JUDGMENT Banerjee, J. - This appeal arises out of a suit brought by the Plaintiffs-Appellants to recover possession of certain land on the allegation that it constituted the original joint holding of them and their co-sharers, Defendants Nos. 13 to 25; that those Defendants having in the year 1303 relinquished their share and interest in the same and given up their right to the Plaintiffs, the Plaintiffs have become entitled to the holding in its entirety that the other Defendants have unjustly deprived the Plaintiffs of their possession of the land and that hence they are obliged to bring this suit. The suit was contested mainly by the Defendant No. 3 who claims to be the owner of the superior tenure under which the Plaintiffs' tenancy is held ; and his defence, so far as it is necessary to be considered for the purposes of this appeal, was that the original holding had been relinquished not only by Defendants Nos. 13 to 25 but also by the Plaintiffs as well, and that the Plaintiffs have no subsisting right to the holding upon which they can maintain this suit. 2. The first Court found for the Plaintiffs and gave them a decree as prayed for. On appeal by the Defendants the lower Appellate Court has modified that decree and limited it to one in respect of the original share of the Plaintiffs, namely, an one-fifth share. 3. Against that decree of the lower Appellate Court the Plaintiffs have preferred this second appeal, and it is contended on their behalf, first, that the relinquishment by their co-sharers operated by way of enlarging their right so as to entitle them to the entire holding, and, secondly, that even if that was not so, the lower Appellate Court ought to have held that their continuing to hold possession by payment of rent to Defendants Nos. 11 and 12, their original landlords operated to create a new tenancy in their favour in respect of the entire holding. 4. With reference to the first contention the facts found by the lower Appellate Court which bear upon the point are shortly these,--that there was a relinquishment by Defendants Nos. 11 and 12, their original landlords operated to create a new tenancy in their favour in respect of the entire holding. 4. With reference to the first contention the facts found by the lower Appellate Court which bear upon the point are shortly these,--that there was a relinquishment by Defendants Nos. 13 to 25 of their interest in the holding, but that the Plaintiffs did not relinquish their interest; and the date of the relinquishment as stated by the Plaintiffs themselves in their plaint, was 1303, that is 1896, or about three years before the institution of the present suit. These being the facts bearing upon the point the learned vakil for the Plaintiffs-Appellants contends that the relinquishment by the Plaintiffs' co-sharers should be held to operate by way of enlarging the Plaintiffs' share in the holding, which is admitted by both sides to be an occupancy holding; and he refers to sec. 20, sub-sec. (4) of the Bengal Tenancy Act as lending support to his contention that an occupancy holding should be treated as being in the nature of a joint tenancy among its co-owners, so that if any of them relinquishes his possession of it, the effect of such relinquishment is to enlarge the rights of those who continue to hold it. It is further contended for the Plaintiffs-Appellants that as the effect of sec. 21 of the Bengal Tenancy Act read with sub-sec. (4) of sec. 20 is to confer upon the Plaintiffs the right of occupancy in the entire land of the holding in suit, they were entitled to a decree for the holding in its entirety. Then it is urged that the opposite view, namely, that taken by the lower Appellate Court, would be attended with undue hardship on the Plaintiffs, as it would force them to be content with a portion of the holding, although if the landlord had refused to accept relinquishment of a part of the holding they could not have compelled the landlord to effect a severance of their share from the share relinquished. On the other hand, the learned vakil for the Respondent, Defendant No. 3, argues that the principle of joint tenancy as distinguished from tenancy in common in English law, is not the rule in this country, that the relinquishment by the Plaintiffs' co-sharers cannot have the effect of enlarging the Plaintiffs' rights, when it is not shown that the relinquishment was in their favour, that sub-sec. (4) of sec. 20 is expressly limited in its operation to the purposes of that section, that if under sec. 21 of the Act the Plaintiffs have a right of occupancy in all the lands in the holding, that does not make that right extend to the entire interest in the holding, and that the one-sidedness of the situation, which the Appellants' argument refers to is one that is sanctioned by sec. 88 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, which makes it optional with the landlord to consent to the division of a holding or a distribution of the rent payable in respect thereof. 5. After giving my best consideration to the arguments on both sides, the conclusion I come to is, that the view taken by the lower Appellate Court is correct. It is a general principle of law that a person cannot claim to have acquired the right of another or to have his own right enlarged by the addition of another's right unless such acquisition or enlargement of right is by a valid transfer from the person to whom such right belonged or by the operation of any law. Now, in the present case the rights of the Plaintiffs, when they held the land jointly with their co-sharers, the Defendants Nos. 13 to 25, were limited to one-fifth of the entire holding, though by reason of there having been no partition, the one-fifth was an undivided one-fifth of the whole. How came they then to acquire the whole in the place of their original one-fifth. It is not suggested in the argument that the relinquishment by the pro forma Defendants Nos. 13 to 25 was in favour of the Plaintiffs, though a statement to that effect is made in the plaint. The whole argument for the Appellants proceeded upon the assumption that the relinquishment was in favour of the landlord. It is not suggested in the argument that the relinquishment by the pro forma Defendants Nos. 13 to 25 was in favour of the Plaintiffs, though a statement to that effect is made in the plaint. The whole argument for the Appellants proceeded upon the assumption that the relinquishment was in favour of the landlord. If that was so, the Plaintiffs cannot claim under any transfer from the original owners of the four-fifths of the holding, which is in dispute in this appeal. Is there any law then by the operation of which they have acquired that interest, or, what comes to the same thing, they have had their rights enlarged so as to embrace now the entirety in the place of their original one-fifth? It is said that such a law is to be found in the Bengal Tenancy Act, sec. 20, sub-sec. (4) read with sec. 21. 6. I do not think that those provisions of the law bear any such construction, Sub-sec. (4) of sec. 20 is expressly limited in its operation to the purposes of the section, one of which is to enable a person to become a settled raiyat of a village, and for such a purpose land held by two or more co-sharers as a raiyati holding shall be deemed to have been held as a raiyat by each of such co-sharers; and then sec. 21 says:--"Every person who is a settled raiyat of a village within the meaning of the last foregoing section shall have a right of occupancy in all land for the time being held by him as a raiyat in that village." So that it would follow, no doubt, that the Plaintiffs have a right of occupancy in the land in suit. But because they have a right of occupancy in the land it does not follow that they are entitled to that land to the exclusion of all other persons. They have obtained a decree declaring their right of occupancy in the land in dispute; only that right does not cover the entire interest in the land, the landlord in whose favour the relinquishment by their co-sharers has been made being entitled to a four-fifth share in the holding and their share being limited to an one-fifth. 7. This view does not militate against either sec. 20 or sec. 7. This view does not militate against either sec. 20 or sec. 21 of the Bengal Tenancy Act nor am I much pressed by the argument that if this view be accepted, whilst it would be open to the landlord to compel the raiyat to come to a partition, which would reduce his holding to his original share, the raiyat could not claim a similar right to compel the landlord to consent to a partition of the holding, if the transfer by the Plaintiffs' co-sharers had been to a third party ; because as has been pointed out in the argument for the Respondents the law sanctions such a thing, sec. 88 of the Bengal Tenancy Act giving the landlord the option of occupancy or refusing to accept the division of a holding or distribution of the rent of it. 8. The case not being one expressly provided for by the Bengal Tenancy Act or by any other enactment must be determined according to the principles of justice, equity and good conscience as laid down in sec. 37 of the Civil Courts. Act No. XII of 1887. 9. Now, I do not think it would be in consonance with the principles of justice, equity and good conscience to hold that the Plaintiffs, who have done or suffered nothing to entitle them to the additional interest they claim, should nevertheless have that interest, when ordinarily the relinquishment of a tenancy operates in favour of the landlord and not of any other person. On the other hand, I think it would be contrary to the principles of justice, equity and good conscience to hold that a relinquishment, such as the one made in this case, should operate by way of enlarging the tenant's right and depriving the landlord of what ordinarily would belong to him. 10. One other consideration will show that the view I take is the correct view, If the Plaintiffs' co-sharers instead of relinquishing their interest in the holding had transferred the same to a third party, such transfer would not have been void, but would have been operative and binding as between the Plaintiffs and the transferee. In support of this view I may refer to the case of Kabil Sardar v. Chunder Nath Nag Chowdhry I. L. R. 20 Cal. 590 (1892). In support of this view I may refer to the case of Kabil Sardar v. Chunder Nath Nag Chowdhry I. L. R. 20 Cal. 590 (1892). And upon such transfer having taken place the transferee might have claimed partition as against the Plaintiffs and the Plaintiffs' enjoyment of the land might have been limited to their share of the land subject to this disadvantage that they must still have continued liable jointly with the transferee for the entire rent of the holding. The difference between that position and the one the Plaintiffs will have to occupy now if the decree of the lower Appellate Court is affirmed will be this, that upon the partition which may be enforced on the footing of that decree either by the Plaintiffs or by the landlord, the Plaintiffs' enjoyment would no doubt be limited, but it will not be coupled with the disadvantage which they would have been under if the transfer had been to a third party as there will be a distribution of the rent, and their liability for rent will be reduced in proportion to the extent of the land they will hold. 11. For all these reasons, I am of opinion, that the view taken by the lower Appellate Court upon the first point is right. 12. Then it was argued that even if that was so, the payment of rent by the Plaintiffs to their former landlords Defendants Nos. 11 and 12 operated so as to create a new tenancy in their favour in respect of the entire holding ; and in support of this contention the case of Binad Lal Pakrashi v. Kalu Pramanik I. L. R. 20 Cal. 708 (1893) was relied upon. 13. I do not think that this contention is correct having regard to the fact found that the payment of rent by the Plaintiffs to Defendants Nos. 11 and 12 that is relied upon was not a bond fide act, and that the Plaintiffs and Defendants Nos. 11 and 12 were colluding with one another to deprive Defendant No. 26, who was then entitled to the superior tenure and whose rights have since passed to Defendant No. 3, of his just rights. The rule laid down in the case of Binad Lal Pahrashi v. Kalu Pramanik I. L. R. 20 Cal. 11 and 12 were colluding with one another to deprive Defendant No. 26, who was then entitled to the superior tenure and whose rights have since passed to Defendant No. 3, of his just rights. The rule laid down in the case of Binad Lal Pahrashi v. Kalu Pramanik I. L. R. 20 Cal. 708 (1893) is based upon the assumption that the tenant entered upon the land and held under a de facto proprietor, who might not be the real owner, in good faith. That element is wanting here, so that the rule laid down in that case cannot apply to this, and the same may be said with reference to the other cases cited in support of the Appellants' contention. It is a general principle of law that no one can confer upon another person any right in any property which is not his own. This is the general rule; and cases like that of Binad Lal Pakrashi v. Kalu Pramanik I. L. R. 20 Cal. 708 (1893) are only exceptions to that general rule. There is nothing shown to induce me to hold that an exception should be made in favour of the Plaintiffs in this case. 14. I may here refer to an unreported recent decision of this Court, namely, that in appeal from appellate decree No. 399 of 1901 Since reported : see 8 C. W. N. 320 in support of the view I take. The second contention of the Appellants must therefore also fail. 15. The result then is that this appeal fails and must be dismissed with costs. The cross-objections not being pressed need not be considered.