permanent character of the holding. 3. As regards the first point it is sufficient to say that there is some evidence to justify the finding of the lower Appellate Court, and that being so we cannot go further into the question in second appeal. 4. 3. As regards the first point it is sufficient to say that there is some evidence to justify the finding of the lower Appellate Court, and that being so we cannot go further into the question in second appeal. 4. As regards the second point it seems to us perfectly clear that the kabuliyat of 1833, which corresponded presumably to the patta granted to the predecessor of the Respondent, was only confirmatory document. 5. Reference has been made to the judgment in the case of Ismail Khan Mahomed v. Joygoon Bibee 4 C.W.N. 210 (1900) to which one of us was a party. It is pointed out for the Appellant that in that case, as in the present the former tenant was said to have executed an istafa or relinquishment of his holding and that it was then held that such a document did not constitute a conveyance as between the tenants but had the effect of putting an end to the tenancy of the person who executed it and therefore the patta relied upon in that case could not be held to be a confirmatory lease; but it must be taken to be the origin of the holding of the new tenant. 6. Each case must be decided on its own evidence. The case to which we have referred has no application to that before us, for it is quite clear that in the present case there was a deed of conveyance independently of the istafa. That deed of conveyance was recited in the kabuliyat and the deed itself is forthcoming. It is apparent on the face of the kabuliyat that the holding had previously passed by inheritance and by transfer, and we think that the learned Judge was clearly right in the view that he took of that document. It speaks of the rent payable as the guzashta, that is, the previous rent, and it simply amounts, in our opinion, to a recognition of the right of the new purchaser of the holding to mutation of names in the landlord's sherista. The istafa referred to in the kabuliyat was in the present case obviously a mere notice by the vendor to the landlord of the transfer to the purchaser and cannot be considered independently of the deed of sale. 7. The istafa referred to in the kabuliyat was in the present case obviously a mere notice by the vendor to the landlord of the transfer to the purchaser and cannot be considered independently of the deed of sale. 7. As regards the third point we think that there is a clear distinction between the case of a deed of sale which is not shown to have been brought to the notice of the landlord and a deed of sale, as in the case before us, expressly recited in the kabuliyat and therefore presumably in the patta. 8. As regards the fourth point we think that it would be erroneous to hold that the dowl patta of 1802 was the origin of the tenancy which it recognised. In our opinion, that document is, on the face of it, not a new lease, which a gomasta might require special authority to execute, but a mere informal document, as the learned Judge says, executed only for the purpose of entering the name of the new purchaser in place of that of the vendor in the landlord's register. Like the kabuliyat of 1833, it recognises the previously existing tenancy of the grandfather of the vendor, which takes the tenancy back, as the learned Judge of the Court below says, to a time before the permanent settlement. The deed of sale, by which the holding was then transferred, has been put in, as well as the dowl patta. 9. It has been contended that the Courts cannot recognise a confirmatory patta unless the original patta is forthcoming; but we are unable to accept that view, which has not been acted upon by this Court in other similar cases. It seems to us that there are certain inferences deducible legally from these documents and from the conduct of the parties which go to support the case set up by the Defendant-Respondent. For a very long period the holding in question has from time to time been transferred and has descended by inheritance; it has been even subdivided by the tenant. It does not appear that there has ever been any objection on the part of the landlord during all this time, although the property is situated in a place where such property has increased enormously in value nor has the landlord ever till now made any attempt to eject the tenant. 10. It does not appear that there has ever been any objection on the part of the landlord during all this time, although the property is situated in a place where such property has increased enormously in value nor has the landlord ever till now made any attempt to eject the tenant. 10. We are unable, as we have said before, to consider this case as if it were before us in first appeal and must content ourselves with saying that, in our opinion, the conclusions arrived at by the learned Judge in the Court below are such as it was open to him to form legally upon the materials before him. We accordingly dismiss this appeal with costs.