JUDGMENT 1. The Petitioner before us has been convicted of the offence of defamation under sec. 500, I.P.C., and a rule was granted by this Court calling upon the District Magistrate to show cause why this conviction should not be set aside upon the ground that the imputation against the character of the complainant having been made in an affidavit could not make the Petitioner amenable to be prosecuted and punished in the Criminal Court. It appears that one Brohmomoyee Dassi applied to the Civil Court to set aside an ex parte decree obtained by the complainant Giribala Dassi. The notice that was taken out against the said Giribala having been returned unserved by reason of her absence from her house, the Petitioner, in an affidavit in support of an application that was made by the said Brohmomoyee Dassi for substituted service, not only stated that Giribala could not be found in her house nor in the village in which she had been residing and that her whereabouts were not known, but went on to say that she was of bad character that she had left the village and that, therefore, the notice that had been issued by the Court could not be served upon her. Now, it seems to us that the statement that was made by the Petitioner in the said affidavit as to the character of Giribala and as to her having gone out of the village (the expression as applied to a female, has a significant meaning) was wholly irrelevant to the enquiry then before the Court. And the Magistrate has distinctly found that this statement was not made in good faith but rather maliciously. The privilege which the Petitioner claims is not a privilege which could possibly be brought within any one of the various exceptions mentioned in sec. 499, I.P.C. It seems to have been argued in the Court below that it would come within the ninth exception, which runs as follows:--It is not defamation to make an imputation on the character of another, provided that the imputation be made in good faith for the protection of the interests of the person making it, or of any other person or for the public good." Upon the finding of the. Court below, the imputation was not made in good faith; and it is perfectly clear that it was not made either for the protection of the Petitioner, or for the protection of Brohmomoyee Dassi whose application for substituted service he wanted to support. The learned vakil for the Petitioner has, however, contended, relying upon the case of Babu Gunnesh Dutt Singh v. Mugneeram Chowdhury 11 B.L.R. 321 (1872), decided by the Privy Council, that in the same way as a witness is protected from prosecution for defamation by reason of any evidence that he may give in a Civil or Criminal proceeding, the Petitioner is also protected, he having made the statement in question in an affidavit in connection with the enquiry then before the Court. That was a case where the Plaintiff sought to recover damages for malicious prosecution; and their Lordships, among other matters, observed as follows:--"This action has been called a suit to recover damages for defamation of character. Their Lordships are of opinion, with the High Court, that if it had been, strictly speaking, such an action, it could not have been maintained for, they agree with that Court that witnesses cannot be sued in a Civil Court for damages in respect of evidence given by them upon oath in a judicial proceeding. Their Lordships hold this maxim which certainly has been recognized by all the Courts of this country, to be one based upon principles of public policy. The ground of it is this, that it concerns the public and the administration of justice that witnesses giving their evidence on oath in a Court of Justice should not have before their eyes the fear of being harassed by suits for damages; but that the penalty which they should incur, if they give evidence falsely, should be an indictment for perjury." It is obvious, upon a reading of the observations, to which we have just referred, that the principle underlying those observations is inapplicable to the facts of the present case. Here, the Petitioner was not examined in a Court of Justice; and he did not make the statement in answer to any question put to him either by any pleader or by the Court, but that he made the statement of his own accord, and most wantonly in respect to an inquiry where such a statement was wholly irrelevant. Here, the Petitioner was not examined in a Court of Justice; and he did not make the statement in answer to any question put to him either by any pleader or by the Court, but that he made the statement of his own accord, and most wantonly in respect to an inquiry where such a statement was wholly irrelevant. We think that neither this case nor any other case which the learned vakil for the Petitioner has called our attention to has any real application to the facts of this case. For these reasons we think that the Petitioner has rightly been convicted, and that this rule must be discharged. We order accordingly.